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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Raw facts are, as such, a meaningless jumble.”
(Joseph Schumpeter, Business Cycles, Vol. I)
Ever since John Maynard Keynes labeled econometrics as “statistical alchemy” rather
than a science (Keynes (1940)), the theory versus empirics debate in economics has been
ongoing. More recently, this debate has been taken up again in the field of development
economics, lanced by the article “Is there too little theory in development economics?”
by Mookherjee (2005). The debate started in view of the multitude of empirical papers
whose relation to economic theory has remained at best unclear. During the last few
years, the role of empirics in economics has been growing, partially due to the increased
possibilities of storing and handling huge data sets. This is reflected for example by the
increase in (partially) empirical papers published in top journals, by the type of work that
Ph.D. students from top graduate schools do or by the number of Nobel Prizes that have
been awarded to empirical researchers in the last decade (Eichengreen (2009)).
However, as unsatisfactory an empirical study without theoretical background may be
considered by many economists, theory that does not explain or that even contradicts
empirical facts is essentially questionable. Econometrics plays an important role in test-
ing hypotheses derived from economic theory, but even more in helping theoretical re-
searchers to find out which questions to ask (Banerjee (2005)). Empirical findings have
often challenged existing theory and they have been a starting point for theoretical anal-
yses. Even the critics of econometrics will not deny that the history of science is full of
examples where empirical findings have preceded and encouraged important theoretical
breakthroughs.
One important motivation for this thesis has been that economic research could greatly
benefit from a close cooperation between theorists and econometricians. To say it in
Koopmans’ words: “Fuller utilization of the concepts and hypotheses of economic theory
[. . . ] as part of the process of observation and measurement promises to be a shorter
1
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road, perhaps even the only possible road [. . . ]”. A simple truth that is still sometimes
forgotten is that “one needs a clear mathematical formulation of the relevant economic
theory before any statistical analysis with economic data can be done” (Maddala (2001)
[The order of words was changed by the author]).
This dissertation consists of four essays from the areas of insurance and international
economics. Their common aim is to create a close link between theory and empirical
analysis. Empirical facts that have called for an extension of existing theory have always
been the starting point for my analyses.
The second link between the essays in this dissertation is the use of micro data. The past
two decades have seen an explosion in the availability of micro data for both firms and
households, mainly due to the increased capacity of electronical storage and a quantum
leap in handling and analyzing large data volumes. This has come along with a shift in
empirical analysis from aggregate models describing markets as a whole to the individual
decision maker. This seems a more natural unit of analysis, as economic decisions are
taken at the individual level and drawing conclusions from aggregate data has to rely on
more (and often unrealistic) assumptions.1
In fact, Chapter 2 of my dissertation, the essay “Who is afraid of political risk?” was
inspired by two empirical papers by Desai, Foley and Hines (Desai et al . (2004) and Desai
et al . (2008)) who investigate how multinational firms choose the capital structure of
their foreign affiliates in response to political risk. They claim that in countries where
political risk is high, multinational enterprises hold a smaller equity share in their foreign
affiliates while at the same time using relatively more debt for financing their affiliates.
When we thought of how to theoretically model this relationship, this prediction seemed
less compelling, especially with regard to the predicted impact of political risk on affiliate
leverage. If political risk increases the risk of expropriation, then this leads to an increased
risk of bankruptcy, and firms should use less debt financing in countries where political
risk is high. We then started to think about whether there might be different types of
political risk such as expropriation, corruption and confiscatory taxation, and how we
could analyze these different types both empirically and theoretically. In our theoretical
analysis we find that, as political risk increases, the ownership share tends to decrease,
because political risk decreases expected profits, whereas leverage can both increase or
decrease, depending on the type of political risk. Only when political risk takes the form
of discriminatory or confiscatory taxation, it will be optimal to finance affiliates with more
debt.
1 Train et al . (1989), chapter 1 and Cameron and Trivedi (2005), chapter 1.
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For our empirical analysis, we use the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) of the
Deutsche Bundesbank, and we find supportive evidence for these effects. We follow two
empirical strategies in order to show that the effects of political risk may differ for different
scenarios of political risk. First, we employ various empirical measures, reflecting different
types of political risk, and identify them with different scenarios. Following this strategy,
we can confirm that the ownership share decreases with political risk no matter what
type of measure we introduce, while leverage can either increase or decrease in response
to different types of risk. The second strategy is to rank the scenarios according to
their severity and to introduce a quadratic function of political risk which allows the
marginal effects of political risk to vary with the severity of political risk. Here, we find
indeed that leverage first increases and then decreases in political risk. For ownership,
it is comparatively more likely than for leverage that the ownership share decreases with
political risk.
Our essay is, to my best knowledge, the first attempt to develop and test theoretical
assumptions of the impact of political risk on the financing of multinational structure
choice. Few thoughts have been spent on what exactly is captured by political risk and
what different types of indices reflect. Further, while the leverage choice of multinational
enterprises has been analyzed frequently, mainly in the area of business taxation, the
ownership share that a parent company will hold in an foreign affiliate has so far received
little attention from econometricians.2
In chapter 3 of my dissertation, “Financial constraints and the margins of FDI”, we analyze
both theoretically and empirically how financial constraints affect a firm’s foreign entry
decision. A brief history of the research preceding our analysis can illustrate how findings
from micro data have deepened the theoretical understanding of economic relationships
and have led to the development of new theories.
In international economics, trade data have traditionally been analyzed on an aggregate
level.3 In particular, the fact that only few firms in each sector engage in exporting
or invest in foreign countries and that these firms differ in many dimensions from their
2 Research on the impact of tax incentives on affiliate leverage includes Desai et al . (2004), Huizinga
et al . (2008), Buettner et al . (2009), and Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005). The reaction of affiliate
leverage to differences in political risk has been analyzed in Desai et al . (2004), Aggarwal and Kyaw
(2004) and Novaes and Werlang (2005). Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) and Javorcik and Wei (2009) are
empirical papers on the ownership choice.
3 An insightful description on how empirical findings on the micro level have altered our understanding
of trade and on how theory has changed in response to empirical findings is provided by Redding
(2008).
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domestic counterparts has lead to the development of models of heterogeneous firms.4
Productivity differences have served as an explanation for the fact that firms which are
active in foreign markets, whether as exporters or as producers, are larger than purely
national firms Helpman et al . (2004).) If there are fixed costs of market entry, only the
most productive firms should be able to overcome these fixed costs.
However, these models completely ignore the financial side of investment: The basic
assumption is that financial markets are perfect, and that firms do not face financial
constraints. Using balance sheet data to analyze differences in financial indicators, empir-
ical papers have started to compare exporters to non-exporters with respect to financial
variables, and they have found that exporters are less financially constrained than their
purely national counterparts. Here, the seminal contribution is a purely theoretical paper
by Chaney (2005). Then, empirical research has started from a more aggregated level with
a paper by Manova (2010) who uses a panel of bilateral exports for countries and sectors
to show that those countries and sectors who are less financially constrained export more.
Next, several empirical papers used micro-level data on the firm-level to show that there
is a negative relationship between financial constraints and a firm’s propensity to engage
in exporting (Greenaway et al . (2007)).
All of the papers about how multinational activity is related to financial constraints have
considered exporting firms. None has attempted to analyze what drives firms’ decisions
to found an affiliate in a foreign country. This is presumably not due to a lack of interest,
but due to a lack of data: Datasets that contained a random sample of firms, national
and multinational, as well as their foreign affiliates, simply did not exist. By merging the
Dafne, a commercial dataset, providing information on a large panel of German firms,
with the Microdatabase Direct Investment of the Deutsche Bundesbank (MiDi), which
provides information on the foreign affiliates of German enterprises, we were able to create
such a dataset. Our data are unique as they allow measuring financial constraints and
productivities at the parent level both for domestic firms and for multinationals, as well
as financial constraints at the affiliate level.
In our theoretical model, we analyze how productivity and financial constraints affect a
firm’s choice to become a multinational firm under conditions of limited internal funds
and the need to obtain external debt finance. Our model features limited contract enforce-
ability and liquidation costs as two sources of inefficiencies in financial contracting that
are particularly relevant for foreign investments. The model provides a set of testable im-
plications concerning the impact of financial constraints, productivity, and host-country
4 Bernard and Jensen (1995) on empirical findings on exporters, Mayer and Ottaviano (2008) on FDI,
and Helpman et al . (2004)
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characteristics on firms’ internationalization choices. In particular, we predict that finan-
cial constraints are more likely to affect the extensive than the intensive margin, unless
financial constraints are severe. Furthermore, we predict that financial constraints are
more strongly felt for large firms, as they are most likely to be interested in foreign ex-
pansion.
In our econometric analysis, we find that productivity and financial constraints have a
significant impact on German firms’ internationalization decisions. Economically, produc-
tivity and financial constraints are of similar importance, but financial constraints matter
most to the subset of firms that consider investing abroad. As suggested by our theoret-
ical model, financial constraints have indeed a negative impact on the extensive margin
of FDI, but less so on the intensive margin. However, we also find that, in contrast to
the parent-level constraints, the affiliate’s financial constraints matter for the intensive
margin. This observation points toward a hierarchy of financing the intensive margin,
with affiliate financing being preferred over parent financing.
Chapter 4, the essay “On the use of information in repeated insurance markets”, was
inspired by a purely empirical paper by Finkelstein and Poterba (2006). They demonstrate
the presence of adverse selection in annuity purchases by showing that there exist “unused
observables”, namely information available to insurance companies that is correlated with
risk experience, but that is not used when setting insurance premia. In their data, the
address of the insured person is an example of information that is almost always collected
by insurance companies, but that is seldom used in pricing insurance, although there is
a correlation between geographic information and other individual attributes. Further
empirical evidence on unused observables is provided by Brown and Finkelstein (2007)
(gender and place of residence in the U.S. long-term care insurance industry) and Ivaldi
(1996) (smoking in the French automobile insurance industry). Finkelstein and Poterba
(2006) conclude their article by stating that “a complete understanding of the limited use
in pricing of available or collectable risk-related information on insurance buyers remains
an open issue”.
However, we are able to explain this phenomenon using a repeated model of an oligopolistic
insurance market where insurance companies take into account the impact of pricing
decisions on competitors’ actions.
In our model, there are two types of individuals who face either high or low risk of damage.
There is a finite number of insurance companies. They can distinguish between these
risks and compete for costumers by setting insurance premia in each period. Companies
interact strategically and preconceive the effect of their pricing decisions on the prices set
by their competitors in subsequent periods. If companies fear a price war after adjusting
their prices, they may refrain from doing so. We show that even if insurance companies
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can distinguish between risk types, equilibria exist in which first, insurance companies
charge the same insurance premium to both risks and second, both risk types purchase
positive amounts of insurance. Thus, we derive an equilibrium with unused observables.
We then show that the same equilibrium outcome is possible if insurance companies cannot
distinguish between high and low risks, i.e. if there is asymmetric information. This
renders possible the following explanation for the existence of unused observables: initially,
there exists a collusive equilibrium in an insurance market with asymmetric information.
Then, after analyzing their data, insurance companies learn how to distinguish between
high and low risks. However, they maintain their pricing schedules in order to sustain
collusion. Further, we show the robustness of our model with regard to two extensions:
Market entry and explicit collusion.
With regard to this chapter of my dissertation, two further points seem worth to be
mentioned in connection with the combination of theory and empirics and with regard to
the use of micro data: First, although empirical work seems to suggest that the common
market structure in most insurance markets is oligopolistic, the vast majority of theoretical
models on the insurance market are one-shot models of either perfect competition or
monopolistic behaviour of insurance companies.5 Empirical evidence suggests that more
work should be devoted to imperfectly competitive models of insurance markets - or, in
the words of Chiappori et al. (2006), “there is a crying need for such models”.
Second, the use of information in the insurance market itself has been changed dramati-
cally by the revolution in information technologies which enables insurance companies to
collect, analyze and make use of large amounts of information. An example of evolving
information that has recently received a lot of attention is that of genetic testing (Hoy and
Witt 2007, Hoy and Polborn 2000, Rees and Apps 2008). A promising field of research
for theorists and econometricians will be to analyze how insurance companies will use this
information, how they will cope with its constant change, and how this will be affected
by the competitive structure of the insurance market.
Chapter 5, the essay “What if everybody had a choice?” addresses a topical public policy
question by applying appropriate econometric methods to a specially designed survey. It
contributes to the discussion on Medicare Part D by using a hypothetical choice experi-
5 Concentration indices for the top 5 insurance companies in the non-life business in Europe in 2002
ranged from 27 percent in Germany to 89 percent in Finland (Buzzaccki and Valletti 2005). Concentra-
tion measures of the life insurance sector in most developed nations in the 1990s have been constantly
high: even in the USA, the least concentrated market, concentration indices for the top 5 insurance
companies have been above 25 percent, while they have been (far) above 50 percent in Australia,
Canada, Japan and the Netherlands (Bikker and van Leuvensteijn 2008). Market concentration is also
reflected in insurance premiums (Dafny et al . (2009)).
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ment that was conducted using a random sample of the relevant population in order to
analyze the demand for drug insurance with different levels of coverage.
In 2006, Medicare Part D, a highly subsidized market for prescription drugs for the elderly,
was newly introduced in the US. Before the introduction of Medicare Part D, prescription
drug insurance had not been part of the 43 million elderly and disabled U.S. residents
on Medicare. Some beneficiaries had coverage from some other source, but about a third
of the relevant population remained without prescription drug insurance which imposed
a high financial burden on the elderly and led to cost-related non-adherence (McFadden
et al . (2008) and Madden et al . (2008)). Medicare Part D has been the largest single
expansion in social insurance in the US since 1965, and it is often used as a natural
experiment to study the optimal design of social insurance programs. Lessons from this
experiment will be crucial both for deciding whether to introduce universal health care
in the USA and for the design of social insurance programs in other countries. Part D
also gives important insights into the practicality of Consumer Directed Health Care, an
approach achieving efficient allocation of health care resources by confronting consumers
with the full marginal cost of the services they use. Medicare Part D can further give
insights in how consumers behave in real-world decision situations that are characterized
by complexity, ambiguity and important consequences.
Therefore, a lively discussion of the consequences of Medicare Part D has taken place in
numerous studies in economics and health. Most of these studies have restricted their
analysis to the relatively small group of “active deciders”: those consumers who had no
prescription drug coverage before the introduction of Medicare Part D. However, many
other groups of consumers were affected by the introduction of Medicare Part D. 6 We show
that these groups differ significantly from the active deciders with respect to their health
and socio-economic characteristics, but also with respect to their insurance demand.
Our essay contributes to the discussion about Medicare Part D by using a hypothetical
choice experiment that was conducted using a random sample of the relevant population
to analyze consumer demand. Thus, the whole potential market is included in the analy-
sis instead of restricting the focus to a small group of consumers. In hypothetical choice
experiments, individuals are asked to choose between different commodities whose at-
tributes vary in order to infer the utility associated with these attributes and consumers’
willingness-to-pay. Here, respondents are asked to choose between insurance contracts
that differ in their level of coverage.
6 For example those who had some privately bought or employer sponsored coverage before or those on
Medicaid. Many consumers were not given an equally free choice regarding their insurance coverage
- as for example the consumers who were eligible for both, Medicaid and Medicare, and who were
automatically enrolled and randomly assigned to prescription drug plans.
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So far, hypothetical choice experiments have mainly been used to create variation in
product attributes. We want to draw attention to the fact that they can be used to
elicit the demand of consumer groups whose choices cannot be observed in the actual
market. This becomes important when making predictions about the impacts of policy
changes. As we observe actual choices for one group of consumers, we can estimate a joint
model using both real and hypothetical choices, thereby mitigating the shortcomings of a
separate analysis of real and hypothetical choices.7
We find that willingness-to-pay for drug insurance is low for consumers with either low
expected drug costs or low income. On the other hand, consumers demand extensive
coverage if they are currently in poor health, expect high future drug costs, but also if they
are risk averse. These findings conflict with consumers’ real choices where neither health
nor socio-economic indicators prove significant. A possible reason for this discrepancy is
that the active deciders for whom we observe actual choices are too homogeneous. In
order to analyze the impact of socio-economic conditions on insurance demand we need
to consider sufficiently heterogeneous consumer groups, which is possible through our
hypothetical choice experiment. Further, we show that willingness-to-pay of the passive
participants is significantly higher than those of the active deciders. Therefore, welfare
estimates of the introduction of Medicare Part D taking into account the active deciders
only might be too low.
The introduction of Medicare Part D can also serve as an example on how empirical and
theoretical research can have important policy implications: First, the market itself was
designed taking into consideration lessons from economic theory: With regard to the de-
mand side, the government has designed a standard insurance contract for this market
that has features that are supposed to overcome adverse selection and excessive use of
medications. On the supply side, the government has designed an auction mechanism
that provides incentives for insurance companies to pass bulk discounts that they receive
from pharmaceutical companies through to consumers. In order to evaluate market out-
comes researchers have used consumer surveys and data from insurance companies and
the government. Well-designed hypothetical choices experiments can help to predict im-
pacts of policy changes and to generalize findings from one specific consumer group to
other groups of the population.
For each chapter of my dissertation, I have pointed to some open questions for future
research. In the following years, my scientific agenda will be to reassume these lines of
research on important applied questions in close connection with theory. A very promis-
7 Strength and shortcomings of real and hypothetical choice data are discussed in detail in chapter 5.3
of this thesis.
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ing field for this type of research is to apply dynamic and/ or imperfectly competitive
models from industrial organization to the fields of health and insurance. Few theoretical
researchers have been active in this field so far, and the amount of data that becomes
available to researchers in this area is increasing steadily. One present project is to ex-
tend the essay “Real versus financial constraints to multinational activity” by analyzing
the decision to enter a foreign market via exports and/ or FDI in the presence of financial
constraints. In another present project, we combine the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
model with a dynamic framework in which consumers can exert preventive effort in several
periods in order to reduce their risk of damage, exhibit hyperbolic discounting and suffer
from a non-monetary loss in case of (health) damage. Thus, we are able to overcome some
features of standard models which contradict empirical findings.
Chapter 2
Who is afraid of political risk?
Multinational firms and their choice of capital
structure∗
2.1 Introduction
Multinational enterprises (MNE) have to adapt their optimal investment strategy to local
conditions worldwide. Most notably, they have to respond to different political environ-
ments that in different locations may give rise to varying political risks. Political risk
encompasses not only ‘sovereign risk’, the risk that the sovereign will interfere with a
firm’s ability to pay its investors as promised, but also other forms of political, economic
and country-specific risks that affect the profitability of an investment in a foreign coun-
try and that would not be present if the country had more stable and developed business
environment and legal institutions (Hill (1998) and Buckley (2003)). This risk ranges
from outright expropriation to more subtle forms like confiscatory taxation, corruption,
or economic constraints such as exchange rate controls. MNE can try to insure against
political risk, but they can never do so fully.8
In this chapter we investigate, both theoretically and empirically, the way MNE choose
their capital structure in response to political risk. For this purpose, we distinguish
different types of political risk. We find that it is important to identify the type that
prevails in a particular country, because different types of risk affect the optimal financing
decision in different ways.
We focus on two choice variables that determine the capital structure - the level of leverage
and the ownership structure of the foreign affiliate. Choosing higher leverage reduces tax
∗ This chapter is based on joint work with Monika Schnitzer.
8 First, the insurance market for political risk is incomplete because most types of political risk are not
contractible and because the market suffers from severe asymmetric information (see for example Desai
et al . (2008)). Second, many investors are unaware of the existence of political risk insurance and even
those who are aware of its existence often do not have such insurance (www.political-risk.net).
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payments but increases the risk of bankruptcy, involving some bankruptcy cost. The
investor balances optimally these costs and benefits of debt financing. Furthermore, he
chooses how much of the affiliate to sell to outside investors, taking into account how the
ownership structure affects the agency costs and the value of the affiliate.
We distinguish three prototypes of political risk throughout the chapter.9 In Scenario
I, political risk takes the form of outright expropriation or nationalization, where the
investor loses all assets and can no longer service his debts. In the past, this type of
political risk used to be very important (Kobrin (1980), Andersson (1991)). Though in
general it seems to be less prevalent nowadays there are very recent examples indicating
its latent relevance.10
Scenario II captures political risk as a form of creeping expropriation that lowers the
expected returns of the project. Examples could be lack of protection for intellectual
property rights or unreliable contract enforcement, but could also be economic constraints
like currency or exchange rate controls, or particular regulatory requirements directed at
foreign multinationals. Political violence that negatively affects market conditions and
hence expected revenues would be another example.
In Scenario III, we capture political risk that directly affects the profits of the investment,
i.e., after servicing potential debt payments. This type of political risk arises if the host
country imposes discriminatory and confiscatory taxation, asks for bribes or blocks the
repatriation of funds from the host country to the home country.
Our analysis shows that these different forms of political risk affect equity holders and
debt holders in different ways and can therefore result in the multinational choosing
different capital structures. We find that the optimal debt level decreases with increasing
political risk in both Scenarios I and II because (creeping) expropriation increases the risk
of bankruptcy, which calls for smaller leverage. But the optimal debt level increases with
political risk in Scenario III because the negative effects of discriminatory or confiscatory
taxation can be contained with higher leverage. Furthermore, we find that, in all three
scenarios, the optimal ownership share tends to decrease as the level of political risk
increases because political risk reduces the investor’s expected returns from the foreign
affiliate, but does not reduce the managerial cost of running the firm. Interestingly,
9 For a description of various forms of political risks see Buckley (2003), Hill (1998).
10 Recent examples where expropriations have taken place are Zimbabwe and Venezuela. In 2007, a law
was adopted in Zimbabwe that forces foreign investors to find a majority Zimbabwean shareholder
within five to ten years (compare for example Deutsche Presse Agentur (2007) or Voice of America
(2008)). In 2008, both Cemex, a Mexican cement company, and Sidor, Venezuela’s biggest producer
of steel, were expropriated by the Venezuelan government without paying appropriate compensation
(compare for example The Associated Press (2008), Romero (2008), or Ackerman (2008)).
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though, due to the interaction with the optimal debt choice, the ownership share reduction
is less pronounced in case of confiscatory taxation, where the debt level increases, as
compared to the case of (creeping) expropriation, where the debt level is reduced as a
response to political risk.
In our empirical analysis, we use the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) of the
Deutsche Bundesbank to investigate the impact of political risk on both the choice of
ownership shares and the leverage of foreign affiliates of German multinationals. The
dataset contains balance sheet information on the foreign affiliates. German parent com-
panies are required by law to report this information when the balance sheet total of
the affiliate and the ownership share are larger than a certain threshold. As a measure
for political risk, we use the time-varying, country-specific index that is provided by the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and that is composed of 12 weighted variables
covering both political and social attributes.
We estimate the impact of political risk on our two choice variables, ownership share
and leverage. We start by looking at the linear effects of political risk. Our ownership
regression indicates that MNEs hold a smaller share of the equity of the foreign affiliate
when political risk is high, confirming our theoretical predictions. Regarding the leverage
choice, we find that affiliates of MNE use a higher level of debt in countries with a higher
level of political risk. This would suggest the prevalence of the less invasive Scenario III
type of political risk.
We then attempt to capture the theoretical insight that the effects of political risk may
differ for different scenarios of political risk. For this purpose we follow two different
strategies. One strategy is to employ various empirical measures, reflecting different types
of political risk, and to identify them with different scenarios. Following this strategy of
using different measures we can confirm that the ownership share decreases in political
risk no matter what type of measure we introduce, while leverage can either increase or
decrease in response to different types of risk. The second strategy is to rank the scenarios
according to their severity and to introduce a quadratic function of political risk which
allows the marginal effects of political risk to vary with the severity of political risk.
Following this approach, we find that indeed leverage first increases and then decreases
in political risk. For ownership, it is comparatively more likely that the ownership share
decreases with political risk.
Our essay is related to two strands of literature, the literature on political risk and the
literature on the capital structure choice.
The first strand studies the effects of political risk on foreign direct investment. The
early theoretical papers were primarily concerned with the question of how foreign direct
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investment can be sustained if there is a risk of nationalization. The seminal paper in
this literature is Eaton and Gersovitz (1983), which shows under what circumstances
reputation can sustain foreign direct investment. Other papers study how political risk
affects the multinational’s investment strategy. This may induce the investor to choose an
inefficient technology (Eaton and Gersovitz (1984)), inefficient investment paths (Thomas
and Worrall (1994), and Schnitzer (1999)) or excess capacity (Janeba (2000)). More recent
papers have investigated the sale of shares to locals as a possible way of mitigating the
risk of confiscatory taxation or creeping expropriation (Konrad and Lommerud (2001),
Mueller and Schnitzer (2006)). However, none of these authors have allowed for different
forms of political risk that impact on the investor’s decisions in different ways. Empirical
studies have focussed on the question of how country characteristics affect the ownership
structure in foreign direct investment projects (Asiedu and Esfahani (2001)).
The second strand of literature has so far mainly focused on taxes as the driving force
behind the capital structure choice. It has been shown both empirically and theoretically
that tax incentives lead to national differences in the level of leverage of affiliates of MNE
(see for example Desai et al . (2004), Huizinga et al . (2008), Buettner et al . (2009) and
Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005)). However, there is much less evidence on how differing
levels of political risk may affect the capital structure of affiliates that are located in
different countries. For US-data, Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) find that political risk
increases affiliate leverage. Aggarwal and Kyaw (2004) also use US data, but on a more
aggregated level. In contrast to Desai, Foley and Hines, they find that political risk
reduces affiliate leverage. Novaes and Werlang (2005) study foreign affiliates in Brazil
and find that they are more highly leveraged than their Brazilian counterparts and that
the difference increases with Brazil’s political risk. This conflicting evidence suggests that
the relationship between political risk and leverage is not straightforward and hence needs
more examination.
The contribution of our essay is twofold. Firstly, it provides a theoretical framework that
explicitly models the choice of the capital structure in response to political risk. It is also
the first attempt to distinguish in a theoretical framework different kinds of political risk.
Secondly, our essay contributes to the empirical literature on political risk by investigating
the impact of political risk on both leverage and ownership choices, and by distinguishing
the impact of different types and magnitudes of political risk. As our theoretical analysis
suggests, the coefficient measuring the impact of political risk on leverage may indeed
change signs, depending on the type of political risk. We find this possibility of different
coefficients confirmed in our empirical analysis.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces our theoretical
model and analyzes the optimal financial structure in the baseline model. Section 2.3
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introduces different types of political risk and investigates the optimal financial structure
in the presence of political risk. In section 2.4, we derive empirical predictions. Section
2.5 introduces the data set. In Section 2.6 we present our empirical results. Section 2.7
concludes.
2.2 The base line model
Consider a multinational investor who intends to invest a fixed amount I in a foreign
location. The project generates a stochastic return R, with R being uniformly distributed
on the interval [0, R¯]. The investment can be financed with either debt, D, or equity, E,
or a combination of the two, such that E +D = I.
The investor has to take two decisions, he has to choose (i) how much debt finance D to
use as opposed to equity finance and (ii) what share α of the affiliate to keep for himself,
i.e., what share (1 − α) of the affiliate to sell to outside investors. In the corporate
finance literature, these decisions have always been studied separately. Thus, to jointly
investigate both decisions, we set up a model that draws on both strands of the corporate
finance literature, the one on the debt versus equity decision and the one on the optimal
ownership share.
Leverage choice
To model the debt versus equity choice, we consider the well established tradeoff that
debt financing saves on tax payments but increases the probability of bankruptcy, giving
rise to potential dead weight losses.11 To capture this tradeoff, we assume that in case of
debt financing D the investor’s liability is restricted to the investment project. So if the
investor takes up debt D, he owes (1 + r)D, where r denotes the interest rate. He can do
so only when the project is sufficiently successful, i.e., generates returns R ≥ (1 + r)D.
The remaining profits, after interest payments have been deducted, are subject to local
taxation, at interest rate t. If the returns are not sufficient to cover the repayment, the
project is liquidated and the investor has to give up all the returns to the bank. The
affiliate’s value V for a given level of D is thus
V =
∫ R¯
(1+r)D
(1− t)[R− (1 + r)D] 1
R¯
dR +D − I (2.1)
11 In the corporate finance literature, this tradeoff is often called the tradeoff between interest tax shields
and the costs of financial distress. See, e.g., Brealey and Myers (2000), pp. 496 ff. Seminal papers on
this issue are Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), and Scott (1976).
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Banks are assumed to operate in a competitive market and to be risk neutral. This means
that, for any level of debt that the investor wants the bank to finance, the interest rate
r is chosen such that the bank can expect to break even. We assume that in case of
bankruptcy transaction costs are incurred during the bankruptcy procedure such that the
bank is able to seize only some share s of the returns that are generated, with s < 1.
This assumption is supposed to capture the dead weight loss that is associated with debt
financing due to the risk of bankruptcy. The interest rate is implicitly defined by the
bank’s break even condition∫ R¯
(1+r)D
(1 + r)D
1
R¯
dR +
∫ (1+r)D
0
sR
1
R¯
dR = D (2.2)
where the first integral represents the expected interest payments and the second integral
represents the expected payoff the bank realizes in case of bankruptcy.
Ownership choice
Consider now the ownership choice of the investor, i.e. what share (1− α) of the foreign
affiliate to sell to outside investors. If financial markets are competitive and perfect, i.e.
with no transaction costs and risk neutrality, then the assets will be valued by outside
investors at their expected value. So the price the investor realizes for selling a share of
(1 − α) of the affiliate, P ((1 − α)V ), is equal to (1 − α)V .12 We will discuss below how
things change if markets are not perfect, in particular if the exposure of outside investors
to political risk differs from that of insiders.
To model the ownership decision, we draw again on the corporate finance literature. In
this literature, two potential effects are discussed why (and how) the ownership choice
may affect the firm’s value. The convergence-of-interest hypothesis predicts that larger
ownership stakes are associated with higher firm values, because they allow for a bet-
ter alignment of the incentives of owner and manager or inside and outside investors.13
The entrenchment hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that insiders who control a
substantial part of the shares may indulge in non-value maximizing behavior at the cost
of outside investors.14 Empirical studies on this issue suggest that the firm value as a
function of the insider’s ownership share α follows an inverted u-shaped pattern. This
evidence has been interpreted such that the convergence-of-interest effect dominates for
low and the entrenchment effect for large values of α.15
12 See, for example, Ross (1977).
13 Berle and Means (1932), Jensen et al . (1976).
14 Demsetz (1983), Fama and Jensen (1983).
15 See, e.g., Morck et al . (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Short and Keasey (1999).
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Following the convergence-of-interest hypothesis we assume that the investor increases his
effort as α increases, at cost K(α), with K ′(α) > 0 and K ′′(α) > 0, as larger ownership
stakes imply more effort to be spent on the firm. Following the entrenchment hypothesis,
we assume that the investor enjoys private benefits B(α) that increase in α, i.e. B′(α) > 0,
but at a decreasing rate, i.e. B′′(α) < 0. The combination of effort and entrenchment
effects are reflected in the revenues of the affiliate that can be appropriated by the investors
in the following way: R¯ is an inverted u-shaped function of α, with R¯′(α) > 0 for α = 0,
R¯′′(α) < 0 and R¯′(αˆ) = 0 for 0 < αˆ < 1.
The investor’s payoff function from holding equity share α, selling equity share (1 − α)
and experiencing private benefits and costs can thus be summarized as follows:
U(D,α) = αV (D,α)+P [(1−α)V (D,α)]+B(α)−K(α) = V (D,α)+B(α)−K(α)(2.3)
The investor chooses both the optimal debt level D and the optimal ownership share α
in order to maximize his payoff function.
The optimal financial structure
We now turn to solving the base line model without political risk. For this, consider again
the investor’s payoff function, which, using the specification of the firm value in equation
(2.1), is
U(D,α) = V (D,α) +B(α)−K(α) (2.4)
=
∫ R¯(α)
(1+r)D
(1− t)[R− (1 + r)D] 1
R¯(α)
dR +D − I +B(α)−K(α) (2.5)
=
1− t
R¯(α)
[
1
2
R¯2(α)− (1 + r)DR¯(α) + 1
2
(1 + r)2D2
]
+D − I +B(α)−K(α)
Using equation (2.2) we can rewrite the payoff function in the following way (see Ap-
pendix)
U(D,α) = (1−t)
[
1
2
R¯(α)− (1− s)(1 + r)
2− s D
]
+
1− s+ t
2− s D−I+B(α)−K(α) .(2.6)
The investor’s maximization problem is characterized by the following two first order
conditions.
dU
dα
= (1− t)
[
1
2
dR¯
dα
− 1− s
2− sD
dr
dR¯
dR¯
dα
]
+B′ −K ′ = 0 (2.7)
dU
dD
= −(1− t)1− s
2− s
[
(1 + r) +
dr
dD
D
]
+
1− s+ t
2− s = 0 (2.8)
The following result summarizes the solution to this maximization problem:
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Result 1 The investor’s maximum payoff is
U∗(D∗, α∗) =
R¯(α∗)
2
1− s+ st
1− s+ t − I +B(α
∗)−K(α∗) (2.9)
where α∗ is implicitly defined by[
1− s+ st
1− s+ t
]
1
2
dR¯
dα
+B′ −K ′ = 0 (2.10)
and D∗ is given by
D∗ =
R¯
2
t
2(1− s) + st
(1− s+ t)2 (2.11)
Proof: See Appendix
The following result summarizes the comparative statics with respect to the local taxation
rate t.
Result 2 The optimal debt level D∗ increases as the local tax rate t increases.
dD∗
dt
=
R¯(1− s)2
(1− s+ t)3 > 0 (2.12)
The optimal ownership share α∗ decreases as t increases, if R¯′ > 0 in the relevant param-
eter range, i.e.
dα∗
dt
=
[
(1−s)2
(1−s+t)2
]
1
2
dR¯
dα[
1−s+st
1−s+t
]
1
2
d2R¯
dα2
+B′′ −K ′′ < 0 if R¯
′ > 0. (2.13)
Proof: See Appendix
Result 2 shows the expected pattern for the optimal debt level: as the tax rate increases,
the debt level increases. It is also straightforward to show that dD∗
ds
> 0, i.e. as the
inefficiency of bankruptcy decreases, the optimal debt level increases. This captures the
well established tradeoff of debt versus equity financing. For the ownership share, we find
that α decreases if R¯′ > 0 in the relevant parameter range, which, as equation 2.10 shows,
is the case if B′ < K ′, i.e. unless the entrenchment benefits are particularly large.
2.3 Political risk and the optimal financial structure
Consider now that the investment project is subject to political risk in the foreign location.
To study how this affects the firm’s financial structure, we distinguish different forms of
political risk.
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(1) Expropriation
The first type of political risk we consider is expropriation or nationalization. This is the
classic form of political risk where a sovereign simply takes property without compensation
(Buckley (2003), Hill (1998)). We capture this form of political risk by assuming that
the investment is expropriated with some probability pi1, i.e. the investors lose control
and cash flow rights from the investment. This leads to the following modified firm value
function.
V1 = (1− pi1)
∫ R¯
(1+r)D
(1− t)[R− (1 + r)D] 1
R¯
dR +D − I (2.14)
Credits are serviced only if the investment is not expropriated. So the zero profit condition
for banks needs to be modified. This is captured by the following condition.
(1− pi1)
[∫ R¯
(1+r)D
(1 + r)D
1
R¯
dR +
∫ (1+r)D
0
sR
1
R¯
dR
]
= D (2.15)
Of course, if the investment is expropriated, the investor also loses his benefits from
potential entrenchment, B(α). His managerial effort costs of running the firm are incurred
before the potential expropriation takes place and hence are not affected. Thus, the
investor’s payoff function is now
U1(D,α, pi1) = (1−pi1)
∫ R¯
(1+r)D
(1−t)[R−(1+r)D] 1
R¯
dR+D−I+(1−pi1)B(α)−K(α)(2.16)
This payoff function implicitly assumes that outside investors, no matter where they
are located, are affected by the danger of expropriation in exactly the same way as the
multinational investor. Of course, there may be circumstances where they are better
protected against expropriation, e.g. because they are local investors and the government
compensates them for their losses. In this case their perceived value of the affiliate is
not as negatively affected as the multinational investor’s perceived value. We will discuss
below how this affects our results.
(2) Creeping Expropriation
Another form of political risk we consider is creeping expropriation or political violence
that negatively affects the expected returns of the investment project. Other examples
would be currency or exchange rate restrictions, or a failure to enforce or respect the
agreed property and contract rights (Buckley (2003), Hill (1998)). We capture this by
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assuming that the investor can capture only a share (1− pi2) of the returns R. This leads
to the following modified firm value function.
V2 =
∫ R¯
(1+r)D
1−pi2
(1− t)[(1− pi2)R− (1 + r)D] 1
R¯
dR +D − I (2.17)
The expected returns of the investment project also affect the zero profit condition for
banks that needs to be modified in the following way.∫ R¯
(1+r)D
(1−pi2)
(1 + r)D
1
R¯
dR +
∫ (1+r)D
(1−pi2)
0
s(1− pi2)R 1
R¯
dR = D (2.18)
As above, also creeping expropriation jeopardizes the investor’s chances of enjoying ben-
efits from entrenchment but leaves managerial effort cost unaffected. Thus, the investor’s
payoff function is now
U2(D,α, pi2) =
∫ R¯
(1+r)D
(1−pi2)
(1−t)[(1−pi2)R−(1+r)D] 1
R¯
dR+D−I+(1−pi2)B(α)−K(α)(2.19)
We now investigate how political risk affects the optimal financial structure. The following
result describes how the investor chooses the optimal ownership share and the optimal debt
level in the presence of (creeping) expropriation. Interestingly, we find that both types
of political risk, expropriation and creeping expropriation, affect the financial structure
and the investor’s payoff in the same way. Thus, we can state the following results for Ui,
where the subscript i = {1, 2} captures both cases, the case of expropriation (1) and the
case of creeping expropriation (2).
Result 3 The investor’s maximum payoff in case of (creeping) expropriation is
U∗i (D
∗
i , α
∗
i ) = (1− pii)
R¯(α∗)
2
1− s+ st
1− s+ t − I + (1− pii)B(α
∗)−K(α∗) (2.20)
where α∗i is implicitly defined by
(1− pii)
[
1− s+ st
1− s+ t
1
2
dR¯
dα
+B′
]
−K ′ = 0 (2.21)
and D∗i is given by
D∗i = (1− pii)
R¯
2
t
2(1− s) + st
(1− s+ t)2 (2.22)
Proof: See Appendix
We now determine the comparative statics with respect to the political risk parameter pii,
with i = {1, 2}.
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Result 4 Both the optimal debt level and the optimal ownership share decrease as (creep-
ing) expropriation increases
dD∗i
dpii
= −R¯
2
t
(2(1− s) + st)
(1− s+ t)2 < 0 (2.23)
dα∗i
dpii
=
(1−s+st)
(1−s+t)
1
2
dR¯
dα
+B′
(1− pii)
[
1−s+st
(1−s+t)
1
2
d2R¯
dα2
+B′′
]
−K ′′
< 0 (2.24)
Proof: See Appendix
For a given debt level, the risk of expropriation makes it less likely that interest payments
are made. This has to be compensated by a higher interest rate, which in turn increases
the risk of bankruptcy. As a consequence, the investor chooses a smaller debt level. In
case of creeping expropriation, overall revenues are smaller, increasing the likelihood of
bankruptcy for any given level of debt. This leads to the same reduction of the optimal
debt level. Thus, in both cases, the problem is that (creeping) expropriation increases the
risk of default. To avoid costly dead weight losses the investor reduces his debt exposure.
With the same debt level, the overall payoff of the investor is the same, for any given
ownership share. (Creeping) expropriation reduces the monetary and non-monetary payoff
from the investment but does not change the managerial effort cost of running the firm.
Thus, the investor optimally lowers his ownership share. This effect would be even larger
if outside investors were less exposed to political risk and hence would value the foreign
affiliate more highly.16
Desai et al . (2008), who find empirically that debt is higher in high political risk countries,
have argued that credits taken by local creditors may not react as much to political risk
because local creditors may be more restricted in their choice of investment opportunities.
The empirical evidence does, however, suggest that local interest rates react positively to
political risk (Desai et al . (2004), Aggarwal and Kyaw (2004)).
(3) Confiscatory taxation
Our third scenario captures the type of political risk that directly affects the multina-
tional’s profits. Examples would be the blocking of the repatriation of funds from the
16 This effect will also be larger if the allocation of ownership rights can be used as a means of influencing
the likelihood of nationalization. As Konrad and Lommerud (2001) and Schnitzer (2002) have shown,
it could be in the interest of the investor to share ownership with host country firms, even without
compensation, if this makes the host country less prone to engage in expropriation or confiscatory
taxation.
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host country to the home country, or corruption and discriminatory and confiscatory tax-
ation that treats foreign firms differently from domestic firms (Buckley (2003)). We model
this as a form of profit tax, i.e., interest payments can be deducted and are not subject
to taxation or bribes. This scenario is particularly relevant if credits are obtained locally
and hence the local government has no interest in jeopardizing the repayment of local
credits.
The affiliate’s value is thus given by
V3 =
∫ R¯
(1+r)D
(1− t− pi3)[R− (1 + r)D] 1
R¯
dR +D − I (2.25)
This type of political risk has no impact on the zero profit condition for banks, provided
that the government indeed exempts the interest payments from discriminatory taxation.
Thus the break even condition for the bank is the same as in the baseline model∫ R¯
(1+r)D
(1 + r)D
1
R¯
dR +
∫ (1+r)D
0
sR
1
R¯
dR = D . (2.26)
As this type of political risk applies to profits rather then revenues, the private benefits of
the investor, B(α), are not likely to be affected, nor is the managerial effort cost, K(α).
This implies the following payoff function:
U3(D,α, pi3) =
∫ R¯
(1+r)D
(1− t− pi3)[R− (1 + r)D] 1
R¯
dR (2.27)
+D − I +B(α)−K(α)
The following result describes how the investor chooses the optimal ownership share and
the optimal debt level as a function of political risk.
Result 5 The investor’s maximum payoff is
U∗3 (D
∗
3, α
∗
3) =
R¯(α∗3)
2
1− s+ s(t+ pi3)
1− s+ (t+ pi3) − I +B(α
∗
3)−K(α∗3) (2.28)
where α∗3 is implicitly defined by[
1− s+ s(t+ pi3)
(1− s+ t+ pi3)
]
1
2
dR¯
dα
+B′ −K ′ = 0 (2.29)
and D∗3 is given by
D∗3 =
R¯
2
(t+ pi3)
2(1− s) + s(t+ pi3)
(1− s+ (t+ pi3))2 (2.30)
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Proof: See Appendix
We can now determine the comparative statics with respect to political risk pi3.
Result 6 The optimal debt level increases as confiscatory taxation increases.
dD∗3
dpi3
=
R¯(1− s)2
(1− s+ t+ pi3)3 > 0 (2.31)
The optimal ownership share α∗3 decreases if R¯′ > 0 in the relevant parameter range, i.e.
dα∗3
dpi3
=
[
(1−s)2
(1−s+t+pi3)2
]
1
2
dR¯
dα[
1−s+s(t+pi3)
1−s+t+pi3
]
1
2
d2R¯
dα2
+B′′ −K ′′
< 0 if R¯′ > 0 (2.32)
Proof: See Appendix
Note that although the value functions in case of expropriation (2.14) and confiscatory
taxation (2.25) look very similar, the break even conditions for the banks (2.15 and
2.26) look different. In contrast to the case of (creeping) expropriation, confiscatory
taxation does not affect the investor’s ability to repay his debt and hence does not increase
the likelihood of bankruptcy. Thus, it avoids the extra cost of capital that comes with
potential bankruptcy. Instead, confiscatory taxation induces the investor to choose a
higher debt level to avoid this drain on profits. As pointed out above, this strategy is
particularly worthwhile if debt holders are not negatively affected and hence do not have
to increase interest rates.17
The optimal ownership share is likely to decrease as confiscatory taxation increases, pro-
vided R¯′ > 0, which, according to the first order condition that implicitly defines α∗3, is
the case if B′(α∗3) < K ′(α∗3).
We can summarize the findings from our theoretical analysis as follows:
For the optimal debt level, we find that the effects depend on the type of political risk. In
scenario (1) and (2) the effects were negative. Only in scenario (3) did we find a positive
effect of political risk on the optimal debt level. The effect of political risk on ownership
share tends to be negative in all three scenarios. Only in scenario (3) could it be positive,
and only if the benefits from the entrenchment effect are particularly large.
17 Note that if our interpretation is correct then we should observe more debt default in case of full or
creeping expropriation, but not in case of confiscatory taxation. Although we have no direct evidence
on the number of defaults, there is suggestive evidence from interest rates that is consistent with our
interpretation. Desai et al . (2004) report in Table V that interest rates react positively to political risk,
but negatively to country tax rates. To the extent that confiscatory taxation has a similar effect as
taxation in general, this supports our implication that the likelihood of default differs in the different
scenarios.
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Result 7 The optimal ownership share reacts more negatively to (creeping) expropriation
than to confiscatory taxation.
dα∗1/2
dpi1/2
<
dα∗3
dpi
(2.33)
Proof: See Appendix
This is due to the interaction with the optimal debt choice. The ownership share reduction
is smaller in case of confiscatory taxation, where the debt level increases, than in case of
(creeping) expropriation, where the debt level is reduced as a response to political risk.
2.4 Empirical predictions
We now turn to the predictions that can be derived from our theoretical analysis. The
following predictions capture the results 4 and 6.
Hypothesis 1 The effect of political risk on the affiliate’s debt level is negative in the
case of (creeping) expropriation and positive in the case of confiscatory taxation.
Hypothesis 2 The effect of political risk on the ownership share is negative in the case
of (creeping) expropriation and tends to be negative in the case of confiscatory taxation.
The problem of directly testing these hypotheses is that it may be difficult to identify
empirically which type of political risk is present. An alternative approach would be to
rank the different political risk scenarios according to their severity. It seems natural to
argue that the first two scenarios of (creeping) expropriation capture a more severe type
of political risk because they describe situations where political risk increases the risk of
bankruptcy, whereas the third scenario describes a situation where political risk is less
severe, because it affects the profitability of the investment only, without jeopardizing
the survival of the affiliate and hence without imposing additional dead weight losses.
Following this approach, we can state the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 The more severe the political risk, the more likely the debt level will be
negatively affected.
Similarly, we can formulate our hypothesis about the ownership share.
Hypothesis 4 The more severe the political risk, the more likely the ownership share will
be negatively affected.
Result 6 also allows us to compare the relative reactions of leverage and ownership share
to political risk. Whereas the reaction of debt is always positive in case of confiscatory
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taxation, this is possible for the ownership share but not necessary. From this, we derive
the following prediction.
Hypothesis 5 The ownership share is more likely to react negatively to political risk than
the debt level.
Finally, we include one prediction about the impact of taxation on the level of debt and
the ownership share, based on Result 2.
Hypothesis 6 The effect of taxation is positive on the optimal debt level and it tends to
be negative on the ownership share.
2.5 Data
The empirical analysis presented in section 2.6 is based on the Microdatabase Direct
Investment (MiDi) of the Deutsche Bundesbank. The database contains a panel dataset
of yearly firm-level information on German parent companies and their foreign affiliates
for the period 1996-2006. The parents are required by law to report information on
their investments abroad and on the financial characteristics of their foreign affiliates if
the balance sheet total of the affiliate and the ownership share are larger than a certain
threshold that varies over time (Lipponer (2006)).
The MiDi contains 469,332 observations with yearly observations over 11 years. As we
are interested in outward FDI, we exclude all observations on inward FDI. This leaves
303,870 observations that represent affiliate-year cells. Affiliates can be present more than
once a year if several parent companies report on them. Dropping all affiliates that are
present more than once in one year leaves 292,494 observations. Deleting all “indirect”
FDI leaves 208,441 observations. Deleting all firms that report negative equity removes
another 21,489 observations from our dataset.18 Thus, the final dataset comprises 186,952
observations.
In each year, our sample consists of about 5,000 to 8,000 German parents and of about
15,000 to 24,500 foreign affiliates (compare Table 2.1). The affiliates are located in more
than 140 countries.
We augment the MiDi dataset by country-level information. As a measure of political
risk, we use the time-varying International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index provided by
18 These are cases of ownership chains where dependent companies of German parents invest in other
companies.
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Table 2.1: Overview of the number of parent companies and affiliates per year
the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group. The index is composed of 12 weighted variables
covering both political and social attributes.19 We recode the index in such a way that
an increasing value represents higher political risk.
There are numerous indices that try to capture the variation of political risk across coun-
tries. A good overview is provided in Howell (2008). For our analysis, the ICRG index
is the best choice for three reasons: First, it takes into account diverse dimensions of
political risk like corruption, bureaucratic quality, but also ethnic and religious tensions
and socioeconomic conditions. Second, while many indices provide only information on
a selective sample of countries, the ICRG index covers more than 140 countries. Third,
the ICRG index varies according to time and provides information for all years that are
covered in the MiDi dataset.
Information on GDP, GDP per capita and the rate of inflation is taken from the World
Economic Outlook Database of the IMF (www.imf.org). The Private Credit variable
is based on Beck et al . (2000). It measures the ratio of private credit lent by de-
posit money banks to GDP. Statutory tax rates are taken from the Institute for Fiscal
19 Government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict,
corruption, military in politics, religion in politics, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic account-
ability and bureaucracy quality.
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Studies (www.ifs.org.uk), as well as from various issues of the Corporate Tax Guides of
Ernst&Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers.
Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analysis. The defini-
tions of the variables are standard, and they are also presented in Table 2.2. Comparing
the descriptive statistics to those of American MNE in Desai et al . (2004), we find that
regarding most variables used in our analysis, on average American and German MNEs
tend to be quite similar. Both are active in about all countries worldwide. Consequently,
the means of our country variables differ only insofar as the time period considered by
Desai et al . (2004) is 1982 to 1994, while we analyze the year 1996-2006. In the period
we analyze, both average inflation and political risk are lower. Affiliate-level variables are
also quite similar for German and US-American affiliates, the sole exception being profits
over total assets: while Desai et al . (2004) report a share of profit to assets of about 15
percent, this ratio is at only 4 percent for the German affiliates.
2.6 Econometric Analysis
The aim of our analysis is to investigate how the capital structure choice of multinational
enterprises reacts to political risk. The two choice variables we consider are the ownership
share and the level of leverage. We define the level of leverage as debt over total assets
and the ownership share as the share of equity of the foreign affiliate held by the German
parent.
Leverage has a mean of 0.61 and a standard deviation of 0.31 at the firm-level. The
standard deviation of average leverage per country is 0.12. The mean of the ownership
share is 0.87, while its standard deviation is 0.24, and the average ownership share per
country has a standard deviation of 0.14. The political risk indicator has an average value
of 0.19 and a standard deviation of 0.08.
Examples of countries with extremely high political risk in our sample (an average political
risk score above 0.45) are Algeria (with a political risk of 0.50), Colombia (with an average
political risk of 0.47), Nigeria (with an average political risk of 0.54), Pakistan (political
risk at 0.49), Yugoslavia (with an average political risk of 0.47) and Zimbabwe with a
political risk of 0.51. The country with the lowest average political risk in our sample
period is Luxembourg with an average political risk score of 0.07.
Figure 2.1 presents how the mean of the ownership share by country varies with political
risk. The graph suggests a negative relationship between the ownership share and political
risk even if we do not control for any other country or affiliate specific factors. When
2 Who is afraid of political risk? 27
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
plotting leverage aggregated by country versus political risk (Figure 2.2), we cannot deduct
any clear relationship between the two variables from the graph. In a regression analysis
at the firm-level we are going to analyze the relationship more thoroughly.
All regressions presented in this chapter are estimated by OLS and include parent-fixed-
effects in order to control for parent-specific individual heterogeneity, and we include year
and affiliate industry dummies. The reason for this specification is that we can explicitly
control for affiliate and country specific heterogeneity, but the only way our data allows
us to control for parent-specific heterogeneity is to include parent fixed effects.20 Thus, we
20 See Desai et al . (2004), Desai et al . (2008) and Buettner et al . (2009) who use the same fixed effects
and dummies in order to control for firm-specific and industry-specific considerations.
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Figure 2.1: The relationship between political risk and ownership share, 1996-2006
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aim to make use of the observed variation between affiliates of the same parent which are
located in different countries as well as of the variation over time. Indeed we find that the
time variation alone is not sufficient for identification, so that we need the cross-section
variation between affiliates of the same parent company located in different countries.21
In all regressions, we use heteroscedasticity robust standard errors, and we control for
clustering of the standard errors by parent company.
In Table 2.3, we present the effect of political risk on both our independent variables as
a first test of our hypotheses. We report each regression with and without including our
statutory tax variable, because we lose many observations when including it. The choice
21 When we use pure time variation in the ICRG index, political risk is no longer significant in explaining
the leverage choice and it positively affects the ownership choice. The latter effect is not inconsistent
with our model (Result 6) but it is not what we would expect to be the dominant effect (Hypothesis
2) and what others have found in cross-section studies (see footnote 15).
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Figure 2.2: The relationship between political risk and leverage level, 1996-2006
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of independent variables is based on Desai et al . (2004) where the authors investigate the
capital structure choice of US-American MNEs.
On average, an increase in political risk leads to an increase in affiliate leverage and to a
decrease in the ownership share the parent holds in the foreign affiliate. This seems to be
consistent with our hypothesis 5 that leverage is more likely to react positively, if at all,
to political risk, than to the ownership share. In the leverage regression, the coefficient of
political risk of 0.1491 can be interpreted as follows: when political risk increases by one
standard deviation of 0.0797, leverage increases by 0.0119 (=0.1491*0.0797), which repre-
sents 2.3 percent of its mean value. This effect is quite close to the 2.9 percent estimated
by Desai, Foley, Hines (2004) for affiliates of US-American MNEs. The estimated effect
of statutory taxes on the leverage share is 0.0146 (=0.2074*0.0705) which represents 2.8
percent of its mean value. Thus, the relative impact of a change of one standard deviation
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Table 2.3: The impact of political risk on affiliate leverage and ownership share
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in political risk on leverage versus a one standard deviation change in statutory taxes is
about 81 percent. The estimated effect of political risk on the ownership share is smaller.
A one standard deviation increase of political risk decreases the ownership share by 1.1
percent of its mean value.22
We include some other exogenous variables that are not directly related to our model
in order to make our results comparable to other results presented in the literature. In
particular, we use the same set of controls as Desai et al . (2004) and Desai et al . (2008),
who include these variables to control for observable dimensions of country and firm het-
erogeneity, and we find the same signs of the coefficients in our regressions as they do.
Larger affiliates, for example, use more debt and hold smaller ownership shares. These
coefficients may be a reflection of financial constraints of foreign investors, something not
explicitly modeled in our framework, which require them to turn to more outside finance
in case of larger investment projects. Along the same lines, we find that affiliates with
higher profits/ assets use less debt, as they seem to have a greater cash flow generating
capacity. The fixed assets reported in the Bundesbank data include tangibles as well as
intangible assets. Thus, the negative coefficient of the fixed asset variable could reflect the
fact that firms with a larger share of intangible assets find it more difficult to use debt,
as intangible assets are usually not accepted as collateral. We also find that firms have
smaller ownership shares in more profitable firms, which seems counter-intuitive. The
effect, however, is economically not very significant: For an increase in profits of one stan-
dard deviation, firms decrease their ownership share only by 0.005 standard deviations.
This finding may also be due to the fact that we only observe accounting profits which
in turn may reflect a firm’s tax saving strategy. Including other macro variables, like
inflation, GDP and GDP per capita, is important as a robustness test of our political risk
variable and indeed their inclusion does not turn the political risk variable insignificant.
Firms in countries with higher GDP per capita use more debt and hold larger ownership
shares. If we interpret GDP per capita as a measure of the profitability of the foreign
market these coefficients seem intuitive.
The fact that a firm’s ownership and leverage choices might be related to each other can
be captured by a correlation of the error terms of the two regressions. The two equations
therefore form a system of seemingly unrelated regressions (Zellner (1962)). In general, it
is more efficient to estimate this system of equations using feasible GLS and to allow for
correlation of the error terms in the asymptotic variance matrix than to use OLS. In our
22 Javorcik and Wei (2009) show that corruption on the country level, measured by three different indices,
reduces the probability of whole ownership of a company. Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) show that the
risk of expropriation decreases the probability of whole ownership. Both papers use cross-sectional
data.
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case, however, there is no efficiency gain from estimating the equations jointly, because the
same regressors are included in both regressions (Cameron and Trivedi (2005)). We test
for correlation of the estimated residuals and we find a positive and significant correlation
in the residuals of the two regressions. This implies that a positive shock on one of the
two variables is also associated with an increase in the other variable.
Desai et al . (2004) and Desai et al . (2008) assume a linear effect of political risk on the
capital structure choice. By contrast, according to our model the influence of political risk
differs by type or strength of political risk, as noted in our hypotheses 1 to 4. To study
this effect in more detail, we follow two empirical strategies. We first continue to work
with the aggregated ICRG index for political risk, but include political risk squared, to
allow for the the marginal effect of political risk to change with its level. This corresponds
to our interpretation above, that the different scenarios or political risk can be ranked
with respect to their severity, with scenario III being the less severe and scenarios I/II
the more severe. Our second strategy is to use alternative disaggregated measures for
political risk, with the idea to capture more specifically one particular scenario.
Table 2.4 presents our results for the ICRG political risk index, including political risk
squared. In both regressions, the estimated marginal effect of political risk on the variable
in question is positive for low levels of political risk and negative for high levels of political
risk. Both results are consistent with the predictions of hypotheses 3 and 4. The big
difference between leverage and the ownership share is in the level of political risk where
the marginal effect changes from positive to negative: for leverage, a maximum is reached
at a level of political risk of about 0.3. The vast majority (about 91 percent) of affiliates
of German MNE operate in countries where the political risk is weaker than this - thus,
for them, the predicted effect is positive. Only for about 9 percent of all affiliates, we
predict the effect of political risk on leverage to be negative. When we model leverage
as a linear function of political risk, the positive effect that we predict for the majority
of affiliates of German MNEs, prevails, as seen in Table 2.3. For the ownership share,
the change from a positive to a negative effect of political risk is predicted to take place
for a much lower level of political risk (about 0.13). This is in fact consistent with our
hypothesis 5.
As outlined above, as a second strategy to capture different scenarios of political risk, we
try different measures of political risk. We use two measures taken from the ICRG invest-
ment risk component (contract risk and repatriation risk) and three measures from the
Heritage Index (corruption, investment risk and property rights risk). Data on contract
risk and repatriation risk have only been available since 2001. Contract risk is defined as
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the risk of unilateral contract modification or cancelation and, at worst, outright expro-
priation of foreign owned assets. Repatriation risk captures to what extent profits can
be transferred out of the host country. Impediments include exchange controls, excessive
bureaucracy and a poor banking system. Corruption is defined as failure of the integrity
of the system. Investment risk measures the degree of restrictions on foreign investment,
considering a country’s policies towards foreign investment, as well as its policies towards
internal capital flows. Property rights risk measures the lack of freedom to accumulate
private property as well as the risk to be expropriated.23
All measures have been recoded in such a way that first, higher values are associated
with higher risk and, second, they lie between 0 and 1. Table 2.5 shows that, as in
Table 2.3, the influence of political risk on the ownership share is negative, for all types
of political risk measures considered. Interestingly, however, political risk can have either
a positive or a negative influence on the level of leverage, depending on the type of risk
present (Table 2.6 ). It is positive for corruption, investment risk and property right risk.
According to our interpretation, this suggests that these three types of risk reduce the
profitability of the investment without significantly increasing the risk of bankruptcy. In
contrast, the coefficient is negative for contract risk, which seems to affect the chances
to generate revenues and hence increases the risk of bankruptcy. Surprisingly, it is also
negative for repatriation risk, even though this kind of political risk is more about the
use of profits, i.e., scenario 3, for which a positive coefficient is predicted. If, however,
credits are taken at home, not locally, the negative coefficient would make sense, because
barriers to repatriation profits would undermine the ability to repay credits.
23 For a more detailed description of the methodology underlying the Heritage Index see Beach and Kane
(2008).
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Table 2.4: The impact of political risk on affiliate leverage and ownership share (Allowing for
nonlinear impact)
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Table 2.5: The impact of political risk (different measures) on ownership share
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Table 2.6: The impact of political risk (different measures) on affiliate leverage
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2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated how MNEs adapt their capital structure choices
in the presence of political risk. Our analysis suggests that, when it comes to assessing
the potential effects of political risk, it is important to distinguish different types of
stakeholders and how these are affected by different political measures. Only then is it
possible to determine the optimal reaction of the investor to this risky environment.
Almost by definition, any form of political risk negatively affects the profitability of a
MNE as a whole. The investor as one of the equity holders is residual claimant of the
MNE. Thus, it is not surprising that he will want to reduce his stake in the firm when
political risk becomes more severe.
But, as our analysis has shown, the effects are less straightforward for debt holders. If debt
holders expect debt service to become less likely, they have to adjust their interest rates.
The larger the additional dead weight losses, the more costly debt financing becomes
and hence the more leverage is reduced. If, instead, debt service is less affected than
the returns to equity holders, then debt can act as a shield against political risk and the
balance shifts towards more debt finance relative to equity finance.
Why does it matter how political risk affects the multinational’s choice of capital struc-
ture? Smaller ownership shares, for example, may negatively affect the governance struc-
ture of the MNE because they typically lead to smaller incentives for controlling the
firm effectively. In addition, smaller ownership stakes could reduce the investor’s incen-
tive to transfer necessary technology. These effects, though not explicitly modeled here,
are well known in the literature. Higher leverage, and hence higher risk of bankruptcy,
on the other hand, lead to higher dead weight losses arising from inefficient bankruptcy
procedures and, in this way, add to the social cost of political risk.
Thus, we would expect different kinds of dead weight losses to prevail, depending on
how political risk affects equity holders relative to debt holders. If ownership shares are
reduced and leverage increases, one may have to face deteriorating governance structures
and more inefficiencies from increased risk of bankruptcy. If instead both ownership
shares and leverage are reduced, it is mostly deteriorated governance structures one has
to expect.
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Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Result 1
Recall that the interest rate is implicitly determined by the following break even condition
for the bank:∫ R¯
(1+r)D
(1 + r)D
1
R¯
dR +
∫ (1+r)D
0
sR
1
R¯
dR = D (2.34)
Solving and rearranging yields
1
R¯
[
(1 + r)DR¯− 2− s
2
(1 + r)2D2
]
= D (2.35)
1
R¯
1
2
(1 + r)2D2 =
(1 + r)D
2− s −
D
2− s (2.36)
(2− s)(1 + r)2D = 2rR¯ (2.37)
From the implicit function
2rR¯− (2− s)(1 + r)2D = 0 (2.38)
we can derive how the interest rate reacts for a change in the debt level D, using the
implicit function theorem.
dr
dD
= − −(2− s)(1 + r)
2
2[R¯− (2− s)(1 + r)D] (2.39)
Using (2.38), this simplifies to
dr
dD
=
r(1 + r)
(1− r)D (2.40)
Furthermore, we can use (2.38) to derive how the interest rate reacts to a change in R¯,
again using the implicit function theorem.
dr
dR¯
= − −2r
2[R¯− (2− s)(1 + r)D] (2.41)
Using (2.38), this simplifies to
dr
dR¯
= − r(1 + r)
(1− r)R¯ (2.42)
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The investor maximizes
U(D,α) = V (D,α) +B(α)−K(α) (2.43)
=
∫ R¯(α)
(1+r)D
(1− t)[R− (1 + r)D] 1
R¯(α)
dR +D − I +B(α)−K(α) (2.44)
=
1− t
R¯(α)
[
1
2
R¯2(α)− (1 + r)DR¯(α) + 1
2
(1 + r)2D2
]
(2.45)
+D − I +B(α)−K(α)
Using equation (2.34) we can rewrite the payoff function in the following way
U(D,α) = (1−t)
[
1
2
R¯(α)− (1− s)(1 + r)
2− s D
]
+
1− s+ t
2− s D−I+B(α)−K(α). (2.46)
The investor’s maximization problem is characterized by the following two first order
conditions.
dU
dα
= (1− t)
[
1
2
dR¯
dα
− 1− s
2− sD
dr
dR¯
dR¯
dα
]
+B′ −K ′ = 0 (2.47)
dU
dD
= −(1− t)1− s
2− s
[
(1 + r) +
dr
dD
D
]
+
1− s+ t
2− s = 0 (2.48)
Using (2.40), we can rewrite the first order condition for the optimal D in the following
way
dU
dD
= −(1− t)1− s
2− s
[
1 + r +
r(1 + r)
(1− r)DD
]
+
1− s+ t
2− s = 0 (2.49)
Rearranging yields
1− s+ t
2− s = (1− t)
1− s
2− s
1 + r
1− r (2.50)
We can use this condition to solve for r and 1 + r:
r =
(2− s)t
2(1− s) + st 1 + r =
2(1− s+ t)
2(1− s) + st (2.51)
Inserting this in (2.38), we can solve for
D∗ =
R¯
2
t
2(1− s) + st
(1− s+ t)2 (2.52)
Using the solutions for r andD, we can finally determine the investor’s payoff as a function
of α
U =
R¯(α)
2
1− s+ st
1− s+ t − I +B(α)−K(α) (2.53)
Q.E.D
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Proof of Result 2
To see how the optimal debt level reacts to changes in t, consider the optimal debt level
as characterized by (2.52):
dD∗
dt
=
R¯
2
[
2(1− s) + st
(1− s+ t)2 + t
(1− s+ t)2s− (2(1− s) + st)2(1− s+ t)
(1− s+ t)4
]
(2.54)
=
R¯(1− s)2(1− t)
(1− s+ t)3 > 0 (2.55)
To determine how the ownership ratio α reacts to changes in t, we rewrite the first order
condition (2.47) that implicitly defines α∗, using (2.42) and the solution to D∗ and r.
After some simplification we obtain
(1− t)
[
1 +
t2
(1− s+ t)(1− t)
]
1
2
dR¯
dα
+B′ −K ′ = 0 (2.56)[
1− s+ st
1− s+ t
]
1
2
dR¯
dα
+B′ −K ′ = 0 (2.57)
From this we find, using the implicit function theorem
dα∗
dt
= −
[
(1−s+t)s−(1−s+st)
(1−s+t)2
]
1
2
dR¯
dα[
1−s+st
(1−s+t)
]
1
2
d2R¯
dα2
+B′′ −K ′′
(2.58)
(2.59)
=
[
(1−s)2
(1−s+t)2
]
1
2
dR¯
dα[
1− s+ st
1− s+ t
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
1
2
d2R¯
dα2︸︷︷︸
−
+ B′′︸︷︷︸
−
− K ′′︸︷︷︸
+
(2.60)
Note that the sign of dα
dt
depends on the sign of dR¯
dα
. Using equation (2.57), we find that
R′ > 0 if B′ < K ′ in the relevant parameter range, and hence dα
dt
< 0 if B′ < K ′.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Result 3
Consider first the case of expropriation. Recall that the interest rate is implicitly deter-
mined by the following break even condition for the bank:
(1− pi1)
[∫ R¯
(1+r)D
(1 + r)D
1
R¯
dR +
∫ (1+r)D
0
sR
1
R¯
dR
]
= D (2.61)
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Solving and rearranging yields
1− pi1
R¯
[
(1 + r)DR¯− 2− s
2
(1 + r)2D2
]
= D (2.62)
1− pi1
R¯
1
2
(1 + r)2D2 =
(1− pi1)(1 + r)D
2− s −
D
2− s (2.63)
(1− pi1)(2− s)(1 + r)2D = 2(1− pi1)(1 + r)R¯− 2R¯ (2.64)
From the implicit function
2[(1− pi1)(1 + r)− 1]R¯− (1− pi1)(2− s)(1 + r)2D = 0 (2.65)
we can derive how the interest rate reacts to a change in the debt level D
dr
dD
= − −(1− pi1)(2− s)(1 + r)
2
2[(1− pi1)R¯− (1− pi1)(2− s)(1 + r)D] (2.66)
Using (2.65), this simplifies to
dr
dD
=
(1 + r)[(1− pi1)(1 + r)− 1]
[2− (1− pi1)(1− r)]D (2.67)
Furthermore, we can derive how the interest rate reacts to a change in R¯
dr
dR¯
= − 2[(1− pi1)(1 + r)− 1]
2(1− pi1)R¯− 2(1− pi1)(2− s)(1 + r)D (2.68)
Using again (2.65), this simplifies to
dr
R¯
= −2[(1− pi1)(1 + r)− 1](1 + r)
2− (1− pi1)(1 + r)R¯ > 0 (2.69)
The investor maximizes
U1(D,α) = (1− pi1)
∫ R¯(α)
(1+r)D
(1− t)[R− (1 + r)D] 1
R¯(α)
dR (2.70)
+D − I + (1− pi1)B(α)−K(α)
=
(1− pi1)(1− t)
R¯(α)
[
1
2
R¯2(α)− (1 + r)DR¯(α) + 1
2
(1 + r)2D2
]
(2.71)
+D − I + (1− pi1)B(α)−K(α)
Using equation (2.61) we can rewrite the payoff function in the following way
U1(D,α) = (1− pi1)(1− t)
[
1
2
R¯(α)− (1− s)(1 + r)
2− s D
]
+
1− s+ t
2− s D − I + (1− pi1)B(α)−K(α) . (2.72)
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The investor’s maximization problem is characterized by the following two first order
conditions.
dU1
dα
= (1− pi1)(1− t)
[
1
2
dR¯
dα
− 1− s
2− sD
dr
dR¯
dR¯
dα
]
+ (1− pi1)B′ −K ′ = 0 (2.73)
dU1
dD
= −(1− pi1)(1− t)1− s
2− s
[
(1 + r) +
dr
dD
D
]
+
1− s+ t
2− s = 0 (2.74)
Using (2.67), we can rewrite the first order condition for the optimal D in the following
way
dU1
dD
= −(1− pi)(1− t)1− s
2− s
[
1 + r +
(1 + r)[(1− pi1)(1 + r)− 1]
[2− (1− pi1)(1 + r)D D
]
+
1− s+ t
2− s = 0 (2.75)
Rearranging yields
1− s+ t
2− s = (1− pi1)(1− t)
1− s
2− s
1 + r
2− (1− pi1)(1 + r) (2.76)
We can use this condition to solve for r and 1 + r:
r1 =
(2− s)t
(1− pi1)[2(1− s) + st] 1 + r1 =
2(1− s+ t)
(1− pi1)[2(1− s) + st] (2.77)
Inserting this in (2.65), we can solve for
D∗1 = (1− pi1)
R¯
2
t
2(1− s) + st
(1− s+ t)2 (2.78)
Using the solutions for r and D1, we can finally determine the investor’s payoff
U1 = (1− pi1)
[
R¯
2
1− s+ st
1− s+ t +B(α)
]
−K(α)− I (2.79)
Creeping expropriation
Consider now the case of creeping expropriation. Recall that the interest rate is implicitly
determined by the following break even condition for the bank:[∫ R¯
(1+r)D
(1−pi2)
(1 + r)D
1
R¯
dR +
∫ (1+r)D
(1−pi2)
0
s(1− pi2)R 1
R¯
dR
]
= D (2.80)
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Solving and rearranging yields
1
(1− pi2)R¯
[
(1 + r)D(1− pi2)R¯− 2− s
2
(1 + r)2D2
]
= D (2.81)
1
(1− pi2)R¯
1
2
(1 + r)2D2 =
(1 + r)D
2− s −
D
2− s (2.82)
(2− s)(1 + r)2D = 2(1− pi2)(1 + r)R¯− 2(1− pi2)R¯
(2− s)(1 + r)2D = 2r(1− pi2)R¯ (2.83)
From the implicit function
2r(1− pi2)R¯− (2− s)(1 + r)2D = 0 (2.84)
we can derive how the interest rate reacts for a change in the debt level D
dr
dD
= − −(2− s)(1 + r)
2
2[(1− pi2)R¯− (2− s)(1 + r)D] (2.85)
Using (2.84), this simplifies to
dr
dD
=
r(1 + r)
(1− r)D (2.86)
Furthermore, we can derive how the interest rate reacts to a change in R¯
dr
dR¯
= − 2r(1− pi2)
2(1− pi2)R¯− 2(2− s)(1 + r)D (2.87)
Using again (2.84), this simplifies to
dr
R¯
= − r(1 + r)
(1 + r)R¯
> 0 (2.88)
The investor maximizes
U2(D,α) =
∫ R¯(α)
(1+r)D
(1−pi2)
(1− t)[(1− pi2)R− (1 + r)D] 1
R¯(α)
dR
+D − I + (1− pi2)B(α)−K(α) (2.89)
=
(1− t)
(1− pi2)R¯(α)
[
1
2
(1− pi2)2R¯2(α)− (1 + r)D(1− pi2)R¯(α)
+
1
2
(1 + r)2D2
]
+D − I + (1− pi2)B(α)−K(α) (2.90)
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Using equation (2.84) we can rewrite the payoff function in the following way
U2(D,α) = (1− t)
[
1
2
(1− pi2)R¯(α)− (1− s)(1 + r)
2− s D
]
+
1− s+ t
2− s D − I + (1− pi2)B(α)−K(α) . (2.91)
The investor’s maximization problem is characterized by the following two first order
conditions.
dU
dα
= (1− t)
[
1
2
(1− pi2)dR¯
dα
− 1− s
2− sD
dr
dR¯
dR¯
dα
]
+ (1− pi2)B′ −K ′ = 0 (2.92)
dU
dD
= −(1− t)1− s
2− s
[
(1 + r) +
dr
dD
D
]
+
1− s+ t
2− s = 0 (2.93)
Using (2.86), we can rewrite the first order condition for the optimal D in the following
way
dU
dD
= −(1− pi)(1− t)1− s
2− s
[
1 + r +
r(1 + r)
(1− r)DD
]
+
1− s+ t
2− s = 0 (2.94)
Rearranging yields
1− s+ t
2− s = (1− t)
1− s
2− s
1 + r
(1− r) (2.95)
We can use this condition to solve for r2 and 1 + r2:
r2 =
(2− s)t
2(1− s) + st 1 + r2 =
2(1− s+ t)
2(1− s) + st (2.96)
Inserting this in (2.84), we can solve for
D2 = (1− pi2)R¯
2
t
2(1− s) + st
(1− s+ t)2 = D1 (2.97)
Using the solutions for r2 and D2, we can finally determine the investor’s payoff
U2 = (1− pi2)
[
R¯
2
1− s+ st
1− s+ t +B(α)
]
−K(α)− I (2.98)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Result 4
In Result 3 we have seen that the optimal debt levels and the investor’s payoff are the
same in both cases, expropriation and creeping expropriation. We now determine the
comparative statics with respect to the local taxation rate pii, with i = {1, 2}.
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To see how the optimal debt level reacts to changes in pi1, consider the optimal debt level
as characterized in (2.78) and (2.97).
dD∗i
dpii
= −1
2
R¯t
(2(1− s) + st)
(1− s+ t)2 < 0 (2.99)
To determine how the ownership ratio α reacts to changes in pii, we use the first order
condition of (2.79) or (2.98) that implicitly defines α∗
(1− pii)
[[
1− s+ st
1− s+ t
]
1
2
dR¯
dα
+B′
]
−K ′ = 0 (2.100)
From this we find, using the implicit function theorem
dα∗
dpii
= −
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
−(1− s+ st)
(1− s+ t)
1
2
dR¯
dα
−B′
(1− pii 1−s+st(1−s+t) 12
d2R¯
dα2︸︷︷︸
−
+(1− pii) B′′︸︷︷︸
−
− K ′′︸︷︷︸
+
< 0 (2.101)
where the negative sign of the nominator is due to the fact that the first order condition
(2.100) needs to be satisfied.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Result 5
Recall that in case of confiscatory taxation the interest rate is implicitly determined by
the same break even condition for the bank as in the base line model:∫ R¯
(1+r)D
(1 + r)D
1
R¯
dR +
∫ (1+r)D
0
sR
1
R¯
dR = D (2.102)
This implies the same implicit function and hence the same conditions for the interest
rate as above.
2rR¯− (2− s)(1 + r)2D = 0 (2.103)
dr
dD
=
r(1 + r)
(1− r)D (2.104)
and
dr
dR¯
= − r(1 + r)
(1− r)R¯ (2.105)
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The investor maximizes
U3(D,α) =
∫ R¯(α)
(1+r)D
(1− t− pi3)[R− (1 + r)D] 1
R¯(α)
dR
+D − I +B(α)−K(α) (2.106)
=
1− t− pi3
R¯(α)
[
1
2
R¯2(α)− (1 + r)DR¯(α) + 1
2
(1 + r)2D2
]
+D − I +B(α)−K(α) (2.107)
Using equation (2.103) we can rewrite the payoff function in the following way
U3(D,α) = (1− t− pi3)
[
1
2
R¯2(α)− (1− s)(1 + r)
2− s D
]
+
1− s+ t+ pi3
2− s D − I +B(α)−K(α) . (2.108)
The investor’s maximization problem is characterized by the following two first order
conditions.
dU3
dα
= (1− t− pi3)
[
1
2
dR¯
dα
− 1− s
2− sD
dr
dR¯
dR¯
dα
]
+B′ −K ′ = 0 (2.109)
dU3
dD
= −(1− t− pi3)1− s
2− s
[
(1 + r) +
dr
dD
D
]
+
1− s+ t+ pi3
2− s = 0 (2.110)
Using (2.104), we can rewrite the first order condition for the optimal D in the following
way
dU3
dD
= −(1− t− pi3)1− s
2− s
[
1 + r +
r(1 + r)
(1− r)DD
]
+
1− s+ t+ pi3
2− s = 0 (2.111)
Rearranging yields
1− s+ t+ pi3
2− s = (1− t− pi3)
1− s
2− s
1 + r
1− r (2.112)
We can use this condition to solve for r3 and 1 + r3:
r3 =
(2− s)(t+ pi3)
2(1− s) + s(t+ pi3) 1 + r3 =
2(1− s+ t+ pi3)
2(1− s) + s(t+ pi3) (2.113)
Inserting this in (2.103), we can solve for
D∗3 =
R¯
2
(t+ pi3)
2(1− s) + s(t+ pi3)
(1− s+ t+ pi3)2 (2.114)
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Using the solutions for r3 and D3, we can finally determine the investor’s payoff
U3 =
R¯
2
1− s+ s(t+ pi3)
1− s+ t+ pi3 − I + (1− pi3)B(α)−K(α) (2.115)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Result 6
To see how the optimal debt level reacts to changes in pi3, consider the optimal debt level
as characterized by (2.114):
dD∗3
dpi3
=
R¯
2
[
2(1− s) + s(t+ pi3)
(1− s+ t+ pi3)2
+(t+ pi3)
(1− s+ t+ pi3)2s− 2(2(1− s) + s(t+ pi3))(1− s+ t+ pi3)
(1− s+ t+ pi3)4
]
=
R¯(1− s)2
(1− s+ t+ pi3)3 > 0 (2.116)
To determine how the ownership ratio α reacts to changes in t, consider the first order
condition of (2.115) that implicitly defines α∗3.[
1− s+ s(t+ pi3)
1− s+ t+ pi3
]
1
2
dR¯
dα
+ (1− pi3)B′ −K ′ = 0 (2.117)
From this we find, using the implicit function theorem,
dα∗3
dpi3
= −
[
− (1−s)2
(1−s+t+pi3)2
]
1
2
dR¯
dα[
1− s+ s(t+ pi3)
1− s+ t+ pi3
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
1
2
d2R¯
dα2︸︷︷︸
−
+(1− pi3) B′′︸︷︷︸
−
− K ′′︸︷︷︸
+
(2.118)
Note that the sign of dα3
dpi3
depends on the sign of dR¯
dα
. Using equation (2.117), we find that
R′ > 0 if B′ < K ′ in the relevant parameter range, and hence dα3
dpi3
< 0 if B′ < K ′.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Result 7
Consider
dα∗1/2
dpi1/2
=
(1−s+st)
(1−s+t)
1
2
dR¯
dα
+B′
(1− pi1/2)
[
1−s+st
(1−s+t)
1
2
d2R¯
dα2
+B′′
]
−K ′′
< 0 (2.119)
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and
dα∗3
dpi3
=
[
(1−s)2
(1−s+t+pi3)2
]
1
2
dR¯
dα[
1−s+s(t+pi3)
1−s+t+pi3
]
1
2
d2R¯
dα2
+B′′ −K ′′
< 0 if R¯′ > 0 (2.120)
To see that dα1/2
dpi1/2
< dα3
dpi3
it is sufficient to show that nominator of
∣∣∣dα1/2dpi1/2 ∣∣∣ is larger than
the nominator of
∣∣∣dα3dpi3 ∣∣∣ and the denominator is smaller than the respective denominator.
Simple rearranging of the respective equations prove that this is indeed the case. Q.E.D.
Chapter 3
Financial constraints and the margins of FDI∗
3.1 Motivation
Multinational firms are larger than their domestic counterparts. For European firms,
Mayer and Ottaviano (2008) show that multinational firms are also more productive,
generate higher value added, pay higher wages, employ more capital per worker, and em-
ploy a larger number of skilled workers. In the theoretical literature, the characteristic size
patterns of multinational firms are explained mainly by differences in productivity. Ac-
cording to this explanation, observed internationalization patterns reflect real constraints
since only the more productive firms can afford to shoulder the fixed cost of market entry.
These stylized facts are confirmed by our data for German companies, where firms owning
foreign affiliates are indeed substantially larger than purely domestic firms (Figure 3.1(a)).
Yet, the two groups of firms also differ in a number of other respects. Multinational firms,
for instance, have lower debt ratios and higher cash flows. This suggests difficulties in
obtaining external finance as an additional impediment to foreign expansions.24 However,
most of the theoretical literature considers the impact of financial constraints to be of lesser
importance, arguing that foreign direct investment (FDI) and the associated financing
decisions can largely be treated separately.25
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the (relative) importance of real and financial
barriers for the cross-border expansion of firms. In doing so, we distinguish between the
decision to enter a foreign market for the first time (the extensive margin) and the decision
on the volume of foreign affiliate sales (the intensive margin). We proceed in two steps.
In a first step, we theoretically analyze how productivity and financial constraints af-
fect a firm’s choice to become a multinational firm under conditions of limited internal
∗ This chapter is based on joint work with Claudia Buch, Alexander Lipponer, and Monika Schnitzer.
24 In the crisis that started in 2007, for instance, an increasing number of German firms reports credit
constraints as an impediment to expansion into foreign countries (DIHK 2009).
25 See, for example, Markusen (2002).
49
3 Financial constraints and the margins of FDI 50
funds and the need to obtain external debt finance. Our model features limited contract
enforceability and liquidation cost as two sources of inefficiencies in financial contract-
ing that are particularly relevant for foreign investments. The model provides a set of
testable implications concerning the impact of financial constraints, productivity, and
host-country characteristics on firms’ internationalization choices. In particular, we pre-
dict that financial constraints are more likely to affect the extensive than the intensive
margin, unless financial constraints are severe. Furthermore, we predict that financial
constraints are more strongly felt for large firms, as they are more likely to be interested
in foreign expansion.
In a second step, we provide empirical evidence using data for German firms. We obtain
information on the foreign affiliates of German firms from a detailed firm-level database
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Direct Investment Micro-Database (MiDi).
Furthermore, we use data on the balance sheets of firms in Germany from both the
Dafne database provided by Bureau van Dijk and the Hoppenstedt database. Our data
are unique as they allow measuring financial constraints and productivities at the parent
level for both domestic firms and for multinationals, as well as financial constraints at
the affiliate level. This enables us to analyze the extensive and the intensive margins of
FDI. Furthermore, we can evaluate the relative importance of financial constraints at both
the parent and at the affiliate level, a question that has - to the best of our knowledge
- not been addressed in the literature so far. In contrast to earlier work focusing on
manufacturing firms, our sample also contains services firms.
Our research is motivated by recent theoretical work stressing the importance of pro-
ductivity for firms’ international expansions. Seminal papers focusing on firms’ export
decisions are Bernard et al . (2003) and Melitz (2003). Helpman et al . (2004) extend the
Melitz model to account for multinational firms. The key to these models is that, ex
ante, firms do not know their productivity. Upon entry, firms draw their productivity
from a commonly known productivity distribution, and the level of productivity becomes
common knowledge as well. Depending on the level of productivity, firms exit the mar-
ket, they produce only for the domestic market, they become exporters, or they set up
affiliates abroad.
The implicit assumption of these models is that firms can finance foreign operations
internally and/or without incurring an external finance premium. Recent papers introduce
financial constraints into the Melitz model. The focus of these models is on firms’ decisions
to export. Chaney (2005) predicts that financially constrained firms are less likely to be
able to cover the fixed cost of exporting. Manova (2010) examines the interaction of
productivity and credit constraints and their impact on the export decision as well as the
volume of export.
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Recent empirical work shows that financial frictions indeed affect export behavior. Using
panel data on bilateral exports at the country level, Manova (2010) finds that financially
more developed countries are more likely to export, and that the effect is more pronounced
in financially vulnerable sectors. Firm-level studies show that financial constraints matter
more for the extensive margin than for the intensive margin of exports (Berman and
Héricourt (2010)), that export starters enjoy better financial conditions (Bellone et al .
(2008)), and that financially healthy firms are more likely to export (Greenaway et al .
(2007)).26 Stiebale (2008), in contrast, finds no effect of financial constraints on a firm’s
export decision once observed and unobserved firm heterogeneity is accounted for.
This essay provides complementary evidence on the role of financial frictions for FDI. As
predicted by our model, we find that productivity and financial constraints have a signif-
icant impact on German firms’ internationalization decision. Economically, productivity
and financial constraints are of similar importance, but financial constraints matter most
to the subset of firms that consider investing abroad. Our model also suggests that the
extensive margin is more likely to be affected than the intensive margin, unless finan-
cial constraints are severe. Our empirical analysis shows that parent financial constraints
have indeed a negative impact on the extensive margin of FDI, but less so on the intensive
margin, mirroring findings by Berman and Héricourt (2010) for exports. However, we also
find that, in contrast to the parent-level constraints, the affiliate’s financial constraints
matter for the intensive margin. This observation points towards a hierarchy of financing
the intensive margin, with affiliate financing being preferred over parent financing.
In the following section, we present our model of multinational firms. In section three,
we describe our data and provide descriptive statistics. Section four provides empirical
evidence, and section five concludes.
3.2 Finance and the margins of FDI: Theory
In this section, we analyze a firm’s choice to become a multinational firm and the volume
of sales of its foreign affiliates in the presence of financial constraints. Firms incur a fixed
cost of market entry as well as a variable cost of production. They finance their foreign
expansion using internally generated funds as well as an external bank credit, potentially
secured by collateral. Financing decisions are made under uncertainty.
Financial constraints are firm-specific; they do not merely reflect differences across firms
with regard to productivity. We do not specify the sources of “financial heterogeneity”,
26 Evidence on the reverse causality from exporting to financial conditions is mixed (Bellone et al . (2008),
Greenaway et al . (2007)).
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but there are several reasons why firms may have different financial constraints. Firms
differ, for instance, with regard to their customer structure and, thus, the probability of
being hit by an adverse demand shock. Firms also differ with regard to the quality of
their management and, thus, the ability of outside lenders to extract information on the
profitability of an investment project.
Financial contracting in our model suffers from potential inefficiencies due to limited en-
forceability of financial contracts, a problem particularly relevant when investing in a
foreign country. Enforceability differs across countries and may be linked to the devel-
opment of the financial market as well as the presence of home country banks abroad.
With limited contract enforcement, collateral may be required to obtain credit financing.
However, collecting and liquidating collateral generates transaction costs, and the amount
of collateral available may be limited. The need for costly and limited collateral confines
the use of external finance and thus the foreign expansion of firms.
To see how the model works, consider the decision problem of a multinational firm that
can invest abroad to serve the foreign market.27 The firm’s alternative investment option
is normalized to zero.28 To set up a foreign affiliate, the firm has to incur a fixed cost of
market entry F . Once the firm has decided to set up a foreign affiliate, it has to choose
the level of sales. Thus, we capture both the extensive and the intensive margins of the
firm’s foreign expansion strategy. To fix ideas, consider the following variable production
cost function, k(x) = x2
2(1+β)
, where x denotes the quantity produced and sold by the
foreign affiliate. The productivity of the parent firm, which also spills over onto the
foreign affiliate, is captured by β. The larger the fixed cost of entry and the lower a firm’s
productivity, the larger are the "real barriers" that a firm faces when entering foreign
markets.
The firm also faces a "financial barrier" in the form of a cash-in-advance constraint be-
cause set up and production cost has to be paid before production starts and before
revenues are generated. Revenues that can be generated on the foreign market are uncer-
tain. Serving the foreign market yields positive revenues px with probability q and zero
27 We focus on horizontal FDI. The qualitative implications of our model with regard to the impact of
financial constraints would also go through for vertical FDI.
28 It is straightforward to extend our model and to include an outside option like exports that depends
positively on the firm’s productivity. As we show in Buch et al . (2010), the firm’s productivity level
matters relatively more for the investment opportunity abroad than for the outside option of exporting.
The qualitative results of our model are unchanged.
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revenues with probability (1− q), where p is the foreign price level.29
Benchmark case without liquidity constraints
Before we describe the impact of financial constraints on investment decisions, consider as
a benchmark the first-best situation where the firm is not liquidity constrained. The firm
can finance both the fixed cost of entry and the variable cost of production from internal
funds L . Thus, it maximizes the following profit function:
pi = qpx− k(x)− F = qpx− x
2
2(1 + β)
− F (3.1)
Taking the first-order condition, solving for the optimal sales of the affiliate xFB = (1+β)qp
and inserting it back into the profit function (3.1) yields the following profits under the
first-best solution (FB)
piFB =
1
2
q2p2(1 + β)− F (3.1a)
Thus, if liquidity is not an issue, the investment takes place if and only if piFB ≥ 0, i.e. if
net profits of the investment are positive. Not surprisingly, profits depend positively on
the firm’s productivity β , i.e. less productive firms are less likely to be able to cover the
fixed cost of market entry.
Foreign expansion with liquidity constraints
Consider now the situation where the firm is liquidity constrained, which we define as a
situation in which its liquid assets L are not sufficient to cover the cost associated with
market entry and production. Thus, the firm needs external finance. We assume that
external finance is raised in the form of debt finance and, specifically, credits from banks.
Firms can obtain credits from domestic or foreign banks. We do not model this choice
explicitly and hence do not impose restrictions with regard to the degree of integration of
financial markets. However, domestic and foreign banks may differ with regard to their
ability to enforce contracts. For instance, if domestic banks maintain affiliates in the
foreign country, too, they are in a better position than banks operating abroad solely
to monitor the affiliates and collect collateral. This adds to the comparative advantage
that they already have in terms of knowledge about the domestic parent. The focus on
29 We abstract from exchange rate changes, i.e. revenues generated on the foreign market can be remitted
1:1 into domestic currency. Russ (2007) has a model in which endogenous adjustment of exchange rates
affects firms’ entry decisions.
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external debt finance assumption reflects the fact that external equity finance plays a
limited role for German firms (?). Also, theoretical considerations suggest a "pecking
order" of external finance according to which external equity finance and portfolio capital
are dominated by bank lending.
Let D denote the credit necessary to finance the fixed and variable cost of entry for a
production level x, given the available liquid funds L , i.e. D = k(x)+F−L. Furthermore,
let (1 + r)D denote the repayment of principal plus interest payment that the firm is
supposed to pay. Like Manova (2010) and others, we assume that credit repayment is
possible only if the revenues from foreign sales are positive. In particular, we rule out the
possibility that the parent firm steps in and repays the affiliate’s credit if the affiliate is
not able to do so. This implies also that the credit repayment (1 + r)D cannot exceed
the revenues px, i.e. (1 + r)D ≤ px . Banks are assumed to operate competitively and to
determine the interest rate such as to just break even in expected terms.
To capture enforcement problems in financial contracts, we assume that credit repayment
cannot be enforced with certainty, even if revenues are positive, but only with probability
µ, with 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 . The enforcement parameter µ has two interpretations. On the one
hand, it can reflect different institutional quality across countries. Legal systems may, for
instance, differ with regard to the degree of creditor friendliness and the enforceability
of contracts.30 On the other hand, it could reflect a greater presence of home-country
multinational banks in the host country. These banks may be able to acquire useful
information on the host-country environment and be able to monitor firms more closely
through their affiliates abroad. This reduces informational asymmetries and makes it
more likely that credit enforcement is successful.
The firm can collateralize (part) of its credit with assets from two potential sources.
First, the firm can pledge its fixed cost investment in the foreign affiliate, F , as collateral.
Second, the firm can use an exogenously given collateral, C, provided by the parent
company, to secure the credit. Let C ≤ C + F denote the collateral actually chosen
to secure the credit, the exact value of which is determined endogenously below. If the
credit is not repaid, the creditor can seize the collateral to cover her losses. However, she
can realize only a fraction θ of the collateral when liquidating it.31 Thus, liquidating the
collateral involves a dead weight loss of (1− θ)C.
There are two situations where liquidation of a collateral (potentially) becomes an issue.
Suppose the affiliate has positive revenues but the creditor fails to be able to enforce the
30 Harrison et al . (2004) report that financial development lowers financial constraints.
31 Without loss of generality, we assume that the efficiency loss is the same for both kinds of collateral
goods.
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repayment. Then, the bank has the option to liquidate the collateral. However, it would
be inefficient to do so, due to the dead weight loss of liquidation. In this case, we assume
that efficient renegotiation will make the firm pay θC, i.e. the amount that the bank can
realize from liquidating the collateral, to avoid inefficient liquidation, and the bank will
accept this offer.32
Now, consider the zero profit condition for banks which determines the interest rate for a
given choice of C:
µq(1 + r)D + (1− µq)θC = D (3.2)
Banks obtain the promised credit repayment (1 + r)D only if credit repayment can be
enforced. In all other cases, they obtain the liquidation value of the collateral, θC, either
because this is what the firm pays voluntarily, after renegotiation, or this is what they
receive from actually liquidating the collateral. Solving for (1 + r)D, we find that banks
charge a risk premium over and above the risk-free rate which is declining in the probability
of success of the project q and in the efficiency of the liquidation procedure, θ
(1 + r)D =
D − (1− µq)θC
µq
(3.3)
Recall from above that the maximum repayment cannot exceed revenues, requiring
(1 + r)D =
D − (1− µq)θC
µq
≤ px (3.4)
Note that the smaller µ, the more important it is to pledge a collateral for this condition
to be satisfied. However, due to the dead weight loss in case the collateral is actually
liquidated, which happens with positive probability, the firm limits the collateral pledged
to the minimum required to obtain the desired credit. Inserting D = k(x) + F − L and
solving for C yields the minimum collateral needed to finance the fixed cost of market
entry and a given level of affiliate sales x taking into account that the collateral has to be
non-negative:
C∗(x) = max
{
0,
[k(x) + F − L]− µqpx
(1− µq)θ
}
(3.5)
The larger the required credit, the larger is the minimum collateral needed. Note, however,
that the collateral cannot exceed the upper bound specified above, C + F . We consider,
32 This assumes that the firm can hold the bank down to its outside option of liquidating the collateral.
It would be straightforward to modify this assumption and let the two parties split the gains from not
liquidating the collateral. However, given our assumption of a perfectly competitive banking market,
the first assumption seems to be the most convincing one. If revenues are not positive, however,
liquidation of the collateral cannot be avoided.
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in turn, the cases where this upper bound of collateral constrains the firm’s optimal sales
choice and where it does not, starting with the case of a non-binding collateral constraint.
3.2.1 Non-binding collateral constraint
Suppose for a moment that the collateral constraint is not binding. Then, for a given
level of affiliate sales x and collateral C, the firm expects the following profits:
pi = qpx− µq(1 + r)D − (1− µq)θC − (1− q)C − [k(x) + F ] +D (3.6)
The first term reflects the expected revenues, the second term the debt repayment that
can be enforced with probability µ if revenues are positive, which happens with probability
q. If credit repayment cannot be enforced, the firm voluntarily pays what the bank would
be able to collect in the event of liquidation, θC, to avoid costly liquidation, as discussed
above. If revenues are not positive, however, the collateral will be liquidated, as captured
by the fourth term. The last terms capture the cost of market entry and production and
the credit obtained by the firm to finance this cost, respectively.
The firm maximizes its profits by choosing the optimal sales of the affiliate x taking into
account the collateral needed to finance market entry and production, C∗(x).
Using D = k(x) + F − L and the equations (3.3) and (3.5) for (1 + r)D and C∗(x) we
obtain:
pi = qpx− k(x)− F − (1− q)(1− θ) max
{
0,
[k(x) + F − L− µqpx]
(1− µq)θ
}
(3.6a)
Note that if C∗(x) = 0, i.e. if no collateral is needed to secure the credit, financing cost
does not bias the investment decision. If collateral is needed, however, expected profits
are lowered by the expected liquidation cost, (1− q)(1− θ)C∗(x).
The following proposition characterizes the solutions of the firm’s maximization problem.
Proposition 1: Non-binding collateral constraint - Extensive and intensive
margins
The profit-maximizing sales level x∗ is characterized by the following solution:
x∗ =
{
1+µz
1+z
(1 + β)qp < xFB, for C
∗(x∗) > 0
(1 + β)qp = xFB, for C
∗(x∗) = 0
with z =
(1− q)(1− θ)
(1− µq)θ (3.7)
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The maximum profit the firm can attain is given by
pi∗ =
{
(1+µz)2
(1+z)
1
2
(1 + β)q2p2 − z(F − L)− F ≤ piFB, for C∗(x∗) > 0
1
2
(1 + β)q2p2 − F = piFB, for C∗(x∗) = 0
(3.8)
provided that the maximum exogenous collateral is not binding, i.e.
C ≥ C∗(x∗)− F
Proof: See Appendix
Note that for µ = 1, the optimum level of sales is the same as the first-best level. Also,
if θ = 1, then z = 1, and again the optimum level of sales is the same as in the first-best
case. Thus, the optimum level of sales differs from the first-best choice only if both µ < 1
and θ < 1. The intuition for this is straightforward. Only if contract enforcement is
less than perfect may a collateral be required to obtain a credit, and only if the use of
a collateral is costly does it affect the marginal cost of financing the production. Thus,
only if a costly collateral is required do profits fall short of first-best profits.
Of course, the firm will engage in FDI only if the maximum profits from investment
are non-negative. The following proposition characterizes the comparative statics for the
firm’s extensive and intensive margins of investment.
Proposition 2: Non-binding collateral constraint - Comparative statics
Changes in the following parameters affect the probability of non-negative profits and thus
the probability of engaging in FDI:
dpi∗
dβ
> 0,
dpi∗
dp
> 0,
dpi∗
dθ
> 0,
dpi∗
dµ
> 0,
dpi∗
dF
< 0,
dpi∗
dL
> 0,
dpi∗
dC
= 0
Furthermore, the intensive margin is described by the following comparative static results
for the optimal volume of foreign affiliate sales:
dx∗
dβ
> 0,
dx∗
dp
> 0,
dx∗
dθ
> 0,
dx∗
dµ
> 0,
dx∗
dF
=
dx∗
dL
=
dx∗
dC
= 0
Proof: See Appendix
Both the optimal volume of sales and the firm’s profits increase in the firm’s productivity
and in the lucrativeness of foreign markets. Furthermore, better contract enforcement in
the host country has a positive effect on sales and profits because it lowers the requirement
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to use costly collateral, and improving the efficiency of liquidating collateral reduces cost.
Higher fixed cost lowers expected profits not only directly but also indirectly. The larger
the fixed cost, the fewer liquid funds are left for financing the investment. Less liquid
funds, in turn, mean greater need for using costly collateral. Hence, there is an indirect
negative effect of fixed cost over and above the direct effect. However, fixed cost and
internal funds do not affect the optimal level of sales choice because the marginal cost of
using collateral does not depend on how much collateral is actually needed. The maximum
collateral, in turn, has no effect on profits and on the firm’s choice of sales as long as it
does not impose a binding constraint.
This scenario describes the situation of a mildly financially constrained investor. The need
for credit financing and the requirement of providing collateral increase the marginal cost
of investment and hence limit the volume of sales and profits. However, as long as the
collateral requirement does not impose a binding constraint, the constraints are not as
severe, as fixed cost and internal funds affect the extensive margin only, not the intensive
margin.
3.2.2 Binding collateral constraint
Consider now the case where the collateral constraint is binding for the optimal sales level
determined above, x = x∗, i.e.
C + F < C∗(x∗) =
{
0;
[k(x∗) + F − L]− µqpx∗
(1− µq)θ
}
(3.9)
In this case, x∗ cannot be implemented because the credit constraint becomes binding. In-
stead, production settles at a smaller level x that is determined by the maximum available
exogenous collateral:
C + F =
[k(x) + F − L]− µqpx
(1− µq)θ (3.10)
Solving this equation for x and inserting it into the firm’s profit function yields the
constrained optimal level of sales choices and profits as characterized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 3: Binding collateral constraint - Extensive and intensive margins
Suppose the maximum exogenous collateral imposes a binding constraint on the firm’s
optimal choice of the level of sales, i.e.
C < C∗(x∗)− F (3.11)
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Then, the investor can attain a maximum profit of
pi = qpx− [k(x) + F ]− (1− q)(1− θ)[C + F ] ≤ pi∗ (3.12)
Where the foreign level of sales x < x∗ is determined by equation (3.10)
Proof: See Appendix
Not surprisingly, profits fall short of the second-best profits that can be attained if the
collateral constraint is non-binding. The following proposition characterizes the compar-
ative static results for the extensive and intensive margins.
Proposition 4: Binding collateral constraint – Comparative statics
The following comparative static results characterize the extensive margins of FDI, sum-
marizing which parameters are more or less likely to ensure non-negative profits:
dpi
dβ
> 0,
dpi
dp
> 0,
dpi
dθ
> 0,
dpi
dµ
> 0,
dpi
dF
< 0,
dpi
dL
> 0,
dpi
dC
> 0
and
d2pi
dCdβ
> 0,
d2pi
dLdβ
> 0
Furthermore, the intensive margin is described by the following comparative statics for the
optimal volume of foreign affiliate sales:
dx
dβ
> 0,
dx
dp
> 0,
dx
dθ
> 0,
dx
dµ
> 0,
dx
dF
< 0,
dx
dL
> 0,
dx
dC
> 0
and
d2x
dCdβ
> 0,
d2x
dLdβ
> 0
Proof: See Appendix
Like above, productivity, lucrativeness of foreign markets, contract enforcement, and the
efficiency of collateral liquidation positively affect both the extensive and the intensive
margin of foreign direct investment. Unlike before, however, fixed cost and internal funds
now affect the level of sales as well, because higher fixed cost (or fewer internal funds)
leaves fewer funds for the financing of production, which cannot be compensated by
increasing credit financing if the collateral constraint becomes binding. And of course
both margins are positively affected if the collateral constraint becomes less binding.
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We also find that the financial status of the firm as captured by the liquid funds and
the collateral available plays a more important role for more productive firms, since they
are the ones more likely to invest. Thus, a high productivity is a necessary, but not a
sufficient condition for foreign expansion.
This scenario captures the case of a more severely financially constrained firm that is not
only exposed to higher marginal cost of credit financing, but that is also constrained in
its access to collateral. The firm is constrained not only at the extensive, but also at the
intensive margin of expansion. Of course, in reality, the two cases may be considered as
representing the two limits of a continuous distribution, with marginal cost of using a
collateral increasing in the size of the collateral. It would be straightforward to generalize
our set up and to allow for a more continuous distribution of financial constraints.
3.2.3 Financial constraints at the affiliate level
So far, we have assumed the liquid funds (L) and the exogenous collateral (C) to be
provided by the parent firm. For the market entry decision, this is the natural assumption.
Over time, however, the foreign affiliate may in turn accumulate earnings and collateral
goods that may affect the financing constraints for the volume of sales. A natural extension
of the model would thus be to take into account liquid funds and collateral goods provided
by the affiliate itself. It seems plausible to conjecture that funds provided by the affiliate
incur lower opportunity cost and/or dead weight losses than funds provided by the parent
firm.33 If this is the case, we would expect funds provided by the affiliate to be used first,
and only if they are not sufficient would we expect them to be supplemented by funds
provided by the parent.
3.2.4 Summing up
The model has rich implications for the determinants of firms’ intensive and extensive
margins of foreign activities. Higher productivity, more efficient liquidation of collat-
eral, better contract enforcement, and more lucrative foreign markets always increase the
volume of affiliate sales. Higher fixed cost decreases and higher internal funds increase
activities. The impact of these variables on the intensive margin depends on whether
the collateral constraint is binding. They have no effect on the intensive margin if the
available collateral is sufficiently large. Likewise, the impact of the size of the collateral
depends on the scenario considered. It should matter most when the collateral available
33 This is a topic discussed extensively in the literature on internal capital markets. See for example
Brusco and Panunzi (2005) or Inderst and Laux (2005). For a survey see Stein (2003).
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is low. Finally, our model predicts that financial constraints matter more for larger, more
productive firms, since these firms are more likely to be interested in foreign expansions.
Table 3.1 gives an overview of the results of the comparative static analyses.
3.3 Data and stylized facts
3.3.1 Data sources
To investigate the importance of real and financial constraints for the foreign investment
choices of firms, we use data from three sources.34 Dafne and Hoppenstedt are commer-
cial databases providing financial information on a large panel of firms that are active in
Germany.35 We use these datasets to obtain information on parent-level financial con-
straints and productivity. Information on the number of German firms’ foreign affiliates,
their sales, the host countries, and affiliate-level financial constraints are obtained from
the firm-level database on multinational firms MiDi (Microdatabase Direct Investment),
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank (Lipponer (2006)).
To eliminate outliers, we start from the full Dafne dataset and drop firms with negative
values for key variables such as sales and total assets. Also, as we need information on
cash flow and sales, we eliminate observations for firms which do not report an income
statement. We additionally truncate some of the data at the 1st and 99th percentile.
Finally, we drop observations showing large changes in sales or in the number of employees
from one year to another (increase by a factor of 10 or drop to 1/10 or less) in order to
control for possible merger-induced outliers.
Table 3.4 compares the structure of the sample after the outlier correction (“corrected
sample”) and the sample used for the regressions in Table 3.6 (“regression sample”). The
two samples are fairly similar in terms of the percentage allocation of the number of
firms across sectors. We have also compared the structure of our sample to the sectoral
structure of the German economy as a whole, and the rank correlation in terms of sectoral
structure of sales has proven to be quite high.
34 See Tables 3.2 and 3.3 for details.
35 Dafne is the German equivalent to the European firm-level database Amadeus. Bayraktar et al . (2005)
also use the German data from Amadeus for an analysis of firm-level domestic investment behavior.
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Table 3.1: Summary of the theoretical model and empirical measurement
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Table 3.2: Data
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics
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Table 3.4: Corrected versus regression sample
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3.3.2 Dependent and explanatory variables
Extensive and intensive margin
By merging the firm-level databases Dafne and Hoppenstedt with information on the
foreign affiliates of German firms provided in MiDi, we obtain a dataset which includes
two groups of firms. The first group contains purely domestic German firms, i.e. firms
which do not hold affiliates abroad (“Domestic Firms”) (94.5% of the firm-year obser-
vations). The second group consists of German firms with foreign affiliates (“German
MNEs”) (5.5%). From MiDi, we also obtain a count variable on the number of affiliates
that a given parent operates abroad. This serves as an additional proxy for the extensive
margin of foreign activities, which measures complex FDI strategies involving many af-
filiates. We also have information on the volume of a firm’s foreign affiliates’ sales as a
measure of the intensive margin.
Productivity
In line with the theoretical model, we use cost efficiency as a firm-level measure of produc-
tivity. Cost efficiency is given by parent sales over total cost, i.e. labor cost plus the cost
of other inputs. A higher value reflects higher cost efficiency, hence we expect a positive
sign. Higher sales relative to total cost might also reflect higher mark-ups. The expected
sign of the coefficient would be the same. We include the size of the parent as a measure
for its productivity, and the expected sign is positive.
Fixed cost
The parent’s fixed cost of investment is proxied by the ratio of fixed over total assets.
We use the ratio rather than the level of this variable as we additionally account for size
effects in our regressions. We expect a negative impact of the fixed asset share on the
extensive margin. The impact of this variable on the intensive margin could be insignifi-
cant, according to our model, if the collateral available is sufficiently large.
Internal funds
In our model, we distinguish liquid funds from less liquid collateral as two determinants
of financial constraints. Log cash flow of the parent is used to measure the internal funds
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available for financing a particular investment project. This variable should have a posi-
tive impact on the extensive margin of foreign activities. As in the case of fixed cost, its
impact could be insignificant on the intensive margin if the collateral available is suffi-
ciently large. In addition, we look at retained earnings of the affiliate as a measure for the
liquid funds available to the affiliate to finance the intensive margin. Again, the expected
sign is positive or insignificant.36
Collateral
The debt ratio measures leverage at the parent and at the affiliate levels ex ante. We can
interpret the debt ratio as a measure of the firms’ collateral – firms which are more highly
leveraged ex ante have, ceteris paribus, fewer assets available that can serve as collateral
for new credits. Hence, the expected sign for the parent debt ratio is negative for both
the extensive and the intensive margins if the collateral constraint is binding. Similarly,
the expected sign for the affiliate debt ratio is negative for the intensive margin. Firms
may also report a high leverage ratio precisely because they have taken out a credit in
order to finance FDI. If this were the correct interpretation, we should expect a positive
sign of the coefficient.
Foreign market size
In our theoretical model, we have described the attractiveness of the foreign market in
terms of the price that firms can fetch abroad for their product. In our empirical model,
we distinguish two aspects of foreign market size. The first is the size of the market
measured through its GDP. The second is the state of development of a foreign market
measured through GDP per capita. We expect a positive sign for both variables.
Contract enforcement
The probability of contract enforcement depends on two parameters - an index measuring
the difficulty of contract enforcement as well as the presence of affiliates of German banks
36 Following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) criticism, there has been a lively debate on the usefulness of
investment-cash flow sensitivities as a measure for financial constraints. The focus of the discussion
have been endogeneity issues as well as issues of adequately taking into account access to external
finance. See also Brown et al . (2009) for an overview of this discussion. We use lagged variables to
address the simultaneity of firm-level variables issue. We also include the debt ratio, as discussed
below.
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abroad. The variable (weak) contract enforcement gives the number of procedures required
to enforce contracts, and the expected impact is negative. This variable can be expected
to influence both the entry decision as well as the volume of activities, and we include
it for both margins. Affiliates of German banks should be at an advantage over other
lenders with regard to monitoring foreign affiliates and enforcing contracts. We use MiDi
to obtain information on the volume of FDI of German banks by country, and we expect
a positive impact on the intensive margin.
3.3.3 Stylized facts
In Figure 3.1, we visualize the differences between German MNEs and Domestic Firms by
plotting the Kernel densities of size (Figure 3.1(a)), cost efficiency (Figure 3.1(b)), cash
flow (Figure 3.1(c)), the debt ratio (Figure 3.1(d)), and the share of fixed assets (Figure
3.1(e)).
Figure 3.1(a) confirms stylized facts reported in earlier papers using firm-level data (e.g.
Mayer and Ottaviano (2008)): MNEs are larger than purely domestic firms. Unreported
one-sided t-tests on the equality of the means between the two sub-samples show that
this difference is statistically significant. Measuring size through the volume of sales gives
a very similar result. MNEs also exhibit a somewhat lower share of fixed assets (Figure
3.1(e)). Figure 3.1(b) shows that differences between the two types of firms in terms of
cost efficiency are small and, in fact, not significant.
Hence, while the dividing line between multinationals and non-multinationals is not as
clear-cut as might have been expected on the basis of the cost efficiency of these firms,
the dividing line is clear for measures of financial status. Multinationals have signifi-
cantly higher cash flow (Figure 3.1(c)) and lower debt ratios (Figure 3.1(d)). Prima facie,
these graphs suggest that heterogeneity with regard to the openness and international
orientation of firms could be driven by financial factors just as by real factors.
3.4 Productivity versus financial constraints: Regression results
Our main empirical model relates financial constraints and productivity to the pattern of
internationalization at the firm level. We are interested in two main questions. First, do
financial constraints and productivity affect the probability of investing abroad? Second,
do these factors affect the volume of foreign affiliates’ sales? We answer these questions
in two steps. In a first step, we analyze the determinants of the firms’ extensive margin of
FDI using the probability of investing abroad and the number of affiliates as dependent
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Figure 3.1: Firm characteristics by multinational status
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variable. In a second step, we analyze the sales of affiliates across countries, i.e. the
intensive margin. We also estimate the extensive and intensive margins jointly using a
Heckman selection model.
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Table 3.5: Probability of owning affiliates abroad
3 Financial constraints and the margins of FDI 72
3.4.1 Extensive margin
Our baseline regression for the extensive margin - the decision to enter a foreign market
- is given by the following probit model:
Pr(FDI)i,k,t = α0 + α1Zi,t−1 + α2Zk,t + α3I + α4S + α5T + i,t (3.13)
where Pr(FDI)i,k,t indicates whether a firm i has invested abroad in year t in country k.
Zi,t−1 (Zk,t) are vectors of firm-level (country-level) control variables.37 We include the
ratio of sales over total cost as a measure of cost efficiency. Our main proxies for financial
barriers are cash flow and the debt ratio. The country-level control variables are GDP,
GDP per capita, and the severity of contract enforcement. We additionally include firm
size, and a full set of industry (I), German states (S), and time (T ) dummies. These
dummies capture systematic differences across industries and states as well as common
macroeconomic effects. We also include an exporter dummy to account for the fact that
exporting is typically a stepping stone into international markets (see Helpman et al .
(2004)). This variable turns out to be positive and significant on the extensive margin
regarding the number of affiliates abroad but insignificant regarding the probability of
owning foreign affiliates.
Table 3.5 shows the results. Column (1) has the baseline specification for the full regression
sample. In columns (2)-(7), we split the sample by size, by sector (manufacturing versus
services), and by legal status (listed versus unlisted). While the sub-sample of listed firms
is small (6,165 versus 51,922 firm-country-year observations), it nevertheless serves as a
useful test of the impact of financial frictions. A priori, we expect financial frictions to be
less important for the listed firms with access to a larger range of financial sources.
Larger and more efficient firms are more likely to be multinationals. Size has a positive
and significant impact on the probability of being a multinational, and this effect is robust
across specifications. Contrary to expectations, cost efficiency is negative and significant
in some specifications. This effect is driven by certain sub-samples such as the large firms
and the services sector firms and suggests that size is a better proxy for productivity than
cost efficiency.
Our measure for fixed cost of market entry, the fixed asset share, has a strong and sig-
nificantly negative impact on the probability of investing abroad for all specifications, as
37 Firm-level regressors are lagged by one period to account for the simultaneity of the explanatory
variables.
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expected.38 Berman and Héricourt (2010) as well as Manova (2010) interpret the fixed
asset share as capturing the tangibility of assets, and hence as a measure of easier access
to external finance secured by collateral. Following their interpretation, the expected ef-
fect is positive. The negative coefficient we find suggests that, for FDI, our interpretation
is the more appropriate one. Financial constraints have a significant and robust impact
on the extensive margin. Cash flow is mostly positive and significant. The debt ratio
has an insignificant impact, consistent with the prediction of the model for non-binding
collateral constraints.
The marginal effects reported in Table 3.5 show a similar importance of productivity and
financial frictions. Generally, however, fixed cost of entry (the fixed asset share) and the
country-level variables are more important than variables such as size or the debt ratio.
Mean elasticities also show the strongest response to changes in log GDP (elasticity of
+0.66), cost efficiency (-0.45), firm size (+0.30), the fixed asset share (+0.23), and cash
flow (+0.16).
To study the interaction of productivity and financial constraints, we split the sample.
We take firm size as an indicator for firm productivity. One of the financial variables -
the debt ratio - is insignificant for both groups. The other - cash flow - matters for large
firms, but not for small firms. The latter finding may look counterintuitive at first sight,
as one would expect smaller firms to be more opaque and hence more likely to be affected
by financial constraints. Our finding is, however, consistent with the prediction of our
model that financial constraints should matter the more, the more productive the firm
and hence the more interested it is in expanding abroad.39 Financial constraints, in other
words, do not impede the foreign expansion of small firms because these firms are not
productive enough to invest abroad in the first place. It is also consistent with the finding
of Berman and Héricourt (2010) who observe that productivity has no effect on a firm’s
export decision if the firm faces financial constraints.
The country-level variables are significant and have the expected sign. GDP is positive and
significant, and GDP per capita is positive and significant for the full sample and for most
of the sample splits, thus confirming the expectation that market size matters. Consistent
38 An alternative interpretation of this finding is that firms with a large share of intangibles and thus
firm-specific know-how are more likely to venture abroad. These firms would also have a lower fixed
asset share.
39 Chaney (2005) distinguishes three classes of firms, with low, intermediate and high productivity. He
predicts that firms with low productivity are not affected by financial constraints, since investing
abroad is not a viable option for them, even without financial constraints. More productive firms,
instead, are hampered by financial constraints in their foreign expansion strategy. In his model, very
productive firms are by construction not liquidity constrained and hence not affected by financial
constraints.
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with our model, greater difficulties with contract enforcement lower the probability that
a given German firm enters a particular country.
In sum, our results show that parent-level financial constraints and productivity affect the
extensive margin of foreign entry: larger, more efficient, and firms with a lower share of
fixed assets are more likely to become multinationals. In addition, country-level variables
capturing contract enforcement and market size play an important role for the entry
decision.
3.4.2 Extensive margin: Number of affiliates
Table 3.6: Determinants of the number of affiliates
An alternative way of looking at the extensive margin of firms’ foreign activities is to
count the number of foreign affiliates that a given parent holds. Adding an affiliate
implies a new set-up cost, hence the count data models presented in Table 3.6 provide
information on the determinants of complex FDI strategies. The count data models
differ in their assumptions regarding the moments of the distribution and the presence
of unobserved individual heterogeneity. These models, therefore, allow controlling for the
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large share of zeros in our data to a differing degree.40 The basic count data model is
the Poisson model which is quite restrictive in assuming that the conditional mean of
the dependent variable equals the conditional variance. The Negative Binomial model
allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity and for overdispersion. It is the preferable
model, as the equidispersion assumption is strongly rejected for our data. Finally, zero-
inflated models assign an even higher weight to the probability of observing a zero in the
dependent variable.
Results from count data models support our finding that larger, less indebted parents,
firms with a lower share of fixed assets, and firms with higher cash flow are more active
internationally. Cost efficiency is negative or insignificant. The debt ratio has a negative
impact on the extensive margin when using the number of foreign affiliates. This is
consistent with the interpretation of high debt ratios as indicators of low collateral at the
parent level which is available to back up new lending.41
3.4.3 Intensive margin: Sales of affiliates
We now focus on the sales of the foreign affiliate, while taking the decision to become a
multinational as well as its location as given. The dependent variable log(Sales)ijk,t are
the sales of affiliate j of parent i in country k, and the regression equation includes control
variables at the parent level (Zi,t−1), at the affiliate level (Zj,t−1), and at the country level
(Zk,t):
log(Sales)ijk,t = α0 + α1Zi,t−1 + α2Zj,t−1 + α3Zk,t + α4S + α5T + ijk,t (3.14)
We estimate this equation as a parent-level fixed effects model; results are given in Ta-
ble 3.7. In contrast to the results for the extensive margin, all our parent-level measures
for real and financial constraints are insignificant for the intensive margin. Given that
most parent characteristics are already absorbed by the fixed effects, variables that cap-
ture parents’ real and financial constraints do not have an additional impact on the sales
of their affiliates. The retained earnings of the affiliate enter with a positive and signif-
icant sign in all specifications. Hence, the availability of liquid funds which also reflects
the profitability of the affiliate matters for the volume of activities.
Our host-country regressors again yield the expected signs. German firms have larger
foreign affiliates in larger countries and in countries hosting many German banks. While
the impact of market size per se is not surprising and would, in fact, be borne out by many
40 For a detailed description of count data models, see, for example, Jones et al . (2007).
41 Naturally, we omit the country-level variables from these regressions.
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theoretical models, the positive impact of bank FDI is in support of our theoretical model.
A greater presence of home country banks and thus familiarity of domestic lenders with
the foreign market should improve the collection of information on the foreign affiliate.
This increases the probability that collateral can be collected abroad, thus lowering the
cost of financing and increasing the volume of lending.
In columns (2)-(5), we perform similar sample splits by size and sector. The overall
findings are very similar with two exceptions. Size (negative) and cash flow (positive) are
weakly significant (at the 10%-level) for the large firms. The positive sign on cash flow is
consistent with the previous finding that financial constraints matter most for firms with
larger foreign activities. Also, within the group of already large firms, the relatively small
ones have higher foreign affiliate sales.
Whereas parent-level frictions do not matter for the volume of activities, financial frictions
at the affiliate level have an impact on affiliate sales. This is a novel finding since, to the
best of our knowledge, the joined impact of parent- and affiliate-level financial frictions has
not been analyzed before. These results suggest a hierarchy of financing foreign expansion,
where preference is given to local funds and only if they are not sufficient, parent funds
are used, albeit at potentially higher opportunity cost.
3.4.4 Heckman selection model
So far, we have treated the decision whether to enter a foreign country and the decision
how much to produce and sell separately. To check whether this assumption is justified, we
estimate a Heckman selection model, which explicitly accounts for the selection into the
FDI mode (Table 3.8). We use state dummies as exclusion restrictions, thus accounting
for the fact that - historically - different regions in Germany have different degrees of
international openness. Variables measured at the affiliate level and German bank FDI
abroad are included in the outcome but not in the selection equation. The Mills ratio in the
outcome equation – affiliate sales – is insignificant, which justifies our earlier assumption
to model the extensive and the intensive margin separately.
Qualitative results by and large confirm earlier findings. It is interesting to see that some
variables affect the probability of setting up an affiliate, but not the volume of its sales.
Higher cash flow has a positive impact on the selection into foreign status but not on
the volume of sales. This effect is, consistent with the findings reported above, driven by
the large firms. Country-level variables such as GDP and GDP per capita have a strong
positive impact on the extensive margin, but none on the intensive margin.
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Table 3.7: Determinants of the volume of affiliate sales
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Table 3.8: Determinants of the volume of affiliate sales
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Some parent-level variables such as cost efficiency (negative), size (positive) and fixed asset
share (negative) have a consistent impact on both margins.42 Affiliate’s retained earnings
have a strong and significant positive impact on the intensive margin, thus confirming
the previous finding that distinguishing parent- and affiliate level frictions is important.
(Weak) contract enforcement also influences both margins negatively, as expected. Bank
FDI has the expected positive impact on the intensive margin.
Finally, splitting the sample into small and large firms confirms that selection into foreign
status is affected by financial constraints for the large firms. Market size has a positive
and significant impact on the volume of foreign sales of large firms and a negative impact
on sales of small firms. This reflects scale economies and the sorting of smaller firms into
smaller markets.
3.4.5 Summing up
Comparing our empirical results to the theoretical predictions summarized in Table 3.1, we
find that they are more consistent with the scenario of non-binding than with the scenario
of binding collateral constraints. Our measure for the parent’s internal funds, cash flow,
is consistently significant for the extensive margin, but not for the intensive margin. Our
measure for the parent’s collateral, the debt ratio, is mostly insignificant at both the
extensive and intensive margin, the only exception being the Heckman selection equation
for large firms and the count model of affiliates where the coefficient of the parent’s debt
ratio is significantly negative. The fixed asset share as our measure for fixed cost is
significantly negative at the extensive and insignificant at the intensive margin, with the
exception of the Heckman outcome equation. Size is always significantly positive for the
extensive margin, and, in the Heckman outcome equation, also for the intensive margin.
Inconsistent with the model, our alternative measure of productivity (cost efficiency)
is frequently insignificant or exhibits the wrong sign. A similar observation has been
made by Greenaway et al . (2007) who find insignificant coefficients for their measure of
productivity (TFP) on firm’s export choice, but significantly positive coefficients for size.
3.5 Conclusions
Multinationals are large. Earlier literature focuses on differences in productivity across
firms as an explanation for this stylized fact. More productive firms find it easier to
42 Note that results in Table 3.8 are not fully comparable to those in Table 3.7 since we do not include
parent fixed effects in Table 3.8 but state, sector, and year fixed effects.
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shoulder the fixed cost of foreign entry, thus being more likely to enter new markets. This
chapter analyzes the importance of financial constraints as an additional barrier to entry
into foreign markets.
We provide a theoretical model and empirical evidence using data on firms’ extensive
margin of foreign activities (the probability to be a multinational firm) as well as their
intensive margin (the volume of affiliate sales across countries). Considering real barriers
to entry as captured by size/productivity and entry cost, we find that larger firms and firms
with a smaller share of fixed assets are consistently more likely to become multinationals,
and these firms also have larger foreign activities. Cost efficiency, in contrast, does not
have the expected positive impact.
Considering financial constraints, our empirical results confirm that these constraints
matter for foreign expansions. Parents with larger cash flow are more likely to become
multinationals and have more affiliates. For the intensive margin, we find a weaker impact
of parent-level financial constraints, but a strong positive impact of affiliate’s retained
earnings. This suggests a financing hierarchy for the intensive margin, with affiliate
financing to be the first and parent financing to be the second choice. Furthermore,
considering the interaction of real and financial barriers, financial constraints matter more
for large firms because these firms are most likely to expand abroad.
The findings of our essay have a number of implications for different literatures. To the
literature of multinational firms, we add a mechanism through which productivity and
financial constraints interact. Models ignoring financial constraints would predict that
enhancement of firm productivity could improve firms’ access to foreign markets. Our
results suggest that high productivity may be a necessary, but not a sufficient precondition
for foreign expansion. Lowering financial constraints might be just as important, as even
large and productive firms are hampered in their internationalization strategy by financial
constraints.
To the banking literature, we add a mechanism explaining why banks and non-financial
firms typically expand into foreign markets in tandem. One reason for the “follow their
customer” patterns in the data could be that home-country banks that are active abroad
could have comparative advantages over local banks in enforcing credit repayment and in
assessing the creditworthiness of FDI projects. This does not ultimately resolve the “follow
their customer” question, but the specific interaction between financial and real barriers
to entry that we stress may provide the possibility of testing this link more structurally.
Finally, our findings can have implications for the international macroeconomic litera-
ture. Essentially, the financial constraints imbedded in our model are similar to financial
accelerator mechanisms used to model the interaction between the financial sector and
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business cycles. In this sense, extensions of our model might provide useful insights into
credit channel mechanisms in open economies and the persistence of shocks triggering
entry into foreign markets.
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3.6 Mathematical appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We obtain x∗ by taking the first-order condition from (3.6) or (3.6a) respectively, setting
it equal to zero and solving for the optimal x∗. To see that x∗ ≤ xFB, note that 1+µz1+z < 1
if µ < 1, which is required for a positive collateral to be needed. pi∗ ≤ piFB follows directly
from x∗ ≤ xFB and can be shown analytically by checking that piFB > pi∗ whenever C > 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider first x∗. It is straightforward to see that:
dx∗
dβ
> 0,
dx∗
dp
> 0,
dx∗
dF
=
dx∗
dL
=
dx∗
dC
= 0
To obtain the remaining comparative statics, we evaluate first:
dz
dθ
=
−(1− q)(1− µq)θ − (1− q)(1− θ)(1− µq)
(1− µq)2θ2 = −
(1− q)
(1− µq)θ2 = −
z
θ(1− θ) < 0
and
dz
dµ
=
(1− q)(1− θ)q
(1− µq)2θ =
zq
(1− µq) > 0
Using these derivatives, we obtain:
dx∗
dθ
= (1 + β)qp
(1 + z)µdz
dθ
− (1 + µz)dz
dθ
(1 + z)2
= −(1 + β)qp(1− µ)
(−)︷︸︸︷
dz
dθ
(1 + z)2
> 0
and
dx∗
dµ
= (1 + β)qp
(1 + z)[µ dz
dµ
+ z]− (1 + µz) dz
dµ
(1 + z)2
= (1 + β)qp
(1 + z)z − (1− µ) dz
dµ
(1 + z)2
= (1 + β)qp
z
(1 + z)2
[1 + z − (1− µ)q
(1− µq)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
] > 0
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Consider next the comparative statics for pi∗.
dpi∗
dβ
> 0,
dpi∗
dp
> 0,
dpi∗
dF
< 0,
dpi∗
dL
> 0,
dpi∗
dC
= 0
are straightforward to see. To see that dpi∗
dθ
> 0 and dpi∗
dµ
> 0 , note that dx∗
dθ
> 0 and
dx∗
dµ
> 0. Using a revealed preference argument, it follows that the profit has to be in-
creasing in these parameters as well.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
We find the constrained optimal choice of x by solving the collateral constraint:
C + F =
[k(x) + F − L]− µqpx
(1− µq)θ
for x. This gives us a quadratic function of x which has the following solutions:
x1/2 = (1 + β)µqp±
√
(1 + β)2µ2q2p2 − 2(1 + β)[F − L− (1− µq)θ(C + F )]
Since we are looking at constrained levels of sales that fall short of the second-best level
of sales x∗, the solution for the investor is to choose the larger of the two levels of sales.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider first x. It is straightforward to see that: dx
dβ
> 0, dx
dp
> 0, dx
dF
< 0. dx
dL
> 0, dx
dC
>
0, dx
dθ
> 0
Finally, note that dx
dµ
> 0, because increasing µ relaxes the collateral constraint. To see
this, note that the right-hand side of:
C + F ≥ [k(x) + F − L]− µqpx
(1− µq)θ
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decreases in µ, for a given x. To see this, note that:
d[ [k(x)+F−L]−µqpx
(1−µq)θ ]
dµ
=
(1− µq)θ(−qpx)− (F + k(x)− L− µqpx)(−qθ)
(1− µq)2θ2 =
−qθpx− (F + k(x)− L)
(1− µq)2θ2 < 0
To see the comparative statics for pi note that they have the same signs as the compara-
tive statics for x because they follow from relaxing (or tightening) the constraints on the
constrained choice of x.
Q.E.D.
Chapter 4
On the use of information
in repeated insurance markets∗
4.1 Introduction
The vast majority of theoretical models on the insurance market are one-shot models of
either perfect competition or monopolistic behavior of insurance companies.43 However,
empirical evidence seems to suggest that in reality, the common market structure in most
insurance markets is oligopolistic. Concentration indices for the top 5 insurance companies
in the non-life business in Europe in 2002 ranged from 27% in Germany to 89% in Finland
(Buzzacchi and Valletti (2005)). Concentration measures in the life insurance sector in
most developed nations in the 1990s have been constantly high: even in the USA, the
least concentrated market, concentration indices for the top 5 insurance companies have
been above 25%, while they have been (high) above 50% in Australia, Canada, Japan
and the Netherlands (Bikker and van Leuvensteijn (2008)). Market concentration is also
reflected in insurance premiums (Dafny et al . (2009)).
Recently, numerous empirical studies have attempted to test the predictions of theoretical
models of insurance markets regarding the distribution and use of information in insur-
ance markets and its effects on market outcomes.44 Several empirical results are hard to
reconcile with standard theoretical models, and they suggest more work should be devoted
∗ This chapter is based on joint work with Heiner Schumacher.
43 Some of the few exceptions are Ania et al . (2002) who re-examine the equilibrium non-existence
problem of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) in a dynamic setting, and Buzzacchi and Valletti (2005) who
provide a model of strategic price discrimination in compulsory insurance markets.
44 See, for example, Chiappori et al . (2006) on general testable implications on insurance markets, Chi-
appori and Salanie (2008) on empirical issues in modeling competition and market equilibrium in
insurance markets, Cutler et al . (2008) on preference heterogeneity in insurance markets, Finkelstein
and Poterba (2006) on testing for adverse selection using unused observables.
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to analyzing imperfectly competitive models of insurance markets – or, in the words of
Chiappori et al . (2006), “there is a crying need for such models”.
In this chapter, we analyze a repeated oligopolistic insurance market. The main feature
of our model is that insurance companies take into account the impact of pricing deci-
sions on competitors’ actions. We think that analyzing repeated interaction is crucial to
understand the use of information in insurance markets for the following reasons:
First, our model provides an explanation for the puzzle of “unused observables” that has
been tested in several empirical papers, but that has not received interest in the theo-
retical literature. In theory, profit maximizing insurance companies should exploit any
risk-relevant information available to them.45 However, there is evidence of unused ob-
servables in insurance markets, that is information which a) insurance companies collect
or could collect, b) is correlated with the risk experience, but c) is not used by companies
to set prices. For example, according to Finkelstein and Poterba (2006), the address of the
insured person is almost always collected, but seldom used in pricing insurance, although
there is a correlation between geographic information and other individual attributes that
affects both the demand for insurance and the risk type. They use data on annuity pur-
chases in the UK to illustrate that the information on the annuitant’s residential location
would help to predict future mortality risk, but that it does not influence the insurance
premium. Gender is another example of an unused observable that is usually collected by
default, but that is not used for pricing in certain insurance markets, the most prominent
example being the the long-term care insurance market and the automotive insurance. In
both markets, the expected costs for the insurer differ substantially for men and women.46
Further empirical evidence on unused observables is provided by Brown and Finkelstein
(2007) (gender and place of residence in the U.S. long-term care insurance industry) and
Ivaldi (1996) (smoking in the French automobile insurance industry). Finkelstein and
Poterba (2006) conclude their article by stating that “a complete understanding of the
limited use in pricing of available or collectible risk-related information on insurance buy-
ers remains an open issue”.47
45 Under perfect competition, companies will use all information in order to charge the fair premium. A
monopolist will use all information in order to maximize profits through price discrimination.
46 See, for example, Finkelstein and Poterba (2006) or the “Gesamtverband der deutschen Ver-
sicherungswirtschaft”, (www.gdv.de), the association of German insurance companies.
47 They mention a number of possible reasons for the existence of unused observables, e.g. regulation or
implementation costs, but show that these cannot fully explain the puzzle.
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Second, the information available to insurance companies and the correlation with the
underlying risk of the insured is subject to constant change. The revolution in information
technologies has enabled insurance companies to collect, analyze and make use of large
amounts of information. An example of evolving information that has recently received
a lot of attention is that of genetic testing (Hoy and Witt (2007), Hoy and Polborn
(2000), Rees and Apps (2006)). Correlation like the one between an insured’s address
and socioeconomic status may change over time as the composition of residents in a
certain area changes. It is therefore important to know how insurance companies respond
to a constant change in their information about risks.
Third, in an oligopolistic insurance market, the existence of bulk discounts can also be
rationalized if companies collude and therefore make positive profits. In competitive
insurance markets with asymmetric information, high risk individuals will demand larger
quantities of insurance than low-risk individuals. In order for an insurance company to
break even, theory predicts that marginal prices should rise with quantity. However, in
reality, many insurance companies offer discounts in bulk (Cawley and Philipson (1999)
or Chiappori et al . (2006)).
In our model, there are two types of individuals who face either high or low risk of dam-
age. There is a finite number of insurance companies. They can distinguish between
these risks and compete for customers by setting insurance premia in each period. Com-
panies interact strategically and preconceive the effect of their pricing decision on the
prices set by their competitors in subsequent periods. If companies fear a price war after
adjusting their prices, they may refrain from doing so. We show that even if insurance
companies can distinguish between risk types, equilibria exist in which (1) insurance com-
panies charge the same insurance premium to both risks, and (2) both risk types purchase
positive amounts of insurance (however, low risks potentially acquire less insurance than
high risks). Thus, we derive an equilibrium with unused observables. Furthermore, if
companies make positive profits out of all risks, it may be rational for them to offer bulk
discounts.
We then show that the same equilibrium outcome is possible if insurance companies cannot
distinguish between high and low risks, i.e. if there is asymmetric information. This
renders possible the following explanation for the existence of unused observables: initially,
there exists a collusive equilibrium in an insurance market with asymmetric information.
Then, after analyzing their data, insurance companies learn how to distinguish between
high and low risks. However, they maintain their pricing schedules in order to sustain
collusion.
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In the next step, we analyze the robustness of our model with regard to two extensions.
First, we allow for market entry.48 Outside firms can enter the market incurring some
entry costs and become incumbent firms for the rest of the game. Second, we allow for
explicit collusion between firms, i.e. they can agree on charging the profit-maximizing
insurance premia for low and high risks. If they can negotiate with each other, companies
are likely to exploit their information. We show that if entry costs are neither too high
nor too low, there exist equilibria with unused observables in which incumbent companies
cannot gain by explicit collusion. The intuition for this result is as follows: if incumbent
companies decide to increase their period profits by charging different premia for low
and high risks, outside companies can enter the market profitably by making a one-shot
gain. If on the other side one incumbent company undercuts the insurance premium of
its competitors, it triggers a price war, which wipes out all gains of this deviation. We
therefore show that equilibria with unused observables can be robust to explicit collusion
and to the threat of market entry. In these equilbria, it does not pay off to use the
information about risks as the maximal level of per-period profits can already be attained
without this information.
At a technical level, our essay also contributes to the literature of third-degree price
discrimination.49 In the case where insurance companies are able to distinguish between
high- and low-risk costumers, they have to decide whether to charge the same or different
prices to two groups of costumers who differ in their willingness to pay. This literature
has introduced the possibility of firms’ competition, but it has not analyzed equilibrium
strategies in the repeated game.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: The next section outlines the basic model
and derives an equilibrium with unused observables. We include explicit collusion and
market entry into the model in section 4.3. In section 4.4, we provide further examples
of the evolution of the use of information in insurance industries, and discuss welfare and
policy implications. The last section concludes.
48 Bikker and van Leuvensteijn (2008) show empirically that market entry is indeed a relevant phe-
nomenon in insurance markets in the countries analyzed in their study (Canada, Germany, Japan, the
Netherlands, and the UK).
49 See Tirole (1988), chapter 3.2 for a summary of this issue.
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4.2 A repeated insurance market
4.2.1 Framework
Time is discrete and denoted by t ∈ {0, 1, ...}. The stage game is the simplest version
of an insurance market.50 In each period, there is a continuum of customers of mass 1.
These can be the same customers or different ones in each period.51 Each customer has
wealth W in each period, and faces the risk of losing an amount of d < W . She may
have either a high-risk probability of piH or a low-risk probability piL < piH . Let λ be the
fraction of high-risk individuals. All customers have the same von Neuman-Morgenstern
utility function U(W ).52 We assume that U(W ) is twice continuously differentiable with
U ′(W ) > 0 and U ′′(W ) < 0.
There are N > 1 long-lived risk-neutral insurance companies in the market. Let I =
{1, ..., N} be the set of insurance companies. First, we will assume that these companies
can distinguish between high- and low-risk customers.53 At a later stage, we will turn
to the case of asymmetric information. In each period, each company i ∈ I offers any
positive amount of insurance.54 Let αi,tH (α
i,t
L ) be the insurance premium for high-risk
(low-risk) individuals offered by company i in period t. If an individual of risk j ∈ {L,H}
purchases an insurance cover Dj ≥ 0 in period t from company i, she pays Djαi,tj to
the company in this period, regardless of whether damage occurs or not. If the damage
50 As formalized, for example, in Rees and Wambach (2008).
51 There may also be a certain in- and outflow of individuals in each period. As long as not all customers
are locked into a specific contract for all periods, the results of the model do not change.
52 This only simplifies the exposition of the model. All of our results would also hold if customer are
heterogeneous in their risk aversion (the only thing we need is that customers are risk averse to some
extent). Note that in standard models of the insurance market, the assumption of a uniform utility
function is not innocuous, see Smart (2000).
53 An alternative interpretation would be that insurance companies cannot perfectly distinguish risks,
but have imperfect information (variables which are imperfectly correlated with risk types) which can
be used to categorize risks, as in Hoy (1982).
54 We thereby assume non-exclusive provision of insurance which is different from most insurance market
models, where companies offer price-quantity combinations (such as Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)).
The assumption of non-exclusivity is not crucial for some markets such as the life insurance market
(see Polborn et al . (2006)). However, for property-liability insurance exclusivity it is more natural (we
are indebted to Michael Hoy for pointing out this fact to us). In terms of our model, non-exclusivity is
not needed for the results on the insurance market with symmetric information in sections 4.2.2 and
4.3. For the results on the insurance market with asymmetric information in section 4.2.3 it is needed
for our characterization of equilibrium outcomes, but not for the existence of collusive equilibria.
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occurs, she gets Dj from the company, i.e. Dj = d implies full coverage. We say that
company i uses the information about risks in period t if αi,tH 6= αi,tL .
Customers are not modelled as strategic players: in each period, they purchase the utility
maximizing insurance cover from the company that offers at the cheapest premium for
their risk. If more than one company has the lowest insurance premium, each customer
randomizes with equal probability from which company she buys insurance. The sequence
of events in each period t is as follows:
1. Insurance companies announce the insurance premia
{(
αi,tL , α
i,t
H
)}
i∈I .
2. Customers purchase insurance DL and DH .
3. Nature decides about the occurrence of damage and payoffs are realized.
Now fix
αi,−1L = α
i,−1
H = 0 (4.1)
for all i ∈ I. For t ∈ {0, 1, ...}, we denote by ht the history of all insurance premia that
were charged by all insurance companies up to period t :
ht =
({(
αi,−1L , α
i,−1
H
)}
i∈I ,
{(
αi,0L , α
i,0
H
)}
i∈I , ...,
{(
αi,t−1L , α
i,t−1
H
)}
i∈I
)
. (4.2)
The set of all possible histories at date t will be denoted by Ht. A strategy of company i is
an infinite sequence of action functions αi,t for every t ∈ {0, 1, ...}, where αi,t determines
αi,tL and α
i,t
H as a function of the history ht:
αi,t : Ht → R2. (4.3)
Without loss of generality we concentrate on pure strategies. The strategies of companies
determine the sequence of insurance premia{{(
αi,tL , α
i,t
H
)}
i∈I
}∞
t=0
. (4.4)
From this sequence, we can derive the profit Gi,t of company i in period t. Insurance com-
panies discount future gains by δ. The sum of normalized discounted profits of company
i is then given by
Gi = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δtGi,t. (4.5)
The insurance market is in equilibrium if no company i can increase its profit Gi by
choosing unilaterally another strategy.
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4.2.2 Equilibria in an oligopolistic insurance market with symmetric infor-
mation
We start by analyzing the demand for insurance. Assume for a moment that company i
offers the lowest insurance premium to individuals with risk j ∈ {L,H} in period t. A
customer with risk j purchases the utility maximizing amount of insurance:
D˜j(α
i,t
j ) = arg maxDjpijU
(
W − d+Dj(1− αi,tj )
)
+ (1− pij)U
(
W −Djαi,tj
)
. (4.6)
This demand is implicitly given by
U ′
(
W − d+ D˜j(αi,tj )(1− αi,tj )
)
U ′
(
W − D˜j(αi,tj )αi,tj
) = αi,tj (1− pij)(
1− αi,tj
)
pij
. (4.7)
As U ′ is continuous, D˜j(αi,tj ) must also be continuous. The fair insurance premium under
which the customer purchases full coverage is given by
αfj = pij, (4.8)
while the highest insurance premium such that the customer is indifferent between pur-
chasing a marginal unit of insurance cover or not is uniquely defined by
αmaxj =
pij
(1− pij) U ′(W )U ′(W−d) + pij
. (4.9)
For insurance premia αi,tj ∈
(
αfj , α
max
j
)
demand is positive and company i earns a positive
profit from contracts with individuals of risk pij. For higher insurance premia, profits are
0, for lower insurance premia, profits are negative. Note that if piL is sufficiently close to
piH , we have αfH < α
max
L . Define
α˜j ∈ arg maxαj ∈ R(αj − pij)D˜j(αj). (4.10)
This is well-defined, as (αj − pij)D˜j(αj) is continuous on the interval
[
αfj , α
max
j
]
and
therefore attains its maximum.
Assume now that only company i offers the lowest premium for customers of both types,
but does not use the information about the insured risk, i.e. αi,tL = α
i,t
H = α
i,t
P , where α
i,t
P
is called the “pooling premium”. We then have
Gi,t = λD˜H(α
i,t
P )
(
αi,tP − piH
)
+ (1− λ) D˜L(αi,tP )
(
αi,tP − piL
)
. (4.11)
Denote by αP0 the pooling premium at which the right-hand side of (4.11) is equal to 0
such that αi,tP ∈ (αP0, αmaxH ) implies positive demand for insurance by at least the high-risk
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individuals and positive profits from the pooling contract. Note that αfH < α
max
L implies
αfL < αP0 < α
f
H . We then can state our first main result:
Proposition 1 (a) For each α ∈ (αP0, αmaxH ) there is a δ(α) < 1 such that there exists a
subgame-perfect equilibrium in which αi,tP = α for all companies i ∈ I and in all periods
t if δ ≥ δ(α). (b) If α /∈ (αP0, αmaxH ), then no such equilibrium exists. (c) We have that
limα↓αP0 δ(α) = 1.
Proof. (a) Consider the following simple grim-trigger strategy which is played by all
companies i ∈ I: charge αi,0P = α. In period t > 0, charge αi,tP = α if and only if
αl,τL = α
l,τ
H = α, l ∈ I, in all periods τ ∈ {0, ..., t− 1}. Otherwise, charge αi,tL = αfL and
αi,tH = α
f
H . We employ the one stage deviation principle in order to show that this can
be an equilibrium. If at least one company charges the fair insurance premia αfL and α
f
H ,
no other company can make positive profits. Thus, the maximal normalized discounted
profit from a deviation of company i in period t is given by
Gi,d = (1− δ)
[
λ(α˜H − piH)D˜H(α˜H) + (1− λ)(α˜L − piL)D˜L(α˜L)
]
. (4.12)
The normalized discounted profit from compliance is given by
Gi,c =
1
N
[
λ(α− piH)D˜H(α) + (1− λ)(α− piL)D˜L(α)
]
. (4.13)
As α ∈ (αP0, αmaxH ), this term is positive. Thus, if δ is sufficiently close to unity, we have
Gi,c ≥ Gi,d. (b) If αfL < α ≤ αP0 and αi,tP = α for all i ∈ I and in all periods t, a single
company l could increase its normalized discounted profit by charging αl,0L = α, α
l,0
H = α
f
H
and the fair premia thereafter. If α ≤ αfL and αi,tP = α for all i ∈ I and in all periods t,
a single company l could increase its normalized discounted profit by charging αl,tL = α
f
H
and αl,tH = α
f
H in all periods t. If α
max
H ≤ α and αi,tP = α for all i ∈ I and in all periods t,
a single company l could increase its normalized discounted profit by charging αl,0L = α˜H ,
αl,0H = α˜L and the fair premia thereafter. (c) Assume that an equilibrium exists in which
αi,tP = α for all i ∈ I and in all periods t. Then the normalized discounted profit for each
firm is equal to the term in (4.13). Note that this term converges to 0 as α approaches
αP0 from above. The maximal normalized discounted profit of a deviating firm can be at
least
(1− δ)(1− λ)(αP0 − piL)D˜L(αP0) > 0. (4.14)
Thus, we must have limα↓αP0 δ(α) = 1.
In the equilibria of proposition 1, insurance companies fear a price war if they change
their insurance premia. Thus, they maintain a pooling premium, which guarantees them
positive profits. This situation exhibits the following features:
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• Although companies have more detailed information about risks, they do not use
it. Thus, we have an equilibrium with unused observables.
• Given that piL is sufficiently close to piH , both low- and high-risk individuals pur-
chase positive amounts of insurance. However, there is adverse selection: as we can
derive from equation (4.7), low-risk customers purchase less insurance than high-risk
customers.
4.2.3 Equilibria in an oligopolistic insurance market with asymmetric infor-
mation
We now turn to the case where insurance companies cannot distinguish between high-
and low-risk individuals and show that a result similar to proposition 1 holds. Because of
asymmetric information, each firm i ∈ I only charges a pooling premium α˜i,tP in period t
and customers purchase the amount of insurance which maximizes their expected utility
from the firm that charges the lowest insurance premium. Fix
α˜i,−1P = 0 (4.15)
for all i ∈ I. For t ∈ {0, 1, ...}, we denote by h˜t the history of all insurance premia that
were charged by all insurance companies up to period t :
h˜t =
({
α˜i,−1P
}
i∈I ,
{
α˜i,0P
}
i∈I , ...,
{
α˜i,t−1P
}
i∈I
)
. (4.16)
The set of all possible histories at date t will be denoted by H˜t. A strategy of company i is
an infinite sequence of action functions α˜i,t for every t ∈ {0, 1, ...}, where α˜i,t determines
α˜i,tP as a function of the history h˜t:
α˜i,t : H˜t → R. (4.17)
Again, we concentrate on pure strategies. The strategies of companies determine the
sequence of insurance premia{{
α˜i,tP
}
i∈I
}∞
t=0
(4.18)
from which the sum of normalized discounted profits G˜i can be calculated as in the last
subsection. The rest of the model remains unchanged. Define
AP =
{
α˜P | α˜P ∈ arg maxα ∈ Rλ(α− piH)D˜H(α) + (1− λ)(α− piL)D˜L(α)
}
,(4.19)
which is the set of pooling-premia, such that the maximal gain from pooling contracts is
attained and
α˜∗P = min {α˜P ∈ AP} , (4.20)
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which is the smallest element in this set. We then can derive:
Proposition 2 Assume that companies cannot distinguish between high- and low risks.
For each α ∈ [αP0, αmaxH ) there is a δ˜(α) < 1 such that there exists a subgame-perfect
equilibrium in which α˜i,tP = α for all companies i ∈ I and in all periods t if δ ≥ δ˜(α). (b)
If α /∈ [αP0, αmaxH ), then no such equilibrium exists. (c) If α > αP0 is sufficiently small,
then δ˜(α) = 1− 1
N
.
Proof. Observe that one equilibrium of the stage game is α˜iP = αP0 for all i ∈ I, therefore
it is an equilibrium if α˜i,tP = αP0 for all i ∈ I and in all periods t. In this equilibrium, all
companies make zero-profits. Assume now that α ∈ (αP0, αmaxH ). Consider the following
simple grim-trigger strategy which is played by all companies i ∈ I: charge α˜i,0P = α. In
period t > 0, charge α˜i,tP = α if and only if α˜
l,τ
P = α, l ∈ I, in all periods τ ∈ {0, ..., t− 1}.
Otherwise, charge α˜i,tP = αP0. If at least one company charges αP0, no other company can
make positive profits. Thus, the maximal normalized discounted profit from a deviation
of company i in period t is given by
Gi,d = (1− δ)
[
λ(α˜∗P − piH)D˜H(α˜∗P ) + (1− λ)(α˜∗P − piL)D˜L(α˜∗P )
]
. (4.21)
The normalized discounted profit from compliance is given by
Gi,c =
1
N
[
λ(α− piH)D˜H(α) + (1− λ)(α− piL)D˜L(α)
]
. (4.22)
As α ∈ (αP0, αmaxH ), this term is positive. Thus, if δ is sufficiently close to unity, we have
Gi,c ≥ Gi,d. (b) If α < αP0 and α˜i,tP = α for all i ∈ I and in all periods t, a single company
l could increase its normalized discounted profit by charging α˜l,tL = αP0 in all periods t. If
αmaxH ≤ α and α˜i,tP = α for all i ∈ I and in all periods t, a single company l could increase
its normalized discounted profit by charging α˜l,0L = α˜
∗
P and α˜
l,τ
L = αP0 in all periods τ
thereafter. (c) Define
G(α) = λ(α− piH)D˜H(α) + (1− λ)(α− piL)D˜L(α) (4.23)
and observe that G(α) is continuous on the interval (αP0, αmaxH ) with G(αP0) = 0. Thus,
there must exist an αˆ with αP0 < αˆ ≤ α˜∗P , such that G(α) strictly increases in the
interval (αP0, αˆ). Consider the same strategy as in part (a) for α ∈ (αP0, αˆ). As before,
the normalized discounted profit from compliance is then 1
N
G(α), while the normalized
discounted profit from a deviation is (1 − δ)G(α). Consequently, the critical discount
factor equals 1− 1
N
.
The results of proposition 1 and proposition 2 enable the following interpretation: the ar-
rival of new information about risks does not necessarily change the equilibrium outcome.
Suppose that the market is in an equilibrium with asymmetric information in which all
4 On the use of information in repeated insurance markets 95
insurance companies charge a premium of α˜ ∈ (αP0, αmaxH ) in each period (proposition 2
says that this is possible). If in that situation new information about risks arrives (as a
result of data-collection, for example), then, by proposition 1, the market can enter an
equilibrium with symmetric information and with exactly the same equilibrium outcome
(given that δ is sufficiently high). This is especially relevant if collusion must be tacit and
companies avoid explicit negotiations. In particular, we have shown that almost every
equilibrium outcome under asymmetric information is also an equilibrium outcome under
symmetric information.
Whether an equilibrium outcome survives the arrival of new information about risks
or not, might depend on the extent of collusion: observe from proposition 1 (c) and
proposition 2 (c) that if profits are low under asymmetric information (i.e. if α˜i,tP is close
to αP0 for all i), the critical discount factor is just 1− 1N , while it is very close to 1 under
symmetric information. Thus, if profits are low, then the arrival of new information
potentially triggers a price war and a change of the equilibrium outcome. Compared to
that, the critical discount factor equals 1 − 1
N
under both asymmetric and symmetric
information if α˜i,tP = α˜
∗
P for all i (which can be shown by going through the same steps as
in the proof of proposition 2 (c)), i.e. if profits are relatively high.
Whenever insurance companies can make expected profits out of all contracts, it is not
difficult to imagine a situation when they do so by granting bulk discounts (instead of
linear pricing) to customers, as discovered by Cawley and Philipson (1999). This especially
makes sense when firms face administrative fixed costs per contract, such that selling more
insurance to some risks increases the expected profit per unit of insurance.
4.3 Explicit collusion and market entry
The equilibria in the last section had a number of attributes that are inconsistent with the
results of one-shot models of the insurance market, but consistent with empirical results.
However, there remain two important issues:
• If an industry makes profits, we would expect market entry.
• If companies are able to sustain collusion, they should be able to increase their
profits even further by using the information about risks, i.e. they may coordinate
on an equilibrium in which all firms discriminate between risks and charge αi,tH = α˜H
and αi,tL = α˜L in all periods t.
55
55 Here we implicitly assume that α˜H 6= α˜L which is true for most standard utility-functions.
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We will deal with both questions in this section and show that the equilibria of proposition
1 still can be robust against market entry and explicit collusion. In all what follows, we
will again consider a scenario with symmetric information. Note that explicit collusion
is illegal in most legislations and tacit collusion (i.e. collusion without communication
between firms) hard to detect.56 We will not rely on this, but assume that firms can
negotiate without being exposed to the danger of punishment.
Denote the set of incumbent companies in each period by It, where
I0 = {1, ..., N} .
In each period t, there is an infinite number of outside firms k ∈ N\It which can enter
the market at cost c > 0.57 These entry costs can be interpreted as installation costs,
for example, the costs of acquiring the necessary distribution channels. If an outside
company enters the market, it belongs to the set of incumbents in all future periods
and can distinguish between high and low risks.58 As tie-breaking rule we define that a
company only enters the market if it can make strictly positive profits. Furthermore, we
define:
Definition An equilibrium is robust against explicit collusion if there is no other weakly
pareto superior equilibrium for incumbent companies.
If an equilibrium in which companies i ∈ I0 do not use the information about risks is
robust against explicit communication, any agreement on adjusting insurance premia to
increase profits must result in a decrease of profits for at least one incumbent company,
and therefore would not be accepted by this company.59
We assume that in each period, outside companies observe the insurance premia charged
by incumbent companies and then decide about whether to enter the market or not. Thus,
56 For a discussion about the difference between explicit and tacit collusion, see Rees (1993).
57 This also could be insurance companies which offer the same insurance contracts, but at substantially
higher rates, such that only a small fraction of uninformed consumers (who do not compare insurance
premia, but randomly choose some contract) purchases those contracts.
58 This particular model of market entry was introduced by Harrington (1989).
59 Note that robustness against explicit collusion is weaker than (weak) renegotiation proofness. For
details about renegotiation proofness, see Mailath and Samuelson (2006), pages 134 - 143. One also
could construct weak renegotiation proof equilibria in our setting, however, their structure is not
interesting for our purpose.
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incumbent companies are Stackelberg leaders and market entry is endogenous as in Etro
(2008). The sequence of events now is as follows:
1. Insurance companies announce the insurance premia
{(
αi,tL , α
i,t
H
)}
i∈It .
2. Outside companies decide whether to enter the market at cost c or not. If a company
k ∈ N\It enters the market, it subsequently sets its insurance premia
(
αk,tL , α
k,t
H
)
.
3. Costumers purchase insurance DL and DH .
4. Nature decides about the occurrence of damage and payoffs are realized.
5. If a company k ∈ N\It has entered the market, then It+1 = It ∪ {k}.
Clearly, as entry costs are positive, incumbents can price outside companies out of the
market. However, if entry costs are small, then per-period profits also must be small. If
these profits are generated by charging a pooling premium such that low risks subsidize
high risks, then it can be profitable for an outside firm to enter the market and to make
a one-shot gain by offering contracts only to low risks. We therefore get:
Proposition 3 If c is sufficiently small, then in equilibrium all companies that make
positive profits in period t use the information about risks in this period.
Proof. Assume that this is not the case and an incumbent company i ∈ It charges
αi,tP ∈ (αP0, αmaxH ) and makes a positive profit in period t. If follows that αl,tj ≥ αi,tP for all
l ∈ It and j ∈ {L,H}. If an outside company k ∈ N\It enters the market, then it earns
at least
−c+ (1− λ)(αP0 − piL)D˜L(αP0), (4.24)
by charging αk,tL = αP0 and α
k,t
H = α
f
H , given that there is no other outside company which
enters the market. The term in (4.24) is positive if c is sufficiently low. Therefore, the
situation outlined above cannot be an equilibrium outcome if c is sufficiently low.
Thus, the equilibria of proposition 1 are not robust against market entry, if entry costs are
sufficiently small. However, we do not expect entry barriers to be negligible for insurance
markets. If c is sufficiently high, the existence of equilibria with pooling premia might be
restored. Define α˜∗P as in the last section and denote
Ghigh = λ(α˜∗P − piH)D˜H(α˜∗P ) + (1− λ)(α˜∗P − piL)D˜L(α˜∗P ), (4.25)
Glow = maxα ∈
[
αfL, α
f
H
]
(1− λ)(α− piL)D˜L(α). (4.26)
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Ghigh is the highest period profit from a pooling contract, Glow is the highest period profit
that can be made by selling contracts only to low risks and by charging a premium in the
interval
[
αfL, α
f
H
]
. For piH → piL, we have αfH → αfL, such that Glow → 0. Thus, if piH is
sufficiently close to piL, then Ghigh > Glow. We then can show:
Proposition 4 Assume that δ > 1 − 1
N
and Ghigh > Glow. If c ∈ (Glow, Ghigh), then
there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium which is robust against explicit collusion and in
which αi,tP = α, α ∈
(
αfH , α˜
∗
P
)
, for all incumbent companies i ∈ I0 in all periods t, while
outside firms do not enter the insurance market.
Proof. Define for G ∈ (Glow, Ghigh)
αG = min
α
{
α ∈
(
αfH , α˜
∗
P
)
| λ(α− piH)D˜H(α) + (1− λ)(α− piL)D˜L(α) = G
}
.(4.27)
Fix a value G∗ ∈ (Glow, Ghigh). Assume that in each period, incumbent companies play a
grim-trigger strategy that also deters entry: Charge αi,tP = α
G∗ if and only if αl,τL = α
l,τ
H =
αG
∗ , l ∈ I0, and Iτ = I0 in all periods τ ∈ {0, ..., t− 1}. Otherwise, charge αi,tL = αfL and
αi,tH = α
f
H . We show that this strategy can support an equilibrium. If a company i ∈ I0
undercuts αG∗ in period t, then the definition of αG, the continuity of αD˜j(α) and the
fact that G∗ > Glow ensure that Gi,t < G∗. Given that no outside company ever enters
the market, an incumbent company complies to this strategy if
1
N
G∗ > (1− δ)G∗, (4.28)
which is equivalent to
δ > 1− 1
N
. (4.29)
The tie-breaking rule implies that an outside company will not enter if and only if
G∗ ≤ c. (4.30)
Thus, if c ∈ (Glow, Ghigh) and (4.29) holds, then an equilibrium with no market entry,
G∗ = c, αi,tP = α
G∗ for all i ∈ I0 and all t exists and is robust against explicit collusion.
The logic of these equilibria is again simple. As incumbent companies play a grim-
trigger strategy, they refrain from changing their pricing schedule. The punishment is
also triggered if an outside company enters the market. Therefore, the period profit is
limited to entry costs, otherwise it would pay off for an outside company to enter the
market and make a one-shot gain. Therefore, incumbent companies cannot coordinate on
insurance premia, such that they earn strictly higher profits.
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The upper bound on entry costs, Ghigh, ensures that a period profit equal to 1
N
c per
incumbent company can be attained by charging a pooling premium. If entry costs
are much higher than Ghigh, incumbent companies can increase their profits by explicit
collusion and by using their information about risks. The lower bound, Glow, is needed
to make sure that no incumbent company can gain by undercutting the premium for
customers with small risk if the period payoff is equal to 1
N
c for each incumbent company.
If entry costs are lower, incumbent companies could still deter entry by charging low
insurance premia, but they would have to use the information about risks in some periods,
otherwise each incumbent company could gain by one-shot deviation. The measure of
admissible values of c can be substantial: Glow strictly decreases in λ and will be small if
piH is close to piL, while Ghigh can be large if customers are very risk averse and ready to
pay a high risk premium.
The result of proposition 3 remains valid if incumbents use other punishment strategies
to deter market entry or deviation from pooling premia. However, the maximal period
profit for incumbent companies may decrease. Consider, for example, a tit-for-tat strategy
where incumbent companies again start to charge profitable pooling premia after a finite
number of periods with zero-profits. Then in an equilibrium with entry-deterrence, the
period profit per incumbent company must be lower than 1
N
c. Otherwise, an outside
company could enter the market, cover its entry costs by capturing the whole market
(as it earns c), and participate in future business profitably after the price war has been
finished.
4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 Examples of the evolution of information in insurance markets
Our model interprets the presence of unused observables as a sign of collusion. This is
in accordance with experience in the US automotive insurance market where, as long as
companies were making extensive profits, contracts were almost not differentiated by risk
class (Carter (2005)). However, as profits in the market started to deteriorate in the
late 1990s, one insurance company (Allstate), changed the number of pricing categories
from 3 to over 1,500. As a consequence, Allstate’s return on equity almost doubled in
the following two years. However, as the author points out, this strategy might not be
of lasting success, as other insurance companies also start to change their pricing system,
and a price war in the auto insurance market is on its way.
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It seems to be the case that it is often small firms or new entrants who start using a finer
risk classification (Finkelstein and Poterba (2006)). Ainslie (2000) provides an example
of the U.K. annuity market where new start-up companies were formed to offer impaired
annuity products to those individuals in observable poor health. Only under increased
competitive pressure did the existing companies follow suit.
The evolution of the use of information in the European Union has followed the evolution
of competition in the insurance industry. Before 1994, when the European Commission
completed a series of directives in order to remove obstacles to competition, the insurance
markets in several European countries such as Germany and Italy were tightly regulated.
Considering the use of information in automotive insurance in Germany, risk categories
were rather coarse and involved extensive pooling (Rees and Kessner (1999)), while in
Italy, companies were even restricted by law to a very limited number of parameters they
could use in their pricing schemes (Buzzacchi and Valletti (2005)). After deregulation, as a
consequence of increased competition, premiums in automotive insurance have undergone
large reductions, and at the same time companies introduced contracts with finer risk
categorization, see Rees and Kessner (1999) and Buzzacchi and Valletti (2005). However,
in some markets, such as the annuity market in Germany, the companies remain in an
equilibrium where contracts are almost not differentiated by risks classes at all.
4.4.2 Welfare and policy implications
The sole existence of unused observables is a signal of anti-competitive behavior in the
insurance industry for the regulator. Therefore, the presence of unused observables could
be used as a policy tool by competition authorities. Given that customers are aware of
their individual risk, equilibria with unused observables are clearly inefficient: as long as
customers are not forced to purchase full coverage (for example, by regulation), they will
buy too little insurance.
Considering the debate on whether insurance companies should be allowed to gather
genetic information or not,60 there are cases where it might be welfare enhancing if not
all information is used to set prices: if customers do not know their individual risk,
genetic testing might impose ex-ante a classification risk on potential insurance buyers.
However, our analysis shows that there are good reasons for insurance companies not
to use genetic information in their pricing schedules: firstly, adjusting pricing schedules
60 For an in-depth discussion of this issue consult Polborn et al . (2006), Strohmenger and Wambach
(2000) and the papers cited there.
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without coordination with other companies might trigger a price war. Secondly, using
more information only makes sense for companies if profits rise. Companies might refrain
from using all additional information in their pricing decisions for fear of market entry.
4.5 Conclusion
Recently, several empirical findings have contradicted the predictions of the standard
one-shot model of an insurance market. Our model of an oligopolistic insurance market
rationalizes the occurrence of two formerly unexplained phenomena, unused observables
and bulk discounts.
From the model we derived two explanations why firms may not use all risk-relevant
information: first, if firms collude tacitly and available information changes over time, then
they possibly refrain from using new information in order to prevent a price war. Second,
if there is the threat of market entry, then per-period profits are limited. Whenever firms
attain the upper limit of per-period profits, it does not pay off for incumbents to include
more information. Under both scenarios, firms can make positive profits out of contracts
with high and low risks and therefore may offer bulk discounts to customers.
A number of extensions to our model can be made. We used a very simple model of an
insurance market, where in each period a new cohort of customers arrives. Usually, a
customer is insured over a longer time horizon and the insurance company can condition
premia for this customer on her history of damages. Thus, experience rating could be
introduced into the model. Eventually, firms may find it optimal to skip experience rating
in order to simplify collusion. Furthermore, one can analyze more complex forms of collu-
sion like, for example, collusion on several different insurance markets as in Bernheim and
Whinston (1990). Note that many insurance companies offer various types of insurance.
Finally, more empirical work on contracts and collusion in insurance markets would be
desirable to investigate the use of information by insurance companies.
Chapter 5
What if everybody had a choice?
Using hypothetical choice experiments to analyze
the demand for prescription drug insurance
5.1 Introduction
“To say it as plainly as I can, health care reform is the single most important thing we
can do for America’s long-term fiscal health” (President Barack Obama, speech at the
American Medical Association, June 15, 2009).
The USA is the country with the single most expensive health care system in the world
(more than 16.2 percent of GDP in 2007) – health care costs per person are almost 50
percent higher than those in the next most costly nation.61 Real health care costs per
capita have been rising at an annual rate of 4.4 percent since the 1980s, and they are
projected to rise even faster in the future. However, Americans are not healthier than
citizens of other nations – among the twenty developed countries with the highest health
care spending, the USA ranks lowest in life expectancy. In fact, the USA is in the group
of countries performing particularly poorly in the elasticity of life expectancy of the 15 to
60 years-old with respect to health care spending - together with Botswana, Swaziland,
South Africa, Namibia, Zambia, Uganda and Gabon. One of the main reasons for this is
uneven access to health care that is caused by the great number of individuals without
health insurance, an estimated 47 million U.S. citizens in 2007.
Thus, there is a crying need for health care reform. After Roosevelt, Truman, Nixon,
Carter and Clinton, President Obama is the latest American president who has called for
such a reform. With the reform, the following features of the present system are supposed
to remain in place: First, obtaining health insurance coverage will remain an individual’s
free choice. Second, the supply of health insurance will remain in the hand of private
61 This and the following facts about international comparisons of health care spending and outcomes
are taken from McFadden et al . (2008).
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companies. Third, the old system, with employers offering coverage for their employees,
the Veterans Administration offering coverage for those (formerly) in the military, and
public insurance for the elderly, disabled and poor (Medicare for the elderly and disabled,
Medicaid for the poor and Shift for children) will remain in place.
Medicare provides basic health coverage for 43 million elderly and disabled U.S. residents.
However, until 2006, prescription drug coverage was not provided by the program, and
about a third of the relevant population were without such coverage (Neuman et al .
(2007)). In 2006, Medicare Part D, a highly subsidized market for prescription drug
coverage, was introduced. This introduction has been the largest single expansion in
social insurance in the U.S. since 1965. Medicare Part D has implications for the optimal
design of the U.S. health insurance systems, because it is similar in many dimensions to
the envisaged health care reform.62
Lessons from this experiment will be crucial both for deciding whether to introduce uni-
versal health care in the USA and for the design of social insurance programs in other
countries. Part D also gives important insights into the practicality of Consumer Di-
rected Health Care (CDHC), an approach to achieving efficient allocation of health care
resources by confronting consumers with the full marginal cost of the services they use.
Further, Medicare Part D can act as a natural experiment of consumer behavior in real-
world decision situations that are characterized by complexity, ambiguity and important
consequences. Therefore, lively discussion of the consequences of Medicare Part D has
taken place in numerous studies in economics and health.63 Most of these studies have
restricted their analysis to the relatively small group of “active deciders”: those consumers
who had no prescription drug insurance before the introduction of Medicare Part D.64
This essay contributes to the discussion on Medicare Part D by using a hypothetical
choice experiment that was conducted using a random sample of the relevant popula-
tion to analyze consumer demand. Thus, the whole potential market is included in the
analysis instead of restricting the focus to a small group of consumers. In hypothetical
choice experiments, individuals are asked to choose between different commodities whose
attributes vary in order to infer the utility associated with these attributes and consumers’
62 More details on Medicare Part D and its connection to the health care reform are given in section 5.2.
63 The results of at least some of them are presented in section 5.2.
64 Many other groups of consumers were also affected by the introduction of Medicare Part D, for example
those who had some privately bought or employer sponsored coverage before or those on Medicaid.
Many consumers were not given an equally free choice regarding their insurance coverage – as for
example the consumers who were eligible for both, Medicaid and Medicare, and who were automatically
enrolled and randomly assigned to prescription drug plans. We will call these consumers passive
participants in contrast to the active deciders.
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willingness-to-pay (WTP). Here, respondents are asked to choose between insurance con-
tracts that differ in their level of coverage. The insurance premia for these contracts are
randomly assigned to the respondents. Hypothetical choice experiments are a well-known
tool from marketing and psychology that in recent years has been used increasingly for
demand estimation by economists. They are also used frequently by health economists
to elicit consumer preferences regarding health care.65 We want to draw attention to the
fact that they can be used to elicit the demand of consumer groups whose choices cannot
be observed in the actual market.66 We thereby proceed as follows:
In this chapter, we use the hypothetical choice experiments to elicit WTP for prescription
drug insurance with different levels of coverage for all types of consumers. We distinguish
between the active deciders and the passive participants (those receiving prescription
drug coverage through their employers, the Veterans Administration, private insurance,
Medicare Advantage Plans or Medicaid). We show that these groups of consumers differ
in many dimensions from the active deciders (for example their WTP for insurance, their
income, their risk types and risk attitudes). Therefore, drawing inference from just this
group of consumers might lead to misleading conclusions - for example, when analyzing
welfare effects of eliminating the coverage gap as suggested by President Obama in his
speech to Congress on health care reform on September 10, 2009. As for the active
deciders, we observe their actual decisions in addition to their hypothetical choices. We
can then estimate a joint model.
For our analysis, we use the Retirement Perspectives Survey (RPS), a dataset unique in
providing a random sample of elderly Americans (and thus covering all groups described
above) and containing both respondents’ actual decisions regarding Medicare Part D as
well as a hypothetical choice dataset where respondents are asked to choose between
different prescription drug plans and the option of not having coverage at all.
We find that WTP for drug insurance is low for consumers with either low expected drug
costs or low income. On the other hand, consumers demand extensive coverage if they
are currently in poor health, expect high future drug costs, but also if they are more
risk averse. These findings conflict with consumers’ real choices where neither health nor
socio-economic indicators prove significant. A possible reason for this discrepancy is that
the active deciders for whom we observe actual choices are too homogeneous. In order to
analyze the impact of socio-economic conditions on insurance demand we need to consider
65 For example Scanlon et al . (1997) or Becker and Zweifel (2008). For a review on the literature
of applications of discrete choice experiments in health economics see Ryan and Gerard (2003) and
Guttmann et al . (2009).
66 More on hypothetical choice experiments and how they can be combined with survey on consumers’
actual decisions can be found in section 5.3.
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sufficiently heterogeneous consumer groups, which is possible through our hypothetical
choice experiment. Taking the whole potential market into consideration, we find that
active deciders exhibit a significantly lower WTP than passive participants. Therefore,
welfare estimates of the introduction of Medicare Part D based on these consumers alone
might underestimate actual welfare.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 describes Medicare Part D, the institu-
tional setting, the types of insurance plans offered, and consumer groups. Section 5.3
is on hypothetical choice experiments. Section 5.4 provides a description of our data
and some descriptives. Section 5.5 describes our estimation method, and section 5.6 our
econometric results. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Medicare Part D
5.2.1 The market
Since its introduction in 1965, Medicare has been providing health insurance for elderly
and disabled Americans. In 2008, enrollment was at about 45 million.67 Individuals are
eligible for Medicare if they are U.S. citizens or long-term legal residents of at least 65
years of age and if either they or their spouses have paid Medicare taxes for at least ten
years.68 Medicare is administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Medicare Part A provides basic coverage for inpatient hospital stays. Medicare Part B
is optional and provides additional care, for example for physician and nursing services
and for durable medical equipment. In 1997, the government introduced the possibil-
ity to receive care through private health insurance plans which are known as Part C,
Medicare+Choice or Medicare Advantage Plans. These plans contract with health care
providers, and eligible patients can only receive care through those providers under con-
tract.69
Before the introduction of Medicare Part D in 2006, only pharmaceutical treatments ad-
ministered in a physician’s office, in a hospital or other institution were covered by the
67 There are several websites which provide information on Medicare: www.cms.hhs.gov,
www.medicare.gov and www.statehealthfacts.org.
68 Further, disabled U.S. citizens or those with end stage renal disease are eligible for the program.
However, we concentrate on the elderly beneficiaries here who form the vast majority of over 90
percent of beneficiaries.
69 Sometimes enrollees are given the possibility to use other providers at some extra cost.
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program. This was a major drawback of Medicare, because only some Medicare benefi-
ciaries had prescription drug coverage from some other source, while about 30 percent of
Medicare beneficiaries had little or no prescription drug coverage (Neuman et al . (2007)).
This had serious negative consequences: First, medical expenditures placed a major finan-
cial burden on the elderly.70 Second, cost-related non-adherence, i.e. the discontinuation
of medication because it is too expensive, was a big concern before the introduction of
Part D (Madden et al . (2008)).
Consequently, the aims of Medicare Part D were to make drug insurance coverage af-
fordable for the elderly with low incomes, to provide protection against catastrophic drug
costs and to reduce cost-related non-adherence.71
Another motive was that insurance companies have more bargaining power than single
consumers vis-a`-vis pharmaceutical companies and this would stop the increase of pre-
scription drug expenditures. Before the introduction of Medicare Part D, the share of
prescription drug spending in U.S. health care spending had been rising steadily.72
In the designing of the market, the government has taken several measures to overcome
problems related to adverse selection and excessive spending. First, the government sub-
sidizes the newly established market so that enrollment should be optimal for almost
everybody. Second, the market is organized in a way that is supposed to give companies
incentives to pass the reductions they receive from pharmaceutical companies through to
consumers.73 Furthermore, the subsidy is supposed to equalize the portfolio of consumers
with regard to their risk types and it provides reinsurance for catastrophic drug benefits.
70 According to data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, per-person expenditures among Medi-
care recipients for prescription drugs were equal to $1,789 in 2003, with more than half of this paid
out-of-pocket and just about 8 percent paid for by the Medicare program (Duggan and Scott-Morton
(2006)). In 2005, about 10 percent of Medicare beneficiaries had catastrophic drug bills of more than
$5,600, while the median income in this population was only $15,700 (McFadden et al . (2008)).
71 There exists a subsidy that recipients whose incomes were at or below 135 percent of the poverty line
can apply for (the so-called LIS). Estimations for 2008 show that 12.5 million Medicare beneficiaries
are eligible for LIS, with 9.4 million actually receiving it. Certain groups of Medicare recipients are
automatically enrolled in the subsidy, for example those on Medicaid (The Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation (2008)).
72 The increase was first slow starting from 4.5 percent in 1982 and then rapidly accelerating in the 1990s
to 10.1 percent by 2005 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) (2008)), and about 60
percent of all prescriptions in the U.S. are filed for beneficiaries of Medicare, Medicaid, and other
government programs (Duggan and Scott-Morton (2010)).
73 At the beginning of each period, insurance companies take part in a bidding procedure with their bids
representing an estimation of the costs that the company incurs in order to provide basic prescription
drug coverage to a representative Part D enrollee. The monthly premium that the plan can charge to
its costumers depends on this bid (and therefore, competition for consumers reduces the incentive to
increase the bid), while the government subsidy depends on the average national bids.
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Third, the late enrollment penalty helps overcoming adverse selection by encouraging
individuals to join Medicare Part D earlier in their lives and not only when they have
already developed health problems. It has to be paid by everybody who i) was eligible
for Medicare Part D during the initial enrollment period (November 15, 2005 to May 15,
2006) or who becomes eligible for the first time during any future open-enrollment period
(November 15 - December 31 of each year); ii) does not have creditable coverage (coverage
which is considered equivalent to Medicare Part D); and iii) who decides not to enroll in
Medicare Part D. It is equal to the months without coverage times one percent of the
national base beneficiary premium.
Fourth, the standard plan designed for this market has several features that are supposed
to discourage excessive spending: A deductible, copayments and a coverage gap in which
the insured has to bear 100 percent of prescription drugs. Further, most plans give
incentives to buy cheap drugs such as generics by reducing copayments for these types of
drugs.74
5.2.2 Market outcomes and prior research on the active deciders
Research on the active deciders has drawn the following lessons from Medicare Part D:
First, by and large, Medicare Part D has been a success in providing a large percentage of
the Medicare eligible population with prescription drug coverage. Enrollment rates were
above 90 percent in the first year of Medicare Part D (Winter et al . (2006)). Those who
remained without coverage in 2006 belong to two very different consumer groups: Those
in relatively good health and those potentially difficult to reach (Neuman et al . (2007)).
Second, the complexity of the market with its many providers and many different products
may have resulted in suboptimal choices, especially among the most vulnerable - those
with low income, low educational attainment, poor health or some cognitive impairment
(Heiss et al . (2006) and Duggan et al . (2008)). Some research suggests that actual premia
are the main driver of consumers’ choices, and that too little weight is placed on expected
out-of-pocket costs (Abaluck and Gruber (2011)).
Third, substantial adverse selection seems to have occurred, but no moral hazard among
the active deciders.75 Most consumers who remained without prescription drug coverage
behaved economically optimal, as their prescription drug needs were low (Winter et al .
74 See section 5.2.3 where the available plans are described in more detail.
75 The term moral hazard might not be the correct one in the context of health insurance. Individuals
might have used too little prescription drugs before, and this might have had adverse consequences for
their health. In fact, this was one of the reasons for introducing prescription drug coverage in the first
place.
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(2006) and Levy and Weir (2009)). However, premia of those plans offering basic Part
D coverage (see below) do not seem to have been affected strongly by adverse selection:
They were even lower than expected. Only those plans appear to have been affected by
adverse selection that offer more extensive coverage that does not benefit from government
subsidies, a sign of which were rapidly rising premia and reduced coverage (McFadden
et al . (2008)).
Several features of Medicare Part D described above make it similar to the envisaged
health care reform.76
First, it remains an individual’s choice whether to enroll in Medicare Part D, whether to
remain without coverage, or whether to remain with the already existing coverage, for
example from employers or private insurance.
Second, there are subsidies for low-income consumers. The government subsidy for catas-
trophic costs places a limit on the out-of-pocket expenses of insured individuals. There is
no cap on the amount of coverage that someone can receive.
Third, insurance is offered by private companies, but there are government regulations
that restrict what can be offered on the market: Contracts offered have to provide a certain
minimum coverage as well as coverage for catastrophic events. Individuals cannot be
denied coverage because they are high-risk consumers. Because insurance companies buy
in great bulks, the government expected that they would be able to use their bargaining
power vis-a`-vis pharmaceutical companies or health care providers.
Fourth, there are several mechanisms that are supposed to counteract adverse selection
and excessive use of care.
Although research on Medicare Part D has already drawn many important conclusions,
when analyzing consumer welfare or predicting policy changes, for example the abolition of
the coverage gap, it is crucial to make predictions that are valid for the whole population.
Therefore, in the following, we describe the features of the supplied plans and the groups
of consumers which will be important for the following analysis.
5.2.3 Types of plans
Under Medicare Part D, the plans insurers can offer are standardized. The standard drug
benefit, as defined by the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization
Act of 2003, is characterized by four main features:77
76 Government plans for the reform can be found at www.healthreform.gov.
77 Features of the plan have changed slightly over time. These are the features of the plan in 2006, when
our first hypothetical choice experiment was conducted.
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1. A $250 (annual) deductible below which the insured have to pay for all costs them-
selves.
2. An interval of drug spending between $250 and $2,250 where the plan covers 75
percent of drug costs.
3. A coverage gap between $2,250 and $5,100 where the insured has to bear the full
costs (which translates into an out-of-pocket limit of $3,600).
4. A catastrophic threshold of $5,100 above which the insurance covers 95 percent of
all costs.
Figure 5.1 (from Heiss et al . (2009a)) shows the beneficiary’s out-of-pocket costs as a
function of his yearly drug bills. The plan was designed in order to both reduce moral
hazard (through the deductible and the coverage cap) and to provide insurance against
catastrophic drug costs.
Figure 5.1: Benefit schedule of the Medicare Part D standard plan
Companies can either offer the standard plans, or plans that offer more extensive coverage,
either by having no deductible or by providing coverage in the coverage gap. The CMS
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classifies the stand-alone prescription drug plans that are available under Medicare Part
D in four categories (Heiss et al . (2009a)):
• The standard plan is the plan with the statutorily defined coverage, deductible,
gap, and cost sharing.
• An actuarially equivalent plan has the same deductible and gap as the standard
plan, but has different cost sharing modalities (such as copayment tiers for preferred
drug costs and generic drugs rather than percentage copayment). Actuarial equiva-
lence to the standard plan may be achieved through restrictions in plan formularies,
but all approved plans must have formularies that include at least two drugs in each
therapeutic category. In 2009, about 34 percent of Part D stand-alone prescription
drug plans had the standard deductible (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation
(2008)).
• A basic alternative plan is actuarially equivalent to the statutory defined benefit,
but both the deductible and cost sharing can be altered (most of these plans have
no deductible). In 2009, about 55 percent of stand-alone plans had no deductible
at all, and 11 percent of plans had a deductible different from the standard one.
• An enhanced alternative plan exceeds the defined standard coverage - for ex-
ample, by offering coverage in the gap for generic drugs only, or both generic and
branded drugs. About one quarter of Part D stand-alone plans and one half of
Medicare Advantage Plans offered gap coverage in 2008 and 2009. The share of
Medicare stand-alone plans with no gap coverage decreased from 85 percent in 2006
to 75 percent in 2009. In Medicare Advantage prescription drug plans this percent-
age was reduced even more drastically from 72 percent in 2006 to 49 percent in 2009
(The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (2008)).
5.2.4 Groups of consumers
Medicare recipients can belong to different groups regarding their prescription drug cover-
age: Stand-alone plans, Medicare Advantage Plans or private insurance, coverage through
the employer or the Veterans Administration, or coverage through Medicaid. These groups
will be described in the following.
Those individuals who had no prescription drug coverage before the introduction of Medi-
care Part D had to make an active choice to enroll in Medicare Part D - remaining inactive
meant choosing to remain uncovered. They could either enroll in Medicare Part D stand-
alone plans which cover prescription drugs only, or in Medicare Advantage Plans (called
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Medicare + Choice before) where prescription drug coverage is provided as part of overall
health care through HMOs.
Some of these plans had covered prescription drugs already before the introduction of
Medicare Part D. With the introduction of Medicare Part D, Medicare Advantage Plans
were almost forced to offer prescription drug coverage, because their enrollees could not
take up Medicare Part D without losing their benefits from outpatient and inpatient care
(Levy and Weir (2009)). Further, these plans are subsidized more heavily in order to
encourage Medicare recipients to seek more extensive coverage (Duggan et al . (2008)).
Thus, Medicare Advantage Plan beneficiaries may belong to either of two groups: They
may have had prescription drug coverage before, and this coverage was simply converted
into Part D coverage, or they may have chosen prescription drug coverage only with
the introduction of Part D. In 2006, about 10.4 million of Medicare recipients enrolled
in Part D chose stand-alone coverage, while about 6 million received coverage through
Medicare Advantage Plans, including 1.2 million new enrollees. About half a million of
those enrolled in Medicare Advantage Plans are recipients of Medicaid (U.S. Departement
of Health and Human Services (2006)).
The situation is similar for individuals that had private insurance for their prescription
drugs before the introduction of Medicare Part D. A special situation holds for Medigap
(or Medicare supplemental) health insurances. These are private supplemental health
insurance plans that cover medical expenses that are not, or partially not, covered by
Medicare. Since 2006, these plans cannot offer prescription drug coverage to new enrollees.
In order not to crowd out prescription drug coverage offered by employers, there are tax-
free subsidies to those employers who provide prescription drug plans that are actuarily
equivalent to Medicare Part D.78 In January 2007, there were 6.9 million Medicare re-
cipients whose coverage was subsidized in this way (Duggan and Scott-Morton (2010)).
Alternatively, employers could decide to wrap around Medicare drug coverage. Individuals
enrolled in these types of plans are counted under Medicare Advantage Plans.
Those employees who had prescription drug coverage before the introduction of Medi-
care Part D simply received a letter from their employer that informed them that their
prescription drug coverage was creditable when Medicare Part D was introduced.
Veterans already had prescription drug coverage before the introduction of Medicare Part
D. As this is considered creditable coverage, there is no need for veterans to sign up
78 Companies receive 28 percent of covered charges between the deductible and an upper limit of $5,600
for each Medicare-eligible participant.
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for Medicare Part D, however, they can do so if they want.79 In 2006, about 2 million
Medicare beneficiaries received their prescription drug coverage through the Veterans
Administration, and about one million veterans were enrolled in a Part D plan (U.S.
Departement of Health and Human Services (2006)).
Medicare recipients who are also eligible for Medicaid were automatically enrolled in a pre-
scription drug plan with some option to switch plans afterwards. Medicaid recipients do
not pay any premium if they choose a plan with average or below average costs. They fur-
ther have no deductibles, no coverage gaps, and lower copays (Duggan and Scott-Morton
(2010)). In 2006, about 6.1 million Medicare and Medicaid recipients were automatically
enrolled in prescription drug plans. Additionally, about half a million Medicare and Med-
icaid recipients received prescription drug coverage through Medicare Advantage Plans
(U.S. Departement of Health and Human Services (2006)).
5.3 Hypothetical choice experiments
5.3.1 Real versus hypothetical choice experiments
In this section, we describe two types of data, real and stated preference data, which can
be used to analyze consumer preferences.
Since the seminal work of McFadden (1974), economists have used survey data on the
micro-level to analyze consumer demand. Each product is defined as a bundle of charac-
teristics, for example in McFadden’s famous work on travel demand, each mode of travel
is defined by the price and time of travel. Consumer preferences are defined over these
characteristics, and the utility consumers obtain from buying a product depends both on
the product’s and their personal characteristics and tastes which can only be partially
observed by the researcher.80
In these consumer surveys, respondents were asked about their actual purchasing decisions
in real markets. The preferences researchers deduce from this information are called
revealed preferences because people reveal their preferences by making their choices. The
advantage of deducing preferences from consumers’ actual choices is that consumers spend
real money facing their actual budget constraints and therefore, the researcher may be
confident about making predictions from this type of data.
79 In fact, this may be beneficial for some low-income veterans who are eligible for the Medicare Part D
low-income subsidy (Rupper et al . (2007)).
80 Some more information on discrete choice models can be found in section 5.5. A detailed description
on the concepts and developments of demand estimation is given in Ackerberg et al . (2007).
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However, making predictions from observed choices has some important limitations.81
First, the attributes of products often exhibit little variation in real markets. For example,
in many markets, price varies very little over products as well as over time. In a statistical
model the researcher might therefore wrongfully deduce that consumer decisions do not
respond much to variations in price, when in reality prices do not vary much because
price elasticity is very high. Second, when forecasting demand for new products, revealed
preference data simply does not exist. The same holds true for certain public goods which
are not traded in the market. Third, choices might be observed for a certain group of
consumers only - as in the case of Medicare Part D. When drawing conclusions or making
predictions, for example what happens if a certain insurance coverage is extended to a
larger group of consumers, researchers may want to have variation not only in product,
but also in consumer characteristics.
To overcome these problems, individuals have been presented with hypothetical choice
tasks. In these tasks, respondents are asked to choose among alternatives from a choice set
whose attributes have been defined by the researcher. In hypothetical choice experiments,
WTP is inferred from individuals’ choices. This allows the researcher to give estimations
on the overall utility of the alternatives as well as their attributes.82 For example, in
our data respondents are asked to choose between different insurance contracts whose
prices vary randomly. The preferences elicited from this type of experiments are called
stated preferences in contrast to consumers’ revealed preferences from their real choices.
Hypothetical choice experiments have been used extensively in marketing and psychology.
Louviere et al . (2000) provide a comprehensive guide to the design, implementation and
interpretation of stated choice methods. In these experiments, sufficient variation can be
created. The choice situation can also be presented to a random sample of the population.
Additionally, the researcher can hold fixed everything in the choice situation that he
wants to hold fixed, and concentrate only on the product characteristics that he is really
interested in. This helps to overcome the well-known problem that prices are correlated
with unobserved product quality, which leads to biases in the estimate of consumer price
elasticity in real data.
Still, a concern about stated choice data is that consumers might behave differently in
the experiment than they do in the real world. As in every experiment, researchers are
concerned with the external validity of hypothetical choice experiments. The seminal
work in this regard is the paper by Mitchell and Carson (1989). Since then, many studies
81 Compare chapter 2 of Louviere et al . (2000) or chapter 7 of Train (2003).
82 In contrast, contingent valuation questions ask the respondent directly about their WTP. Avoiding to
ask respondents directly about their WTP reduces the risk of strategic manipulation of the answers
by the respondents (Brau and Bruni (2008)).
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have aimed at testing how WTP stated in hypothetical choice experiments differs from
real WTP. Two studies from the health sector are Hanley et al . (2003) and Becker and
Zweifel (2008). Carson et al . (1996) have performed a meta-analysis comparing WTP
estimates from stated and revealed preference counterparts, and they find that the stated
WTP is slightly lower than real WTP. The issues cited most frequently are that first, the
sample drawn for experiments is not representative of the population. For example, a
sample of undergraduate students might not be a representative sample or the population
for eliciting WTP for public goods. However, the sample of respondents we use in our
data is a random sample of the relevant population. Second, when asked for their WTP
for public goods, respondents might strategically overstate their WTP or respond in a
way that they think is “politically correct”. We expect this to hold true more in the public
good setting and not in the insurance setting that we will apply the hypothetical choice
experiments to.
There are also benefits from combining real and stated preference data, a method that is
sometimes also called data enrichment. The basic idea is to create variation in attributes
through the hypothetical choice data and to base the hypothetical choice experiments in
reality using respondents’ real choices.83
Figure 5.2 shows what type of choices, real or hypothetical or both, we observe for different
consumer groups. For all consumers, we observe their hypothetical choices. For the active
deciders, whether or not they decided to take up insurance coverage in Part D, and for
those consumers who decided to enroll in Part D, we can observe their actual plan choices.
Figure 5.3 illustrates what share the different groups have in our dataset. This gives us
different possibilities of using our hypothetical choice experiment:
First, we can use the hypothetical choice experiment to analyze WTP for prescription
drug insurance taking into account the whole potential market.
Second, concentrating on the active deciders, we can test for external validity of our
hypothetical choice experiment - this is, we can try to answer the question of whether
consumers’ WTP expressed in our hypothetical choice experiment differs from their actual
WTP (Carlsson and Martinsson (2001)).84
83 See Train (2003), chapter 7, and Louviere et al . (2000), chapter 8. Applications include Morikawa
(1989), Ben Akiva and Morikawa (1990), Hensher and Bradley (1993), Adamowicz et al . (1997),
Hensher et al . (1999), Brownstone et al . (2000), Bhat and Castelar (2002) and Walker and Ben-Akiva
(2002).
84 Some of the methodological factors concerning the combination of revealed and stated choice experi-
ments are described in section 5.5.
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Figure 5.2: Decision tree of consumer groups
Population
Active Deciders Passively enrolled
Non-participationParticipation
Plan Choice
Figure 5.3: Consumer groups in the RPS
Third, we can estimate a joint model of both revealed and stated choices as for the active
deciders we observe both types of choices. This can help us to mitigate the weaknesses
and make use of the strengths of both types of data.
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5.4 Data and descriptives
The Retirement Perspectives Survey (RPS) is a panel dataset of elderly U.S.-citizens that
is representative of the U.S. non-institutionalized population in terms of demographics and
socio-economic status. It is a research project conducted by Daniel McFadden, Joachim
Winter and Florian Heiss, based on a panel of individuals maintained by Knowledge
Networks, a commercial survey firm. Participants were provided with web TV hardware
which enabled them to answer the internet survey with their TV sets.
There are four waves of the survey:
• RPS-2005, conducted in November 2005
• RPS-2006, conducted in May 2006
• RPS-2007, conducted in March and April 2007
• RPS-2009, conducted in February and March 2009.
The following information was obtained from each respondent:
• Socio-economic characteristics, including household income, age, gender, ethnic
group, and education level85
• Measures of the respondent’s health (such as self rated health, chronic conditions,
functional limitations)
• Measures of the respondent’s prescription drug use (number of prescription drugs
taken, current and expected out-of-pocket costs for prescription drugs, names of
prescription drugs taken for some frequent health conditions like chronic pain, high
cholesterol or diabetes)
• Information on the respondent’s prescription drug insurance coverage
• Information on the respondent’s enrollment decisions, knowledge, and opinion re-
garding Medicare Part D
• Hypothetical choice experiments where respondents were given the choice between
insurance contracts with differing levels of coverage (including no coverage) and
randomly varying premia
85 These variables are provided by Knowledge Networks as background variables.
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• Some simple measures of risk attitudes and planning horizons.
There are several articles which use the RPS in order to analyze the enrollment decisions
of active deciders (Winter et al . (2006), Heiss et al . (2009a), McFadden et al . (2008), Heiss
et al . (2009b)). Heiss et al . (2009a) provide a detailed description of response behavior,
selection issues and the application of sampling weights. Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 are taken
from Heiss et al . (2009b). Table 5.1 shows how the sample of respondents and the response
rates developed over time. For our analysis, we are only interested in those individuals
eligible for Medicare, therefore we restrict the sample to respondents aged 65 and older in
2006. Table 5.2 shows how the RPS compares to the 2004 Health and Retirement Survey
(HRS) in terms of socio-economic characteristics and insurance status. The RPS seems
to reasonably mirror the HRS, even more in the weighted samples. However, we will not
use weights in our subsequent analysis.
Table 5.1: Sample selection criteria and response rates, RPS 2005-2009
Definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used can be found in Table 5.3. Most
variables correspond to a question of the survey with the exception of expected drug costs
which was created by Winter et al . (2006) based on the respondents’ prescription drug
use and the price they would have paid for them over the counter. The idea is to elicit
the expected drug bill for each individual in the case of no insurance.
In 2006, the RPS sample in the relevant age group (aged 65+) consisted of 1,666 respon-
dents. 97 of them had to be excluded from the analysis because they did not answer the
questions on prescription drug insurance coverage. 56 percent of our sample are females.
Most of the respondents (about 38 percent) are between 65 and 70 years old, 28 percent
between 71 and 75, and about 33 percent are older than 75 years. Annual household in-
come was below $20,000 for about 23 percent, between $20,000 and $60,000 for about 58
percent of the sample and above $60,00 for the remaining 19 percent. About 13 percent
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics, HRS 2006 and RPS 2006
of respondents have less than high school education, while about 87 percent have high
school education or higher qualification.
As to their health and prescription drug use, in 2006, when asked about the number
of different prescription drugs used in the last month, some 10 percent did not use any
prescription drugs at all. About 29 percent reported having used one or two different
prescription drugs, and about 61 percent of respondents reported having taken more than
three different prescription drugs within the last month. Most of the respondents (about
40 percent) rated their health as “good”, 38 percent as “very good” or “excellent”, and only
22 percent said that they were in “fair” or “poor” health. Our estimated prescription drug
costs have a skewed distribution with a long tail, where a lot of consumers have quite low
costs and very few consumers have very high costs.
Table 5.4 shows how prescription drug coverage in the RPS compared to the total popula-
tion. Table 5.5 shows how health and demographics differed among the different consumer
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groups.86 The most noticeable patterns regarding sociodemographic characteristics are
that first, among veterans, the percentage of males is highest. Second, the groups with
the lowest incomes are, as expected, those on Medicaid or state programs, while those
with employer coverage or private insurance have rather high incomes. The latter groups
also tend to have received more education. The fraction of non-whites is largest for those
on Medicaid, for veterans or individuals who are covered by their employers.
Regarding health and prescription drug use, there are large differences among consumer
groups: Total drug costs in 2005 were much lower for those consumers who were without
prescription drug coverage before the introduction of Medicare Part D and who decided
to remain without coverage (see also Figure 5.4). The median of estimated annual pre-
scription drug costs for this consumer group is only $94, while it is about $1,567 for
the group with the next lowest median, those who were covered by an Medicare HMO.
The same holds true for the number of different prescription drugs taken during the last
month - almost 40 percent of those remaining without coverage report not to have taken
any prescription drugs. Other groups whose prescription drug use in 2005 was relatively
low are those consumers with HMO or employer coverage, while consumers with cover-
age by either Medicaid or the Veterans Administration, but also consumers who bought
private description drug coverage, on average took many prescription drugs and had high
estimated costs.
Self reported health is likewise far better for those who remained without prescription
drug coverage than for any other group (see Figure 5.5). Veterans, beneficiaries eligible
for Medicaid or those who received coverage through state programs tend to be in poor
health.
5.4.1 The RPS hypothetical choice experiment
In the RPS 2006, a hypothetical choice experiment was conducted in order to elicit the
preferences for prescription drug coverage of all consumers, not just the active deciders.87
As the RPS focuses on questions on Medicare Part D and as all respondents in the
RPS 2006 have already answered the questionnaire in 2005, we expect respondents to be
familiar with the questions on insurance and Medicare Part D when taking part in the
hypothetical choice experiment.
86 Most differences between the other groups and the active deciders are statistically different at the ten
percent level. Results of t-tests are not reported here.
87 A description of the RPS can be found in section 5.4.
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Figure 5.4: Number of different prescription drugs taken in 2005
Consumers were provided with a short introduction, in order to place our hypothetical
choice experiment in the context of Part D (telling them for example that the same
late enrollment premia would apply in the experiment as under the Part D regulation).
One part of the introduction for the experiment differed depending on which group of
consumers was interviewed. The exact wording of the experiment can be found in the
appendix of this chapter.
Then the respondents were given a choice between four alternatives with randomly varying
premia:
• Basic Plan premium: $ PBi This plan covers all prescription drugs you currently
use and most of what you might need in the future. It has a deductible of $250, pays
75 percent of costs above $250 up to $2250, provides no additional benefit until costs
reach $5100, and pays 95 percent of costs above that level.
• Enhanced Plan premium: $ PEi This plan is equivalent to the Basic Plan but
has no deductible. This means that the 75 percent coverage begins at the first dollar
you spend on prescription drugs, up to $2250. Like the Basic Plan, there are no
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Figure 5.5: Self-rated health status in 2005
additional benefits until costs reach $5100. The Enhanced Plan pays 95 percent of
costs above that level.
• Premier plan premium: $ PPi This plan is equivalent to the Enhanced Plan, but
is does not impose a coverage gap between $2250 and $5100. So it pays 75 percent
of all costs up to $5100 and for 95 percent above that amount.
• No prescription drug insurance at all
Each respondent was presented with three different hypothetical choice tasks. In the first
round, everybody was presented with the same hypothetical prices, and in the second
and third round, prices were randomly assigned to the respondents. The upper panel
of Table 5.6 shows the premia that were assigned to the different types of plans in our
hypothetical choice experiment, and therefore our hypothetical supply prices. For the
first choice, premia were the same for all respondents. These premia closely resemble the
premia for all plans available in the market as constructed from Heiss et al . (2009a) with
the CMS plan finder. Note that the premia for the plans actually chosen by the active
deciders in the RPS, and therefore the prices in market equilibrium, are much lower than
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supply prices, at least for basic and enhanced coverage. For the second and third choice,
premia were randomly assigned.
We find large differences regarding the preferred plans when looking at consumer choices
in the first hypothetical choice experiment where the prices were the same for everybody:
Those consumers who chose to remain without coverage in the real market also show a
much greater preference for less or no coverage in the hypothetical choices (see Figure 5.6).
The hypothetical choices of those having chosen stand-alone coverage and those who chose
HMO coverage are quite similar: A large percentage of consumers would prefer plans that
offer more coverage than the Part D standard plan. This tendency is even stronger for
those consumers who were covered by their former employers or the Veterans Adminis-
tration and even more pronounced for those consumers who had private prescription drug
insurance or who were covered by state programs. Surprisingly, consumers on Medicaid
do not show a comparably low preference for plans with no deductible and gap coverage.
Figure 5.6: Hypothetical choices by consumer groups
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5.5 Multinomial Logit Model
The multinomial logit model (MNL), sometimes also called conditional logit model, was
developed by Daniel McFadden in the mid 1960s in the context of so-called random utility
models (McFadden (1976)). It goes back to the work of Thurstone’s “Law of comparative
judgment” (1927), Marschak (1960)’s introduction of random utility models and Luce
(1959)’s description of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) axiom.
The idea behind the random utility framework (RUM) is as follows.88 A decision maker
i faces a choice among J mutually exclusive alternatives j. In our hypothetical choice
experiment, these alternatives represent different prescription drug insurance contracts.
We want to explain what factors drive the individual’s choice. Since J is finite, the
models describing the individual’s choice are called discrete or qualitative choice models
in contrast to continuous or quantitative models. The choice set is exhaustive, which
means that all possible alternatives are included. In our case, the individual must also be
given the alternative to remain without prescription drug insurance.
We assume that the decision maker will choose the alternative with the highest (indirect)
utility Uij.89 Utility depends on characteristics
• that vary over alternatives only, for example the premium of the insurance contract
if it is unconditional on the insured’s characteristics
• that vary over the decision makers only, for example income or risk aversion
• that vary over both the decision maker and the alternatives, for example expected
drug costs when a specific insurance contract is chosen.
Some of these characteristics, the xij, are observed by the researcher. Vij = V (xij)
represents the observed or representative part of utility. Other characteristics of either
the alternatives or the decision maker are known by the decision maker himself, but
unobservable to the researcher. The influence of all unobservable factors is combined in
an error term eij. Therefore
Uij = Vij + eij, (5.1)
or, stated differently, the unobservable is simply the difference between the true utility
Uij and the representative utility Vij. Therefore, the distribution of eij will always depend
on the specification that the researcher chooses for the observed part of utility.
88 See Train (1986) and Train (2003).
89 Utility that has been maximized under a budget constraint.
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The particular choice model depends on the distribution that the eij are assumed to
follow. The assumption for the logit model is that the eij are independently, identically
distributed (i.i.d.) extreme value type I with density function
f(eij) = exp(−eij) ∗ exp(−exp(−eij)) (5.2)
and cumulative distribution function
F (eij) = exp(−exp(eij)). (5.3)
Knowing that the decision maker will choose the alternative j that yields the highest
utility and knowing the distribution of the unobserved error terms, the probability that
decision maker i will choose alternative j can be expressed as:
Pij = Prob(Uij > Uik ∀k 6= j) (5.4)
= Prob(Vij + eij > Vik + eik ∀k 6= j) (5.5)
= Prob(eik − eij < Vij − Vik ∀k 6= j). (5.6)
This choice probability does not mean that each decision maker’s choice is random - in
fact, from the decision maker’s point of view, his choice is deterministic: He will choose
the alternative that yields the highest utility. The choice is random only for the researcher
who does not observe all relevant characteristics. It is random in the sense that if the
researcher observes a sample of decision makers with the same observed characteristics,
he will still not be able to perfectly predict their choices because he does not observe some
of the relevant factors of this decision. If the sample size goes to infinity, then the share
of people choosing alternative j will converge to Pij.90
Note that the individual’s choice depends on the differences in the utilities of the different
alternatives. Therefore, each decision maker’s choice depends on the joint (cumulative)
distribution of the differences in unobserved utility between all alternatives. He will only
choose alternative j if the random variables eik − eij ∀k 6= j are jointly below the known
value Vij − Vik∀k 6= j. In the logit model, the eik − eij follow a logistic distribution with
distribution function
F (eik − eij) = exp(eik − eij)
1 + exp(eik − eij) . (5.7)
90 There exist also other interpretations of this randomness, as for example bounded rationality or quixotic
factors. A survey respondent in a stated choice experiment might for example simply make his cross
at a random alternative (Train and Wilson (2009)).
5 What if everybody had a choice? 125
The choice probabilities then become
Pij =
exp(Vij)∑
k exp(Vik)
(5.8)
where the observed part of utility, Vij, is usually specified as a linear function of the
observed characteristics and a vector of unknown parameters, β, that has to be estimated
Vij = β
′xij. (5.9)
Note that as only differences in utility matter, only characteristics that vary over alter-
natives can affect the choice probabilities. The influence of characteristics that vary over
the decision makers can only be identified by interacting them with variables that vary
over the attributes.
Estimating discrete choice models requires some type of normalization because utility is
a cardinal variable which means that the level of utility is not identified. Neither adding
a constant to each alternative’s utility, nor multiplying utility by a constant will change
the observed choices. Therefore, some normalization is necessary when estimating the
unknown parameters β. As Uij = Vij + eij, multiplying utility by a constant λ means
multiplying the variance of the error term by λ2. Normalization is therefore usually done
by normalizing the variance of the error term. In the case of the logit model, the variance
is normalized to pi2/6. This means that the estimated βs are estimates of the “real” βs,
divided by λ which is defined by the (unknown) variance σ2 of the unobserved factors:
σ2 =
λ2 pi2
6
. (5.10)
In other words, the “true” βs cannot be identified separately from σ2, and when we
compare the coefficients from two data sources, we will never know whether differences
result from differences in the true parameters or the variance of unobserved factors.
If the model contains alternative-specific constants cj, these constants will represent the
mean of all unobserved factors per alternative, and the normalized error
ij =
eij − cj
λ
(5.11)
is distributed i.i.d. extreme value with mean zero and variance pi2/6.
The parameters of the MNL model are usually estimated by maximum likelihood. The
joint likelihood (over all individuals) of the observed choices is maximized with respect to
the unknown parameters.
One important feature of the multinomial logit model is the IIA property (Luce (1959)).
In the logit model, the choice between two alternatives j and k is independent of irrele-
vant alternatives in the sense that the ratio of the probability of choosing alternative j to
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the probability of choosing alternative k is independent of all other alternatives and their
attributes. This property is caused by the relatively strict assumption that the errors are
independent of each other, which means that the unobserved parts of utility of the alterna-
tives are not related to each other. Expressed in terms of elasticities of substitution, when
one desirable characteristic of one alternative changes and this leads to an increase in the
probability that this alternative will be chosen, the result will be a proportionate decrease
in the probabilities that all other alternatives are chosen. This might not be realistic if
some alternatives are more similar than others. However, the residuals in the logit models
depend on the researcher’s specification of representative utility. Therefore, the IIA will
hold if heterogeneity in the attributes and the decision makers is attributed to observed
characteristics. In other words, the logit model can capture heterogeneity due to observed
characteristics, while it cannot capture variation due to unobserved characteristics.
Several tests of the IIA property were suggested by McFadden (McFadden (1978) and
McFadden (1987)), Hausman and McFadden (1984), and Train et al . (1989). The test we
will use in this chapter is based on the test developed in Hausman and McFadden (1984).
The idea is to estimate the model twice: Once with the full set of alternatives, and once
with a subset of alternatives (where IIA is assumed to hold). The parameter estimates of
the full sample are consistent and efficient under the null hypothesis that IIA holds, but
inconsistent if it fails. The parameter estimates from the restricted sample are consistent,
but inefficient under IIA, and consistent even if IIA fails. Therefore, a standard Hausman
specification test can be used. If the variance-weighted difference of the two estimates is
too large compared with the critical values of a χ2 distribution, then the null hypothesis
of IIA is rejected.
There are some methodological issues concerning stated and revealed preference models
in the context of logit models (see Train (2003), chapter 7, and Louviere et al . (2000),
chapter 8): While the coefficients in respondents’ utility functions should be the same
in both types of data, unobserved factors will differ in stated and revealed preference
situations. We would expect that the real choices of respondents are affected by many
more unobserved factors than stated choices. For the real choices, these might include
unobserved attributes of both the alternatives or the decision maker and measurement
error, while for the stated choices, there might be unobserved attributes of the decision
maker, factors that are specific to the experimental design and variables that are relevant
for the choice situation, but that have not been included in the experiment (Bhat and
Castelar (2002)).
Therefore, when estimating a joint model of the stated and revealed preferences, we want
to allow for different scale factors λSP and λRP (Morikawa (1989) and Louviere et al .
(2000)), assuming that the true utility parameters are the same for the two data sets. As
5 What if everybody had a choice? 127
the scale factors are unobserved and can never be identified within one source of data, it
is the convention to normalize λRP to unity such that λSP represents the stated preference
relative to the revealed preference scale factor. One possibility to jointly estimate both the
model parameters and the (relative) scale factor is using a nested logit model (Bradley and
Daly (1992), Hensher and Bradley (1993) and Louviere et al . (2000)). The nested logit
model generalizes the MNL by relaxing the IIA assumption. In particular, alternatives
are grouped into subsets or nests, and the variances of the error terms (and therefore the
scale factors) are allowed to vary across nests. Therefore, artificially creating two nests
for each decision made, one that contains the alternatives from the stated and one that
contains the alternatives from the revealed preferences, allows estimating both the βs and
the relative scale parameters.
5.6 Econometric results
Let the indirect utility that consumer i obtains from the insurance contract j be
Uij = V (aj, pj, yi, si, gi) + eij (5.12)
where aj are the attributes of the insurance contract of which we explicitly state pj, the
contract’s premium; yi is the income of the insured; si are socio-economic conditions;
and gi is the group of the population that the consumer belongs to, which might either
just reflect a difference in the status quo of the insurance91 or be some proxy for other
unobserved characteristics of the respondent.
The attributes of the insurance contracts are (compare also Table 5.3):
• Insurance: The contract provides prescription drug coverage with copayments, the
deductible and the coverage gap equal to the Part D standard benefit.
• No deductible: The contract does not have the $250 deductible of the Part D
benefit.
• Gap coverage: The contract provides coverage also in the coverage gap.
• Premium: Monthly premium in $.
We will proceed with our analysis as follows: We will first analyze the hypothetical choices
from a random sample of the whole potential market. Next, we will analyze the real choices
91 Compare Becker and Zweifel (2008).
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of the active deciders. Finally, we will estimate a joint model combining both real and
hypothetical choices.
Table 5.7 shows the MNL estimates of consumers’ hypothetical choices. Each consumer is
presented with three choices, and thus we use standard errors clustered by the individual.
The standard Hausman/ McFadden IIA test (see section 5.5) cannot be performed in this
case, because the assumption that the MNL estimator is efficient under the null hypothesis
is violated with clustered standard errors. We instead implement Stata’s suest version
of the Hausman test (StataCorp (2007)). We assume that it is most likely that the IIA
assumption will be violated for the no coverage alternative. The p-value for the rejection
of the IIA assumption is at 8.3 percent, so we cannot reject IIA at either the 1 or 5 percent
level, but at the 10 percent level, we can. Thus, for a first analysis, we stick with the
MNL model and the IIA assumption.
Our main interest lies in estimating consumers’ WTP for drug insurance with different
levels of coverage where WTP is defined as the amount of premium increase that exactly
offsets the increase of an attribute by one unit (or in the discrete case, the amount of
premium that exactly offsets being provided with the discrete attribute versus not being
provided with it), so that total utility remains unaffected:
WTP = −(βattribute/βpremium). (5.13)
The ratio of two coefficients can be interpreted directly in the MNL model as the un-
observed scale factors cancel out in this case. For illustration, Table 5.8 contains the
estimates of consumers WTP for selected equations. Our basic regression (1) shows that
the WTP estimated from the hypothetical choice experiments is $41.80 for basic, $66.57
for enhanced and $94.32 for premium coverage.
Regressions (2) and (3) show that WTP for basic insurance coverage is low for consumers
with either low expected drug costs or low income. By contrast, consumers demand
extensive coverage if they are currently in poor health, expect high future drug costs,
but also if they are more risk averse. These findings conflict with consumers’ real choices
where neither health nor socio-economic indicators prove significant. A possible reason
for the discrepancy of regression results on hypothetical and real data is that the active
deciders are too homogenous, and that we need to consider sufficiently heterogeneous
consumer groups in order to analyze patterns in these characteristics.
Hypothetical WTP in our base regression is somewhat higher than WTP for all observable
plans and a lot higher than WTP for the plans actually demanded by RPS respondents
(compare Table 5.6). In part, this is due to the fact that we observe real choices for the
active deciders only, and the hypothetical choices confirm that WTP is significantly lower
for the active deciders than for the passive participants (compare regression (4)). WTP
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of the active deciders is at $30.30 for basic, $48.91 for enhanced and $63.33 for premium
coverage in the hypothetical choices which is much closer to actual market behavior.
Therefore, welfare estimates on the introduction of Medicare Part D based on the active
deciders only will significantly underestimate welfare for the whole potential market.
Table 5.9 shows the MNL estimates of the real market decisions of the active deciders.
WTP estimated from the decisions of the active deciders is insignificant for prescription
drug insurance per se (compare Table 5.8). Consumers are willing to pay $5,19 for cover-
age without deductible and an additional $8.30 for gap coverage. These estimates seem
unreasonably low. This might be due to three reasons: First, 101 of our 469 active deciders
are consumers who decide to remain without prescription drug coverage. For this group,
WTP should be indeed below the lowest observed supply price. Second, insignificant
WTP for certain product attributes might be due to the fact that there is a high corre-
lation between attributes and prices. Third, for consumers who expect not to need any
prescription drugs and therefore have zero expected costs, WTP for insurance, whether
basic or more extensive, is either negative or insignificant. Only consumers with high drug
costs exhibit significant and positive WTP. Fourth, we observe more product attributes
in the real market than in the hypothetical market. For example, gap coverage is either
provided for generics only or for both generics and brand-name drugs (see regression (3)).
In fact, WTP for gap coverage for generics only is not significant, while it is $25.78 if both
generics and brand-name drugs are covered. Further, consumers’ WTP is lower for plans
with drug tiers and higher for plans with a mail-order option, and WTP decreases for each
top 100 drug that is either uncovered or only covered after authorization (See regression
(4)). We will mitigate the outlined shortcomings of a separate analysis of hypothetical
and real choices by estimating a joint model using both types of data.
As described in section 5.5, combining stated and revealed preference models allows us
first, to make use of the whole potential market, second, to create variation in attributes
through the hypothetical choice experiments and third, to base respondents’ decisions in
reality by using the real choices of the active deciders. As described in section 5.5, we
can use a nested logit model in order to allow for different scale factors in the stated and
revealed preference model (see Table 5.10). We restrict the scale parameter of the real
choices to be one. Stata does not report the scale parameter itself, but the dissimilarity
parameter 1/λ. First, note that the estimate of the hypothetical relative to the real
dissimililarity parameter is equal to 0.72. As we can reject the hypothesis that it is
equal to unity (unity lies outside of the confidence interval), we can reject that the scale
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parameters and therefore the unobserved variances in our real and hypothetical choices
are equal.
1/λSP
1/λRP
= λRP/λSP = 0.72, (5.14)
and
σ2SP
σ2RP
=
[
1/λSP
1/λRP
]2
= 0.722 ≈ 0.52. (5.15)
Therefore, the variance of the hypothetical data is about 52 percent of the variance of the
real preference data.
Estimated WTP from the combined choices is at $35.39 for the Part D standard plan,
$51.84 for enhanced and $72.39 for premium coverage. Note that these estimates are on
the one hand much more sensible than the unreasonably low estimates from consumers’
real choices. This might be due to the variation in the premia which we created in our
experiment. On the other hand, they are somewhat lower than the estimates from the
hypothetical choices. Therefore, combining real and stated preference data can help re-
searchers to make more reasonable predictions on how consumer welfare has been affected
by a policy change. Further, we can include consumer groups in our analysis whose ac-
tual choices cannot be observed, but who have still been affected by the reform. This is
especially important when we want to take into account the effect of socio-economic char-
acteristics on demand, because taking the whole market into consideration, we observe
much more variation in these characteristics. Both make our results more generalizable
in order to predict the effect of policy changes in other markets.
5.7 Conclusion
This essay has contributed to the discussion about Medicare Part D by using a hypo-
thetical choice experiment that was conducted using a random sample of the relevant
population to analyze consumer demand. Thus, the whole potential market has been
included in the analysis instead of restricting the focus to a small group of consumers
whose actual choices we can observe, the so-called active deciders.
We have found that willingness-to-pay for drug insurance is low for consumers with either
low expected drug costs or low income. By contrast, consumers demand extensive coverage
if they are currently in poor health, expect high future drug costs, but also if they are
risk averse. With the exception of drug costs, none of these variables prove significant
when using the actual decisions of the active deciders only, because this group is too
homogenous in their characteristics.
5 What if everybody had a choice? 131
Further, demand for prescription drugs differs significantly between the active deciders
and other consumer groups who have also been affected by the reform. WTP of the
passive participants is significantly higher than that of the active deciders. Therefore,
welfare estimates of the introduction of Medicare Part D taking into account the active
deciders only might be too low.
As we observe actual choices for one group of consumers, we have estimated a joint
model using both real and hypothetical choices, thereby making use of the strengths and
mitigating the weaknesses of both types of data. The estimates of WTP of the joint model
seem to be most realistic regarding the prices we actually observe in the market.
So far, hypothetical choice experiments have mainly been used to create variation in
product attributes. We want to draw attention to the fact that they can be used to elicit
the demand of consumer groups whose choices cannot be observed in the actual market.
This becomes important when making predictions about the impacts of policy changes,
especially when we want to analyze how demand is affected by consumers’ socio-economic
conditions.
As lessons from the introduction of Medicare Part D will be crucial both for deciding
whether to introduce universal health care in the USA and for the design of social in-
surance programs in other countries, analyzing how consumers behave in this market is
highly policy relevant. There has been substantial debate on the question whether the
U.S. government should have engaged itself further in individuals’ health care decision,
both in a regulatory and a financial way. Therefore, researchers have been interested
how consumers’ welfare has been affected by the introduction of Medicare Part D. In
particular, it is important to find out whether the most vulnerable groups of consumers
have been reached by the reform. Our findings can help to make the findings from the
literature more generalizable to other populations and markets, because we do not restrict
our focus to a small group of consumers.
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5.8 Appendix
5.8.1 The RPS hypothetical choice experiments
In 2006, the introduction for individuals without prescription drug coverage was:
“At the end of this year, you will be able to make new choices about your prescription
drug coverage for the next year.”
The introduction for those with Part D plans (whether stand-alone or HMO/ Medi-
care+Choice) was:
“At the end of this year, you will be able to make new choices about your prescription
drug coverage for the next year. You may stay in your current plan, you may switch
to another plan, or you may even elect to unsubscribe and not select any plan.”
The introduction for those covered through their employer or union, the Veterans Admin-
istration, private insurance or some other source was:
“Even though you have prescription drug insurance from other sources, we would
like to know what your choices would be if the only coverage you could get would be
through a Part D plan.”
The second part of the introduction was then the same for everybody:
“We are now going to show you some plans that have realistic features and premiums.
We are interested in what plan you would choose if these were your only options.
Specifically, on each of the following pages we will show you three plans that differ
in coverage and premiums.
On each page, please report which of these options is the most attractive and which
is the least attractive. You will always have the option to choose none of these
three plans and thus have no prescription drug coverage (but then you would have
to pay higher premiums if you enroll later, according to current Medicare Part D
regulations.”
The actual choice task was as follows:
“Please consider a situation in which you would have no prescription drug coverage
from any other source. Imagine that these were the only three prescription drug
plans that you could choose from. You can also choose not to have coverage at all.”
• Basic Plan premium: $ PBi This plan covers all prescription drugs you currently
use and most of what you might need in the future. It has a deductible of $250, pays
75 percent of costs above $250 up to $2250, provides no additional benefit until costs
reach $5100, and pays 95 percent of costs above that level.
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• Enhanced Plan premium: $ PEi This plan is equivalent to the Basic Plan but
has no deductible. This means that the 75 percent coverage begins at the first dollar
you spend on prescription drugs, up to $2250. Like the Basic Plan, there are no
additional benefits until costs reach $5100. The Enhanced Plan pays 95 percent of
costs above that level.
• Premier plan premium: $ PPi This plan is equivalent to the Enhanced Plan, but
is does not impose a coverage gap between $2250 and $5100. So it pays 75 percent
of all costs up to $5100 and for 95 percent above that amount.
• No prescription drug insurance at all.
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Table 5.3: Variable description and descriptive statistics
No Part D Part D Private Employer Veterans
coverage stand-alone HMO
Observations 94 352 226 83 573 139
share 6.06% 22.68% 14.56% 5.35% 36.92% 8.96%
Total drug costs in $ (2005)
mean 1411.29 2766.98 2517.73 3268.08 2390.29 2908.36
1st quartile 0.00 834.99 685.39 1110.94 690.91 1204.36
median 93.79 1989.67 1567.16 2246.36 1878.80 2424.45
3rd quartile 1492.48 3335.78 3272.15 4056.73 3373.03 3940.83
Drug costs (2005)
costs=0 39.36% 9.94% 14.60% 3.61% 11.34% 3.60%
0<costs<=250 15.96% 6.53% 7.08% 8.43% 7.16% 6.47%
250<costs<=1000 9.57% 8.81% 11.50% 10.84% 9.77% 10.07%
1000<costs<=2250 20.21% 32.39% 30.53% 27.71% 29.49% 23.02%
2250<costs<=5100 8.51% 29.26% 24.34% 33.73% 31.24% 43.17%
costs>5100 6.38% 13.07% 11.95% 15.66% 10.99% 13.67%
Number of prescriptions (2005)
0 38.30% 9.94% 14.60% 3.61% 11.17% 3.60%
1 to 2 34.04% 29.26% 30.09% 28.92% 26.18% 20.86%
3+ 27.66% 60.80% 55.31% 67.47% 62.65% 75.54%
Number of prescriptions (2006)
0 31.51% 7.05% 10.84% 5.33% 7.97% 7.09%
1 to 2 36.99% 31.54% 29.06% 32.00% 29.48% 26.77%
3+ 31.51% 61.41% 60.10% 62.67% 62.55% 66.14%
Self reported health (2005)
excellent 20.21% 6.55% 8.41% 2.41% 6.46% 2.16%
(very) good 62.77% 72.93% 65.93% 75.90% 74.69% 71.94%
poor/fair 17.02% 20.51% 25.66% 21.69% 18.85% 25.90%
Self reported health (2006)
excellent 14.89% 5.68% 6.19% 3.61% 6.11% 4.32%
(very) good 69.15% 73.86% 69.91% 73.49% 73.12% 71.22%
poor/fair 15.96% 20.45% 23.89% 22.89% 20.77% 24.46%
Age group (2006)
<=70 32.98% 42.90% 34.51% 22.89% 42.06% 30.94%
70<age<=75 42.55% 24.72% 34.07% 27.71% 25.65% 31.65%
>75 24.47% 32.39% 31.42% 49.40% 32.29% 37.41%
Gender
male 35.11% 38.64% 32.30% 45.78% 42.58% 92.09%
female 64.89% 61.36% 67.70% 54.22% 57.42% 7.91%
Educational level
more than high school 38.30% 42.33% 38.94% 53.01% 53.23% 43.17%
high school or less 61.70% 57.67% 61.06% 46.99% 46.77% 56.83%
Income
<=20K 30.85% 28.41% 36.73% 21.69% 12.04% 30.22%
20K-60K 58.51% 55.97% 48.23% 59.04% 63.00% 56.83%
>60K 10.64% 15.63% 15.04% 19.28% 24.96% 12.95%
Risk
pay less than expected value 59.34% 52.03% 54.17% 55.42% 51.78% 52.94%
pay expected value 19.78% 22.38% 14.81% 22.89% 19.57% 19.12%
pay more than expected value 20.88% 25.58% 31.02% 21.69% 28.65% 27.94%
Hypotheticals: preferred plan
no coverage 49.45% 13.45% 12.27% 16.46% 9.11% 17.91%
basic 10.99% 23.10% 21.82% 12.66% 11.79% 17.91%
enhanced 25.27% 36.26% 31.82% 18.99% 35.54% 25.37%
premium 14.29% 27.19% 34.09% 51.90% 43.57% 38.81%
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Table 5.4: Prescription drug coverage among Medicare beneficiaries in 2006
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Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics by consumer group
No Part D Part D Private Employer Veterans
coverage stand-alone HMO
Observations 94 352 226 83 573 139
share 6.06% 22.68% 14.56% 5.35% 36.92% 8.96%
Total drug costs in $ (2005)
mean 1411.29 2766.98 2517.73 3268.08 2390.29 2908.36
1st quartile 0.00 834.99 685.39 1110.94 690.91 1204.36
median 93.79 1989.67 1567.16 2246.36 1878.80 2424.45
3rd quartile 1492.48 3335.78 3272.15 4056.73 3373.03 3940.83
Drug costs (2005)
costs=0 39.36% 9.94% 14.60% 3.61% 11.34% 3.60%
0<costs<=250 15.96% 6.53% 7.08% 8.43% 7.16% 6.47%
250<costs<=1000 9.57% 8.81% 11.50% 10.84% 9.77% 10.07%
1000<costs<=2250 20.21% 32.39% 30.53% 27.71% 29.49% 23.02%
2250<costs<=5100 8.51% 29.26% 24.34% 33.73% 31.24% 43.17%
costs>5100 6.38% 13.07% 11.95% 15.66% 10.99% 13.67%
Number of prescriptions (2005)
0 38.30% 9.94% 14.60% 3.61% 11.17% 3.60%
1 to 2 34.04% 29.26% 30.09% 28.92% 26.18% 20.86%
3+ 27.66% 60.80% 55.31% 67.47% 62.65% 75.54%
Number of prescriptions (2006)
0 31.51% 7.05% 10.84% 5.33% 7.97% 7.09%
1 to 2 36.99% 31.54% 29.06% 32.00% 29.48% 26.77%
3+ 31.51% 61.41% 60.10% 62.67% 62.55% 66.14%
Self reported health (2005)
excellent 20.21% 6.55% 8.41% 2.41% 6.46% 2.16%
(very) good 62.77% 72.93% 65.93% 75.90% 74.69% 71.94%
poor/fair 17.02% 20.51% 25.66% 21.69% 18.85% 25.90%
Self reported health (2006)
excellent 14.89% 5.68% 6.19% 3.61% 6.11% 4.32%
(very) good 69.15% 73.86% 69.91% 73.49% 73.12% 71.22%
poor/fair 15.96% 20.45% 23.89% 22.89% 20.77% 24.46%
Age group (2006)
<=70 32.98% 42.90% 34.51% 22.89% 42.06% 30.94%
70<age<=75 42.55% 24.72% 34.07% 27.71% 25.65% 31.65%
>75 24.47% 32.39% 31.42% 49.40% 32.29% 37.41%
Gender
male 35.11% 38.64% 32.30% 45.78% 42.58% 92.09%
female 64.89% 61.36% 67.70% 54.22% 57.42% 7.91%
Educational level
more than high school 38.30% 42.33% 38.94% 53.01% 53.23% 43.17%
high school or less 61.70% 57.67% 61.06% 46.99% 46.77% 56.83%
Income
<=20K 30.85% 28.41% 36.73% 21.69% 12.04% 30.22%
20K-60K 58.51% 55.97% 48.23% 59.04% 63.00% 56.83%
>60K 10.64% 15.63% 15.04% 19.28% 24.96% 12.95%
Risk
pay less than expected value 59.34% 52.03% 54.17% 55.42% 51.78% 52.94%
pay expected value 19.78% 22.38% 14.81% 22.89% 19.57% 19.12%
pay more than expected value 20.88% 25.58% 31.02% 21.69% 28.65% 27.94%
Hypotheticals: preferred plan
no coverage 49.45% 13.45% 12.27% 16.46% 9.11% 17.91%
basic 10.99% 23.10% 21.82% 12.66% 11.79% 17.91%
enhanced 25.27% 36.26% 31.82% 18.99% 35.54% 25.37%
premium 14.29% 27.19% 34.09% 51.90% 43.57% 38.81%
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Medicaid State Part D Other Total
program unspecified source 
Observations 49 18 14 21 1569.00
share 3.16% 1.16% 0.90% 1.35% 1.00
Total drug costs in $ (2005)
mean 3383.00 3526.57 1340.41 1851.85 2554.30
1st quartile 1110.94 685.39 122.77 93.79 685.39
median 2726.72 1388.86 898.17 1602.46 1878.80
3rd quartile 5109.45 4797.22 1574.03 2674.51 3338.37
Drug costs (2005)
costs=0 16.33% 5.56% 21.43% 23.81% 12.43%
0<costs<=250 2.04% 11.11% 7.14% 14.29% 7.52%
250<costs<=1000 2.04% 11.11% 21.43% 4.76% 9.69%
1000<costs<=2250 16.33% 27.78% 42.86% 23.81% 28.68%
2250<costs<=5100 36.73% 27.78% 0.00% 23.81% 29.38%
costs>5100 26.53% 16.67% 7.14% 9.52% 12.30%
Number of prescriptions (2005)
0 16.33% 5.56% 21.43% 23.81% 12.30%
1 to 2 8.16% 33.33% 35.71% 28.57% 27.21%
3+ 75.51% 61.11% 42.86% 47.62% 60.48%
Number of prescriptions (2006)
0 15.22% 0.00% 11.11% 26.32% 9.65%
1 to 2 13.04% 12.50% 44.44% 21.05% 29.39%
3+ 71.74% 87.50% 44.44% 52.63% 60.96%
Self reported health (2005)
excellent 2.08% 0.00% 7.14% 9.52% 6.83%
(very) good 41.67% 55.56% 85.71% 80.95% 71.09%
poor/fair 56.25% 44.44% 7.14% 9.52% 22.08%
Self reported health (2006)
excellent 2.04% 5.56% 0.00% 9.52% 6.12%
(very) good 55.10% 50.00% 85.71% 80.95% 71.83%
poor/fair 42.86% 44.44% 14.29% 9.52% 22.05%
Age group (2006)
<=70 48.98% 22.22% 35.71% 28.57% 38.37%
70<age<=75 30.61% 33.33% 21.43% 14.29% 28.36%
>75 20.41% 44.44% 42.86% 57.14% 33.27%
Gender
male 42.86% 27.78% 28.57% 42.86% 44.04%
female 57.14% 72.22% 71.43% 57.14% 55.96%
Educational level
more than high school 36.73% 33.33% 35.71% 28.57% 45.70%
high school or less 53.27% 66.67% 64.29% 71.43% 54.30%
Income
<=20K 61.22% 61.11% 28.57% 33.33% 25.05%
20K-60K 32.65% 38.89% 57.14% 47.62% 56.79%
>60K 6.12% 0.00% 14.29% 19.05% 18.16%
Risk
pay less than expected value 58.33% 58.82% 57.14% 42.86% 53.13%
pay expected value 22.92% 17.65% 14.29% 23.81% 19.78%
pay more than expected value 18.75% 23.53% 28.57% 33.33% 27.09%
Hypotheticals: preferred plan
no coverage 16.33% 5.88% 14.29% 26.32% 14.56%
basic 32.65% 11.76% 42.86% 26.32% 17.44%
enhanced 24.49% 23.53% 28.57% 36.84% 32.26%
premium 26.53% 58.82% 14.29% 10.53% 35.74%
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Table 5.6: Market shares and premia of prescription drug plans in hypothetical and real choices
in 2006
Monthly premia in $
Hypothetical market Basic Enhanced Premium
First choice Fixed premium 30.79 37.88 50.33
Second and third choice Lowest premium 15.39 18.94 25.16
Highest premium 40.02 49.25 65.43
Real market Basic Enhanced Generics Generics and Brand
All available plans (Average premia) 30.75 37.92 48.13 61.88
Plans actually chosen in the RPS (Average) 17.00 26.60 46.10 60.80
Market shares in percent
Hypothetical Market Basic Enhanced Premium
All respondents 20.0 31.9 48.2
Only those with Part D 22.4 31.6 46.0
First choice All respondents 20.4 37.8 41.8
Only those with Part D 26.7 41.9 31.4
Prediction (Price available plans) All respondents 20.1 32.0 45.7 *
Prediction (Price chosen plans) All respondents 24.8 37.0 38.1 *
Prediction (Price available plans) Only those with Part D 22.8 31.8 45.4 *
Prediction (Price chosen plans) Only those with Part D 30.9 38.8 30.3 *
Real Market Generics Generics and Brand
All available plans 2006 34.0 50.6 12.9 2.5
Plans actually chosen in the RPS 36.3 54.3 4.8 4.6
* Price is the weighted sum of generics and generics and brand coverage, with the weights given by the market shares
Source: The prices and market shares of supplied plans are taken from Heiss, McFadden, Winter (2009)
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Table 5.7: Multinomial logit analysis of hypothetical choices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Plan attributes
Reference group: no coverage
Premium -0.0263*** -0.0286*** -0.0298*** -0.0301*** -0.0311***
Insurance 1.100*** 1.233*** 1.487*** 0.913*** 1.256***
No deductible 0.652*** 0.766*** 0.618*** 0.561*** 0.459**
Gap coverage 0.730*** 0.435*** 0.384*** 0.435*** 0.200
Real coverage
Reference group: active deciders
Passive x insurance 0.456*** 0.413**
Passive x no deductible 0.249* 0.230
Passive x gap coverage 0.324*** 0.262**
2005 drug costs
Reference group: medium drug costs
No costs x insurance -0.571*** -0.604*** -0.581***
No costs x no deductible -0.603*** -0.593*** -0.580***
No costs x gap coverage 0.186 0.185 0.200
High costs x insurance 0.149 0.195 0.193
High costs x no deductible 0.102 0.174 0.170
High costs x gap coverage 0.472*** 0.406*** 0.400***
Socio-economic variables
Female x insurance -0.123 -0.107
Female x no deductible 0.160 0.167
Female x gap coverage -0.112 -0.110
Low income x insurance -0.223 -0.197
Low income x no deductible -0.245* -0.227
Low income x gap coverage -0.239* -0.219*
Higher education x insurance -0.116 -0.144
Higher education x no deductible 0.0652 0.0532
Higher education x gap coverage 0.136 0.122
SHRS poor/fair x insurance -0.116 -0.151
SHRS poor/fair x no deductible -0.170 -0.182
SHRS poor/fair x gap coverage 0.381*** 0.371***
Age > 75 x insurance -0.0322 -0.0352
Age > 75 x no deductible 0.116 0.118
Age > 75 x gap coverage -0.111 -0.108
Risk averse x insurance 0.100 0.114
Risk averse x no deductible 0.223 0.228
Risk averse x gap coverage 0.333*** 0.334***
Observations 6262 4604 4531 4604 4531
* denotes p<.1, ** denotes p<.05, and *** denotes p<.01 for a two-sided t-test (clustering by respondent)
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Table 5.8: Willingness-to-pay for insurance attributes by consumer group
Insurance No deductible Gap coverage
Hypothetical choices
Basic MNL 41.80*** 24.77*** 27.75***
Passive 45.41*** 26.88*** 25.16***
Active 30.30*** 18.61*** 14.42***
Real choices
Basic MNL 0.91 5.19*** 8.30***
Combined model
Nested logit 35.39*** 16.45*** 20.55***
* denotes p<.1, ** denotes p<.05, and *** denotes p<.01 for a two-sided t-test.
Table 5.9: Multinomial logit analysis of revealed choices
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Table 5.10: Nested logit analysis of combined stated and revealed choices
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